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1 Learning from History
If men could learn from history, what lessons it might teach us! 
But passion and party blind our eyes, and the light which experi-
ence gives is a lantern on the stern, which shines only on the waves 
behind us. 
(Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 1831)1
In 2003, shortly after the beginning of the Iraq War, British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair arrived at the United States Congress to raptur-
ous applause. At the end of a standing ovation he began a speech 
in which he announced that the use of history in developing for-
eign policy was defunct. For him, at the beginning of what would 
become the most controversial and criticised war of a generation, 
there had never been a time when ‘a study of history provides so 
little instruction for our present day’.2 
It was not long after this speech that Iraq descended into post-
war chaos and accusations of blame for the disastrous events 
emerged. Historians and commentators quickly asked how, given 
Britain had so much experience in Iraq, had policy-makers got 
post-war planning so wrong? Britain had been responsible for the 
founding of the state of Iraq in 1919 and established its Hashemite 
monarchy. It had governed the country under a League of Nations 
mandate until 1932 and maintained close links throughout the 
twentieth century: intervening against a coup in 1941, maintaining 
military occupation until 1947, keeping the country as a satellite 
state until 1958 and intervening again in 1991. How then, with all 
of the lessons of history at its disposal, had the government failed 
to understand the complexities of governing the Iraqi nation? The 
accusation was soon made that British policy-makers had failed to 
learn the lessons of history.
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Despite Tony Blair’s statement to Congress, the government 
quickly searched for ways to counteract the allegations that it had 
not learned from the past. A fl urry of reports were produced to 
demonstrate to the public that lessons were at least being identi-
fi ed from the Iraq operation. As the 20th Armoured Brigade low-
ered the mission fl ag in Basra, Whitehall discussed culminating 
their efforts with a public inquiry. By the summer of 2009 the Iraq 
Inquiry had been announced under the Chairmanship of Sir John 
Chilcot. The inquiry was given the specifi c objective of determin-
ing lessons for the future:
Our terms of reference are very broad . . . to establish, as accurately 
as possible, what happened and to identify the lessons that can be 
learned. Those lessons will help ensure that, if we face similar situa-
tions in future, the government of the day is best equipped to respond 
to those situations in the most effective manner in the best interests 
of the country.3
Initially, the inquiry seemed promising, with the pledge of full gov-
ernment cooperation and the power to call the highest echelons of 
Whitehall to the witness stand. Even the former Prime Minister, 
Tony Blair, made an appearance for public questioning; attending 
the inquiry in January 2010 and again a year later. These appear-
ances were highly anticipated with widespread media coverage 
and over-demand for seats in the hearing room leading to alloca-
tion via public ballot. They were also controversial: surrounded by 
large protests and punctuated by intermittent heckling and booing 
from the audience.
Over time, expectation dissipated. The inquiry progressed at 
a painfully slow pace, its duration being longer than that of the 
war it was investigating. It was also plagued with diffi culties. In 
particular there was continual wrangling between the inquiry and 
the Cabinet Offi ce over what information could be released to the 
public, with the inquiry succumbing to Cabinet Offi ce demands to 
restrict the release of letters between Tony Blair and the American 
President George W. Bush. Furthermore, politicians were accused 
of delaying tactics through the ‘Maxwellisation’ process, allow-
ing those facing criticism in its report the right of response before 
publication.4
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Nonetheless, whilst the seven-year inquiry continued, politi-
cians were increasingly keen to stress that lessons from Iraq had 
been learned. Such lessons were regular rationale for foreign pol-
icy decisions, including Britain’s response to the Arab Spring and 
the 2011 crisis in Libya. The shadow of lessons from Iraq also 
lingered over two crucial parliamentary votes on action in Syria, in 
2013 and 2015, and impacted the approach to tackling the threat 
of Daesh. In 2014, Prime Minister David Cameron addressed the 
United Nations (UN) Assembly on the plans to defeat the extremist 
group. Purporting the opposite view to Tony Blair a decade before, 
he stated that history, in particular the lessons from the Iraq War, 
was a vital consideration in the creation of current policy: ‘it is 
absolutely right that we should learn the lessons of the past, espe-
cially of what happened in Iraq a decade ago’.5 However, details 
surrounding the claims to have learned lessons remain distinctly 
hazy; who is learning what lessons, how and for how long, are 
unknown. This book examines these questions to uncover whether 
the British government learns from past interventions in the Mid-
dle East. In so doing it will explore both the criticism that Britain 
does not learn from its past, as well as scrutinising the contradict-
ing claims made by politicians that lessons have been learned. It 
does so at a decisive moment, as the continued threat of Daesh, 
instability in Libya, regional boycotting of Qatar, concerns over 
the regime in Turkey and ongoing confl ict in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, 
Israel and Palestine all ensure that the possibility of further British 
intervention in the region remains a contemporary and conten-
tious reality, where lessons from the past could prove invaluable 
for shaping the future.
Learning from History in Whitehall
The debate about the role of history, evidenced by the opposing 
views of Blair and Cameron, is not new. Between the mid-1950s 
and the late 1970s a debate emerged amongst key historians as to 
whether history should be used within the development of policy. 
This debate came to fruition as the writing of the wartime offi cial 
histories began to draw to a close and consideration was given to 
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the future of the project. The discussions reignited a wider debate 
of whether history was a useful policy-making tool; did history 
provide lessons and could or should they be used in the creation 
of British policy?
Whilst the prominent historians Sir Geoffrey Elton and A. J. P. 
Taylor fi ercely disagreed with the idea that history provided les-
sons, an alternative perspective was beginning to gather pace, 
pushed forward by historians including Allan Bullock, Marga-
ret Gowing, William Keith Hancock and Michael Lee.6 Instead, 
they urged for the increased use of history within Whitehall 
and accused policy-makers of ‘a lack of historical depth’.7 This 
view built upon a long-standing historical tradition; Thucydides 
wrote his History of the Peloponnesian War, recounting the war 
between Sparta and Athens in the fi fth century bc, in order to 
inform policy-makers of the future. He stated the writing was 
for ‘those who want to understand clearly the events which hap-
pened in the past, and which (human nature being what it is) will, 
at some time or other and in much the same way, be repeated 
in the future’.8 This has become a fundamental assumption of 
social scientists who emphasise the importance of understanding 
past political and international relations phenomena in order to 
inform current decisions and, taking the argument even further, 
to form theoretical positions to provide a predictive function for 
the future through inductive reasoning.
In fact, a few Whitehall departments invested in the notion of 
learning from history throughout the twentieth century. Following 
the end of the First World War, a number of international history 
and international relations chairs were introduced to universities, 
often under the title of ‘Peace Studies’. These were funded by the 
government to encourage the study of the First World War and to 
consider how lessons could be learned from the events to prevent 
war in the future. 
Similarly, the civil service placed signifi cant emphasis on the 
importance of historical knowledge in its entrance examination 
and the study of history was considered one of the recognised 
roads to the higher ranks within the service. In 1946 A. L. Rowse 
argued that the work of the civil service was ‘for the most part 
concerned with nothing so pure and abstract as mathematics, but 
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with the administration of human affairs . . . for which the appro-
priate background and training are provided by history’.9
Government also invested in the production of Whitehall offi cial 
histories. These began under the Committee of the Imperial Defence 
(CID), the forerunner of the Cabinet Offi ce. The CID’s Historical 
Section was started in 1908 to compile the military history of Britain 
and to learn lessons from the Boer and Russo-Japanese Wars. In 
1939, when the CID lapsed, the Historical Section became the 
responsibility of the Cabinet Offi ce and in 1941 it was tasked with 
the preparation and publication of the Offi cial History of the Sec-
ond World War from a military, intelligence and civil perspective. 
The aim of this was to record ‘experience for government use’ in the 
event of another war.10 The focus upon offi cial histories has been 
supported by a series of Public Record Acts – beginning in 1958, 
amended in 1966, again in 2000 with the Freedom of Information 
Act and most recently in 2010 with the Constitutional Reform and 
Governance Act – to establish a public record closure period but 
also requiring departments to adopt more methodical procedures 
for processing and preserving records of historical value.
In 1957, the year after the Suez debacle, the Cabinet Secretary, 
Norman Brook, invested further funding to encourage all White-
hall departments to follow this lead and use history more system-
atically in their everyday work. When Brook’s initiative was taken 
to the Foreign Offi ce Steering Committee in April 1958 it pro-
duced a positive response. A background paper, written by the 
Head of the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department, revealed 
support for learning from history:
Looking back can be a salutary exercise. If we could spare the time or 
the staff we should probably derive great benefi t from examining in 
retrospect the accuracy of the information on which policy was based 
and the correctness of the conclusions drawn from it . . . past experi-
ence can be a useful guide to recurrent problems.11
In addition, in 1964 Lord Plowden’s ‘Report on Representational 
Services Overseas’ emphasised the use of historians by stating 
‘Full use should be made of their services by executive depart-
ments so as to ensure that action on current problems is not taken 
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in ignorance of the lessons of the past.’12 Then, in 1966, Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson agreed to extend the offi cial histories to 
the examination of events during peacetime; a programme which 
continues today. 
However, despite these many endeavours to learn from history 
there have equally been many failures, omissions and diffi cul-
ties. The investment in university chairs or recruitment of history 
graduates has not always equated to the consideration of lessons 
from history in the policy-making process. Instead, relationships 
between Whitehall and academia have always been encouraged 
but diffi cult, for a number of reasons.13 For history graduates the 
pressures of the civil service can often overcome their historical 
dispositions and policy-making is a complex process where the 
lessons of history form only part of the consideration in any deci-
sion-making. Furthermore, there is now a much wider range of 
disciplines considered for entry and promotion within the civil 
service. In the Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce (FCO), for 
example, the subject of law has become increasingly of interest 
but applications are accepted from all disciplines.14 
The offi cial histories have also been limited and received criti-
cism for being both time-consuming and expensive. When, in 
1957, the Select Committee on Estimates examined the cost of 
producing the offi cial histories it reported losses of £15,000 on 
the publication costs of the civil histories and £11,000 on military 
histories, in addition to the £79,517 paid in salaries to historians 
that year. This was not portrayed positively in the media and led 
to wider criticisms of the programme including in relation to the 
duplication of work and the occupation of valuable premises in 
Westminster.15 
The selection process of offi cial histories has also seemed limited; 
a shortlist of topics were to be prepared by an interdepartmental 
committee based on the criteria of presenting the British case of 
events, usefulness and, crucially, avoiding matters of controversy 
which may have party political or foreign policy implications. As 
a result, the offi cial histories which were produced took the form 
of a narrative and, aware of their publication for a wider audience, 
offered little criticism or clear identifi cation of lessons for the future. 
Each history was also agreed by a group of Privy Counsellors and 
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the Prime Minister And all offi cial histories, as with all documents 
released by the government for public consumption, were ‘weeded’ 
to ensure no harm could be done to British interests or offence 
given to other governments or political leaders. For this reason the 
fi ve-volume diplomatic history of the Second World War, written 
by Llewellyn Woodward, was only published over a decade after 
completion.16 
As a combination of the selection and weeding processes, there 
were accusations – including from A. J. P. Taylor – that the offi -
cial histories merely served as a propaganda tool. Rather than 
providing a reliable account of history, from which useful lessons 
could be drawn, the series presented a one-sided view to vindicate 
the actions of the British government.17 Even worse, some media 
reports suggested ‘calculated inaccuracy’ and pointed to the con-
cealment of sources.18 
Woodward’s heavyweight history also illustrated another fun-
damental problem with the offi cial histories; they were often too 
long and unwieldy to ever be read by even the most interested 
of parties. For busy Whitehall staff the opportunity to read such 
histories, and attempt to learn lessons from them, was minimal. 
As a result, the offi cial histories were underutilised and became 
increasingly expensive. Even the 1957 history funding experience 
put forward by the Cabinet Secretary proved largely unsuccessful; 
few government departments took up the mantle, with many cit-
ing the lack of resource as a fundamental barrier. 
By 1976 the Treasury’s history department was closed. In 
response to the closure, in a 1978 lecture, the former Treasury 
historian Margaret Gowing explained the lack of history within 
Whitehall. She advised that even though central government 
employed nearly 18,000 scientists and engineers and 900 social 
scientists, it employed only a handful of historians and histori-
cal courses were not included in the syllabus of the Civil Service 
College: ‘Historical knowledge, it seems, is not a necessity but a 
luxury.’ She found this incredible:
But why, if the status and usefulness of historical knowledge are so 
high, is there so little use of it in central and local government? Since 
the machinery of government is reorganised so often and ministers, 
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civil servants and policies are so ephemeral, surely a collective mem-
ory is required? Surely governments need to understand the complex 
roots of policies and problems? Surely analysis of past experience 
should be fed back into the system?19
Politicians Learning from History
As the ultimate policy decision-makers, with government depart-
ments acting as the advisor and implementer, the ability of poli-
ticians to learn from history can counteract any of Whitehall’s 
historical failings and provide some credence to the contemporary 
claims of having learned lessons. Many key politicians throughout 
the twentieth century have been interested in history, following a 
long tradition of Greeks, Romans and men of the Renaissance 
who read history not for pleasure but for practical benefi t. This 
is because history has always, as John Tusa argues, provided a 
useful tool for policy-makers confronted by the challenges of 
uncertainty by offering a pattern from which to draw answers: 
‘The truth is that outlines of an answer are far more likely to 
lie in historical examination of the past than wholly unfounded 
speculation of the future.’20 For politicians, therefore, history pro-
vides a useful road map. In fact, history was the favourite reading 
of Napoleon, Lloyd George, Hitler and Sir Winston Churchill. 
Churchill, who declared ‘Personally I’m always ready to learn, 
although I do not always like to be taught’, believed in the ben-
efi ts of the lessons of the past for informing policy and famously 
stated ‘The farther backward you can look, the farther forward 
you are likely to see.’21 More recently a number of politicians, 
including Paddy Ashdown, William Hague and Boris Johnson, 
have also published their own history books.22 
One regular use of history by politicians is through analogy, 
which is widely used within both policy decision-making and policy 
rhetoric.23 The most commonly used analogy throughout the twen-
tieth and early twenty-fi rst centuries was that of ‘appeasement’ or 
‘Munich’, with many aggressive dictators compared to Hitler or 
Mussolini.24 Both Anthony Eden and Harold Macmillan used this 
analogy in their analysis of Colonel Nasser’s nationalisation of 
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the Suez Canal. Margaret Thatcher compared General Leopoldo 
Galtieri’s attack on the Falkland Islands and Saddam Hussein’s 1990 
invasion of Kuwait to the Anschluss.25 The analogy was similarly 
echoed by Tony Blair in relation to Slobodan Milosevic over Kosovo 
and the dictatorial rule of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003.26 How-
ever, this use of history has two key failings. Firstly, analogies provide 
a shortcut to rationality, offering a simplifi ed overview of a historical 
event. At times when politicians are working under extreme pres-
sures the analogy handily reduces a complex and nuanced historical 
event to a mere sound bite or one sentence overview; hence the les-
son of ‘Munich’ has become that all foreign acts of aggression must 
be met immediately with military might.27 Again, this is often used in 
an attempt to provide a predictive function or even to offer a form of 
evidence to reinforce pre-existing ideas about how to manage a situ-
ation. Either way, this single-minded and simplifi ed view would not 
be one accepted by many historians as a lesson from history. 
Secondly, analogies are often retrospectively applied as rhetor-
ical support for policy decisions and not used within the policy-
making discussion itself. In this way analogies, and history, 
provide politicians with support for the presentation of policy 
to the public, rather than in its creation. Arthur Schlesinger, 
on reviewing Ernest May’s book ‘Lessons’ of the Past, claimed 
‘The past is an enormous grab bag with a prize for everybody. 
The issue of history as rationalization somewhat diminishes the 
force of the argument that history is per se a powerful formal 
determinant of policy.’28 Following 9/11 a plethora of analo-
gies were drawn by policy-makers as rationale for policy.29 This 
has led Andrew Mumford to conclude that the use of analogy 
shifted away from a tool of using history to help decision-
making to one of abusing history for ideologically informed pol-
icy justifi cation.30
Learning from the History of Military Interventions
Learning from history can be utilised by policy-makers across 
government – both politicians and civil servants – but this book 
will specifi cally focus upon learning from history in military 
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interventions. Whilst many Whitehall departments are involved 
in these forms of intervention abroad they are primarily man-
aged through the Prime Minister’s Offi ce (No10), FCO, Ministry 
of Defence (MoD) and the intelligence agencies and thus these 
departments will form the prime focus of this book. 
Throughout the terms ‘Britain’ and ‘British government’ – as 
the decision-makers over British foreign and security policy – will 
be used interchangeably. In addition, for consistency, ‘the FCO’ 
will be referred to as such throughout with the term to encom-
pass both the Foreign Offi ce and Commonwealth Offi ce (which 
only merged in 1968). Similarly, although the MoD only came into 
existence in its present form in 1971 it will also be referred to as 
such throughout with the term subsuming its fi ve previously sepa-
rate departments: the Admiralty, the War Offi ce, the Air Ministry, 
the Ministry of Aviation and the Ministry of Defence itself. These 
merged in 1964 with the defence functions of the Ministry of Avia-
tion Supply absorbed in 1971, when the MoD took over respon-
sibility for supplying military aircraft and guided weapons. The 
MoD is also a duality as both a Department of State and a mili-
tary headquarters for the three services (the British Army, Royal 
Navy and Royal Air Force) therefore the work of the services will 
also be included under this heading. Furthermore, the intelligence 
community (IC) will be considered as one body because of the 
many overlaps across the relevant intelligence agencies – includ-
ing the Security Service (SS – more commonly known as MI5), the 
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS – more commonly known as MI6) 
and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) – and 
because all of the intelligence agencies are subject to the setting of 
priorities by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). As a result, the 
Defence Intelligence Service (DIS) – which although forming part 
of the MoD budget is also represented on the JIC – and the JIC’s 
supporting staff (the Joint Intelligence Organisation) – will all be 
examined as part of the IC. This will not only prevent confusion 
but will additionally overcome some of the challenges of trying to 
attribute specifi c intelligence to one particular body when these 
lines of accountability remain blurred due to secrecy.
Each of these bodies has established unique ways and means to 
try to record, manage and draw lessons from history. At the same 
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time as the Cabinet Offi ce was commissioning offi cial histories from 
external historians, the FCO and the MoD invested in permanent 
in-house historians, sometimes supported by the additional com-
missioning of works. The MoD even established independent his-
torical branches for each of its three services, with only the Army 
Historical Branch being centrally managed in the MoD since 1970. 
The work of the in-house historians was also excluded from the cen-
tralised procedure of the Cabinet Offi ce’s Historical Section – which 
was established in 1966 – allowing them greater control over the 
subjects of their histories. 
The FCO initially chose to use their in-house historians to 
focus upon the publication of Documents on British Foreign Policy 
(DBFP). This was a series of volumes featuring an edited, chrono-
logical selection of documents – considered by the historians to 
be the most important documents in the FCO archives – relating 
to British foreign policy between 1919 and 1939. This series was 
only completed in 1986. In 1973, the government announced its 
intention to publish a new collection with the aim of providing 
documents from the post-Second World War period; Documents 
on British Policy Overseas (DBPO) began with the Potsdam Con-
ference in July 1945. DBPO continues to be published today along 
thematic lines.
The focus on DBFP and DBPO meant that little was produced 
that offered an analysis of history or identifi ed lessons for the 
future. Rohan Butler, who became the senior editor of DBFP in 
1955, argued that this provided ‘a balanced view of British for-
eign policy’ and this stance continued throughout the twentieth 
century.31 Although the FCO in-house historians’ role has now 
expanded and includes additional publications across a range of 
topics – which are written as narratives and often in the form of 
much shorter essays or occasional papers – their main activity 
remains the publication of DBPO.32 
In the MoD, one maxim has always been that the military 
only study their last war and thus do poorly in the next. In fact, 
unlike in the FCO, there has been a long-standing tradition of 
both writing and teaching history across the services. The his-
torian Margaret Macmillan claims ‘Two groups in particular in 
our society have always taken history seriously as a guide. People 
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in business and in the military.’33 Unlike the FCO historians who 
were publishing for public consumption, the primary objectives 
of the historical branches within the MoD were to write classifi ed 
histories, which provided narratives of campaigns and details on 
specifi c aspects such as command structures or bases.34 However, 
these histories were often written in a functional way and were 
regularly concerned with the minutiae of a particular operation, 
not longer-term trends. In addition, subjectivity over the selec-
tion of topics remained. Sir Michael Howard noted, in a keynote 
address to the fi rst ‘Past Futures’ conference on military history at 
the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, that when he was a regi-
mental historian the role was ‘to chronicle triumphs, not disas-
ters. The purpose is morale building, not dispassionate analysis, 
which rather limits its didactic value.’35 Brigadier General Sir 
James Edmonds, the man in charge of the offi cial military histo-
ries of the First World War, felt similarly. He often stated that he 
could not provide the entire truth in an offi cial history because of 
loyalty to the service and former comrades.36
Nonetheless, teaching of military history does form part of the 
curriculum within service Staff Colleges and historical vignettes 
are included within doctrine. There is a history department at 
the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, there are opportunities 
to complete degrees in War Studies and there are many links with 
academic historians. Service specifi c publications (such as the 
British Army Review, Air Power Review and The Naval Review) 
also often include articles of historical interest whilst battlefi eld 
studies and staff rides to locations of past battles, to learn the his-
tory of an operation, have increased over the years. 
In contrast, within the IC very little has been published in terms 
of histories. Some history of intelligence during the Second World 
War has been published but many documents have remained clas-
sifi ed, exemplifi ed by reports relating to the cracking of the enigma 
code only being released to the public in 2011.37 Besides the offi cial 
history volumes on British intelligence in the Second World War 
there have only been three offi cial histories produced, all published 
within the last few years; Christopher Andrew’s history of MI5, 
Keith Jeffrey’s history of MI6 until 1949 and Michael S. Good-
man’s fi rst volume of the history of the JIC.38 This lack of published 
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history is perhaps inevitable given that it was not until 1992 that 
the name of the Head of MI5 was fi rst revealed: Stella Rimington. 
In addition, the SIS was only offi cially recognised as existing for 
the fi rst time through the words ‘There shall continue to be a Secret 
Intelligence Service’ in the Intelligence Services Act 1994. 
Instead, the IC relied upon a few, limited, internal histories but 
has not benefi ted from a British equivalent of the US Central Intel-
ligence Agency (CIA) journal Studies in Intelligence.39 A handful 
of specifi c reports have also been produced after intelligence fail-
ures, including the 1968 Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia and 
the 1973 Syrian and Egyptian attacks on Israel, in an endeavour to 
identify lessons for the future. However, unlike in the MoD, no his-
tory training programmes have existed for IC recruits. Often train-
ing has been focused upon more technical aspects, particularly for 
those starting employment at GCHQ, or the craft of intelligence 
collection, analysis and report reading. Nonetheless, as intelligence 
analysts examine current and past evidence in order to try to assess 
the present and anticipate the future course of events, there are a 
number of similarities between the approach to researching a prob-
lem and the approach of the historian. Consequently, the lessons of 
history should always be enshrined in their assessments.40 
Overall, each department has approached history, and learn-
ing from it, very differently. The question is whether any of these 
approaches have made any difference to decisions affecting inter-
ventions. 
How Do We Learn?
The study of learning is traced back to the epistemological – how 
knowledge can become known – debates of Plato and Aristotle. 
Whilst Plato had a rationalist epistemology, arguing that knowl-
edge could be discovered through self-refl ection, Aristotle had an 
empiricist approach, believing that knowledge was found externally 
through the senses. These confl icting philosophies have infl uenced 
the understanding of how we learn ever since. 
Cognitivist psychologists follow a Platonic, rationalist episte-
mology and see learning as similar to an information processing 
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model, whereby inputs are managed into short-term memory and 
coded for long-term recall.41 For cognitivists, such as Jean Piaget, 
the study of how learning occurs is the study of the internal – of 
perceptions, beliefs, desires, motivations and thought processes.42 
L. S. Vygotsky extended Piaget’s work to examine the impact of 
social interaction on learning and as a result he placed greater 
emphasis upon social factors, including the role of culture and 
language but continued to focus on internal processing.43 For cog-
nitivists, therefore, learning is defi ned as the appropriation of new 
knowledge and this knowledge does not necessarily need to be 
utilised, or observed externally, to have been learned.
On the other hand, behaviourist psychologists, such as I. P. 
Pavlov, follow the empiricist tradition and view learning as a 
refl ex to outside stimuli which may or may not be conditioned.44 
For the behaviourist psychologists Edward Thorndike and B. F. 
Skinner learning is an active process whereby an action and its 
consequences reinforce each other; behaviour followed by reward 
is repeated (positive learning), whilst behaviour which is not 
rewarded is not repeated (negative learning).45 This is known as 
operant, or instrumental, learning. Therefore, for behaviourists, 
the study of learning is about the examination of specifi c stimuli 
that change behaviour and learning itself is the gaining of knowl-
edge which affects behaviour. 
A third epistemological approach was put forward by Imman-
uel Kant who modernised the idea of rationalism and empiricism 
through the concept of ‘a priori’ knowledge.46 For him the two 
could be brought together through the understanding that experi-
ence awakens awareness of pre-existing, innate knowledge. This 
philosophy is used by constructivist psychologists who emphasise 
that learning is about actively seeking meaning through real life 
experiences in order to construct knowledge.47 This idea is used 
in theories of adult education whereby knowledge is constructed 
rather than transmitted in the manner of the education of children. 
Consequently, constructivists view learning not as defi ned by an 
effect on behaviour but by an effect on beliefs. 
In education studies, George Siemens extended the work of con-
structivist psychologists to develop a further theoretical approach 
to learning: connectivism. He argued that the digital age changed 
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the way in which learning takes place and drew upon chaos theory 
to explain that learning occurs by the connection of information. 
He argued
Learning (defi ned as actionable knowledge) can reside outside of 
ourselves (within an organization or a database), is focused on 
connecting specialized information sets, and the connections that 
enable us to learn more are more important than our current state 
of knowing.48
This theoretical approach is particularly useful for providing a 
connection between the analysis of individuals and the organ-
isational structures and systems within which knowledge can be 
found, such as digital archives.
What is Learning from History? 
The different approaches to learning mean that there is no agreed 
defi nition of learning. This book will defi ne ‘learning from his-
tory’ in the context of British interventions in the Middle East as 
‘a process which runs between the acquisition of knowledge of 
the past and its use to inform policy decisions’. In this defi nition 
learning is the action and the lesson is the object. The ‘what’ is 
learned is defi ned as ‘knowledge of the past’ and the condition of 
this knowledge being ‘of the past’ adds the specifi city of learning 
from history, rather than learning by other means such as deduc-
tive or logical reasoning. 
However, it would not be enough to defi ne learning from his-
tory as only ‘the acquisition of knowledge of the past’; this is 
history rather than learning from it. Although there is no require-
ment for this learning to have an immediate effect, what dis-
tinguishes learning from history is the use of this knowledge to 
inform policy-making; it is the utilisation of history, taking its 
understanding from the passive to the active, impacting beliefs, 
behaviour or both. Without this utilisation nothing is learned, 
it merely is and it is only once the knowledge has been used to 
inform policy decisions that a lesson can claim to have been 
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learned. This does not presume that there needs to have been a 
‘change’49 or ‘adaption’50 in policy. Whilst change or adaption 
may be one outcome of learning, existing beliefs and behaviours 
can also be confi rmed, compounded or the conclusion drawn 
that a preferable alternative does not exist leading to repetition 
or maintaining of the status quo.
The defi nition also does not include an accuracy or effi ciency 
requirement; the lesson does not have to be ‘right’, nor does it 
require that it leads to an improvement. Although a number of 
scholars provide these criteria as essential precursors to learning, 
this book assumes that learning which is considered to be ‘wrong’ 
or ineffective is still learning.51 The inclusion of such precursors is 
fraught with normative diffi culties, of judging ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ 
lessons and providing a standard measurement for assessing effi -
ciency as well as methodological challenges of assessing an effect 
upon belief systems. The position of judging right and wrong is 
also subjective in time, consequently this book seeks only to exam-
ine whether learning occurs, not to judge whether lessons were 
right or wrong.
Who Learns from History? 
The question of how learning from history occurs within mili-
tary interventions is further complicated because of the number 
of actors involved in any learning process: individuals,52 groups 
of individuals,53 generations,54 society,55 states56 and organ-
isations.57 This book will focus on the three most signifi cant 
learners for military interventions: individuals, institutions and 
generations. The state will not be examined as a ‘learner’ itself 
but instead learning will be examined at the more devolved level 
of the individuals, generations and institutions which infl uence 
the making or enacting of the foreign and security policies of 
the state.
The individual has been selected due to the impact of certain 
key individuals on the policy-making process. It will be limited 
to those who work or worked within the FCO, MoD and IC. 
The one exception will be the additional consideration of the 
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Prime Minister due to the offi ce’s infl uence and control over pol-
icy direction.58 The FCO, MoD and IC will also be considered 
learners within their own right as institutions. These institutions 
are important to examine because they defi ne the organisational 
framework and culture within which learning occurs.59 Insti-
tutions also offer the possibility for more formalised learning 
processes than those made by individuals; they can turn tacit 
lessons, or those held by individuals, into explicit lessons which 
can be shared. 
Generations will also be examined as learners. As a result of 
societal learning, generations absorb many of the most signifi -
cant values and beliefs that dominate the majority of opinion at 
a particular time.60 They provide a collective memory of lessons 
of events which were considered to be important during specifi c 
times. In addition, the comparison of learning across different 
generations allows for the analysis of the development of learn-
ing over a longer period of time and a consideration of which 
lessons survive across generations and why. For the purposes of 
this book, generations are defi ned as groups of individuals who 
worked within the FCO, MoD or IC at a particular point in 
time. Three generations will be considered: those based within 
the FCO, MoD or IC at any time between 1956–61, 1990–1 and 
2003–9. There may be some personnel who served as juniors in 
1956 and had reached senior level positions by 1990, with even 
higher numbers of personnel who were serving in both 1991 and 
2003. Consequently, it will be noted where any key individuals 
overlap across these generations.
Clearly, none of the three groups of learners exists in a vac-
uum or is mutually exclusive to the others; individuals form the 
workforce in institutions and the collective group of people that 
create a generation. Similarly, a generation of employees exist 
within an institution whilst an institution frames the experiences 
of individuals and generations. Consequently, this book will 
consider the three groups of learners as spheres which overlap 
and interact with each other (as illustrated in Figure 1.1). The 
very centre of the diagram – where all three spheres of learn-
ing overlap – is where learning is the most effective, in terms of 
impact and longevity.
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In many cases the spheres of learning are likely to be defi ned by 
the historical source which evidences learning. For example, per-
sonal papers reveal learning in the individual sphere, ministerial 
parliamentary speeches reveal learning in the institutional sphere 
and notes from retrospective conferences reveal learning in the gen-
erational sphere. However, identifying patterns of who is learning 
will provide further information to be able to identify which learn-
ers, if any, are driving the learning process within British military 
interventions.
The Learning Process
Drawing upon the work of psychology and organisational the-
orists, this book will assume that learning does not occur as a 
monolithic action but is a process which can be broken down 
into further stages across all three spheres of learning: lesson iden-
tifi cation, lesson implementation, lesson distribution and lesson 
Figure 1.1 The spheres of learning
5842_Kettle.indd   18 06/09/18   11:37 AM
19
Learning from History
retention (as illustrated in Figure 1.2).61 Each of these stages will 
be examined in assessing whether the British government learns 
from its history of military interventions, and the relevant terms 
used accordingly throughout.
Lesson identifi cation is always the fi rst stage of the learning 
process. It is at this stage that, in line with the defi nition, the 
‘acquisition of knowledge’ occurs. This idea draws upon the cog-
nitivist theory of learning whereby such knowledge is considered 
relevant. Knowledge can be acquired through a number of dif-
ferent methods and from various sources although the ambition 
is to acquire knowledge from the action of others. As Otto von 
Bismarck famously stated ‘Fools say they learn by experience, I 
prefer to profi t by other people’s experiences.’62 
After knowledge is acquired it becomes understood and is given 
value and meaning – it is interpreted (as illustrated by Figure 1.3). 
This idea draws upon the constructivist approach to learning. 
How it is interpreted will depend on the learner but at this stage 
Figure 1.2 The learning process
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biases, beliefs, goals, and current and future activities will impact 
the knowledge and the lesson which is ultimately identifi ed. 
Once a lesson is identifi ed, there is no determined order for the 
other stages of the learning process. Implementation is the stage 
in the learning process when the knowledge of the past, the lesson 
identifi ed, is used to inform policy. This is most closely aligned to 
the behaviourist approach to learning and it is only once a lesson 
has been implemented that it can be claimed to have been learned. 
If a lesson is not implemented it risks being forgotten. 
In order to advance the learning process, distribution of lessons 
to other learners must also occur. Lesson distribution is important 
to ensure that all relevant learners learn from history and that les-
sons are not lost if individual learners are removed from offi ce, 
personnel are changed within an institution or a generation dies 
out. The distribution of lessons by one learner can also become a 
source from which another learner may identify lessons. It is for 
this reason that the distribution of lessons across Whitehall is so 
important. 
The fourth stage of the lessons process is retention. Retention 
is the recording of the lesson for the future and aligns with the 
connectivism theory of learning and ideas of memory. In some 
cases it is not necessary to implement or distribute the lesson 
Figure 1.3 Lesson identifi cation
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immediately and therefore it must be retained to maintain the 
possibility of satisfying the second part of the defi nition of learn-
ing from history: ‘to inform policy decisions’. Even if the lesson 
has been implemented and distributed, it should nevertheless 
be retained for the benefi t of future learners. If lessons are not 
retained there is a risk that such lessons will become unlearned. 
Unlearned lessons are those which were ‘learned’ at some time 
but, having been implemented, the implementation process has 
now ceased or decisions have since been taken which contradict 
the original lesson thus the lesson has been unlearned. The key 
difference between whether a lesson is forgotten or unlearned 
is whether a lesson was ever implemented, or learned, in the 
fi rst place.
Learning from the History of British Interventions 
in the Middle East
When British troops returned to Helmand Province in Afghani-
stan in 2001 many of the inhabitants thought that they had come 
to avenge the defeats of their predecessors in the nineteenth cen-
tury. Similarly, Middle Easterners have long memories and – in a 
region where many policy-makers stay in power for decades, if 
not their whole lives, or form part of a political dynasty – scars of 
the past can run deep and supersede the career of a British politi-
cian, civil servant or serving personnel. In the Middle East the 
British also have a particularly long and unfl attering historical 
legacy to understand and overcome, but it is one which provides 
a signifi cant resource for lessons to inform foreign and security 
policy. In the twentieth century alone Britain has been involved in 
numerous interventions and was responsible for the defeat of the 
Ottoman Empire, the occupation of a signifi cant amount of ter-
ritory – following the Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1916 – and the 
establishment of the state of Israel and subsequent 1947 partition 
of Palestine. Iraq was under a British mandate until 1932, Jordan 
until 1946, Israel until 1948 and British troops were perma-
nently stationed in Egypt until 1956. Britain maintained the Aden 
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protectorate in Yemen until 1963 and only fi nally withdrew from 
Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1971; as 
such there is much from which to learn.
This book examines learning from history before, during and 
after fi ve key British interventions in the Middle East in the last 
seven decades. Chapter 2 opens on the most infamous interven-
tion of the twentieth century – the disastrous 1956 Suez opera-
tion. This was a watershed moment for Britain in the Middle East 
and has since become one of the most frequently used analogies in 
British foreign policy, akin to Vietnam in the United States (US), 
and synonymous with failure. After Suez the government worked 
hard to avoid prolonging the embarrassment of the events – by 
avoiding any public identifi cation of lessons – but behind the 
scenes much refl ection was made. Two years later the implemen-
tation of these lessons were tested in the 1958 Jordan interven-
tion. Chapter 3 examines this operation and considers the impact 
of 1956 on decision-making. In contrast to Suez, Jordan proved 
successful and provided a template for how best to intervene 
in the region without appearing imperial. By the time of the 
British intervention in Kuwait in 1961, the subject of Chapter 4, 
the government had a recent history of both success and failure 
to be used to inform decisions. A glance around the Cabinet table 
in 1961 provided a very similar view to 1956, with key mem-
bers of the government having a personal history of events from 
which to draw lessons and to help inform policy. 
Chapter 5 moves towards the end of the twentieth century 
to examine the 1990–1 Gulf War, by which time personnel had 
changed and individual experience of the region could no longer 
be relied upon to inform decision-making. Consequently, lessons 
from the previous decades were forgotten and mistakes repeated. 
However, the lessons from the war itself became politically divi-
sive; as the fi rst major confl ict in the post-Cold War era, lessons 
were used to defi ne the future of British foreign and security policy 
in a new international context. Twelve years later Britain faced 
the same enemy but, according to the Prime Minister, history was 
irrelevant. Chapter 6 examines the most notorious war of the 
twenty-fi rst century thus far – the 2003–9 Iraq War – and uncov-
ers the disparity of approach across Whitehall to history at this 
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time. This was another defi ning moment for Britain as failings in 
Iraq led to a loss of public and parliamentary appetite for overseas 
military engagement and forced a new refl ection upon the impor-
tance of learning from the events. 
Finally, Chapter 7 explores how learning from history has 
changed since the Iraq War, reveals why lesson learning has stalled 
in the past, leading to disastrous consequences, and exposes the 
reality that Britain is still failing history. In order to combat this 
problem, suggestions for how learning from the past could be 
improved are presented. This learning is vital if there is to be any 
future profi t from the diffi cult events of Britain’s recent history of 
military interventions in the Middle East.
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2 No End of a Lesson – Suez 1956
Let us admit it fairly, as a business people should,
We have had no end of a lesson: it will do us no end of good.
(Rudyard Kipling, The Lesson, 1901)
Rudyard Kipling wrote his famous poem The Lesson about the 
Boer War (1899–1902) but Anthony Nutting, the only Minister 
who was privy and opposed to all of the secrets of Suez from the 
outset, felt Kipling’s poetic lines to be equally appropriate to Suez. 
As a result, he titled his published version of events No End of a 
Lesson: The Story of Suez.1
The story of Suez began in 1856 when Ferdinand De Lesseps 
obtained a concession from Egypt to construct the Suez Canal. 
When the canal opened in 1869 it had an immediate impact on 
world trade and soon after Britain bought Egypt’s 44 per cent 
shareholding in the Suez Canal Company with France holding the 
remaining 56 per cent. British infl uence over the vital waterway 
increased in the 1880s when Britain gained control of Egypt before 
negotiating free navigation of the canal, as a neutral zone under 
the protection of the British military, at the 1888 Convention of 
Constantinople. In 1914 when Suez came under German–Ottoman 
attack, Britain established a protectorate over Egypt and sent forces 
to the canal. Even when, in 1922, Egypt was declared indepen-
dent, Britain retained control of the Canal Zone. Subsequently, the 
1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty agreed to the withdrawal of all British 
troops from Egyptian territory except for those deemed necessary 
to protect the canal and its surroundings. 
The Suez crisis was sparked as a result of post-Second World 
War nationalism. The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty had never been 
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welcomed by Egyptian nationalists and its signing had caused a 
wave of demonstrations. In 1951 it was universally abrogated by 
the nationalist Wafd government. A year later, a military coup 
by the Free Offi cers Movement – led by Muhammad Naguib and 
Gamal Abdel Nasser – overthrew King Farouk and established a 
new nationalist and anti-imperialist agenda. With a popular new 
leader in power, President Nasser, Britain agreed to withdraw 
all troops from Egypt through the Suez Base Canal Agreement 
of 1954. The agreement provided for the gradual evacuation 
of the Suez Canal base and subsequent passing of control to 
Egyptian military forces. The agreement was also dependent 
upon the freedom of navigation through the canal and the pro-
viso that British troops were permitted to return to protect the 
Canal Zone should it be threatened by an outside power. Britain 
completed the Suez base evacuation on 13 June 1956, fi ve 
days early.
In the meantime, in 1954, Nasser had begun plans to build a new 
dam at Aswan. Discussions between Egypt, the US and Britain on 
fi nancing the dam took place in Washington in November 1955. 
A few months later, on 1 March 1956, news reached London from 
the British Ambassador in Jordan that King Hussein had dismissed 
the British General John Bagot Glubb from the post of Chief of the 
General Staff and Commander of the Arab Legion, Jordan’s Royal 
Army.2 General Glubb had commanded the Army since 1939 and 
the British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, blamed the humiliation 
on the infl uence of Arab nationalism and the President of Egypt.3 
This event, compounded by the backdrop of the Cold War and the 
growing relationship between Egypt and the Soviet Union, eventu-
ally led Britain and the US to pull out of the Aswan Dam fi nance 
negotiations.4 Seven days later, on 26 July 1956, Nasser declared 
the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company and his plan to 
use the revenues from the canal to fund the Aswan Dam project. 
For the international community the nationalisation created a cri-
sis for worldwide trade. For Britain it was a humiliation which 
impacted national and strategic interests; troops had only left the 
area the month before and each year 60 to 70 per cent of Britain’s 
crude oil passed through the canal, as well as more than 50 million 
tons of British shipping.5 
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The FCO immediately became embroiled in diplomatic negotia-
tions to fi nd a solution to the crisis. They also sought to create a 
new Suez agreement and set up a London conference, followed by a 
Suez Canal Users’ Association. However, Eden’s patience with diplo-
macy rapidly declined and alternative options for removing Nasser 
and recapturing the canal were considered. At the end of October 
1956, secret meetings to discuss a military intervention were held in 
Sèvres, France, between a small group of representatives from Britain, 
France and Israel. It was agreed that Israel – who had been in disputes 
with Egypt since the 1948 Arab-Israeli War – would attack Egypt 
thus providing a pre-text for Anglo-French action as ‘peacekeepers’ 
to separate the two warring factions. In so doing, Britain and France 
would invoke the 1954 Suez Base Canal Agreement to send troops to 
protect the Canal Zone and subsequently regain its control.
On 29 October 1956, Israeli forces crossed the border and 
attacked the Egyptian Army. The next day an ultimatum to stop 
the fi ghting was issued by Britain and France. When Egypt refused 
to relent, the Anglo-French forces began their attack – codenamed 
Operation Musketeer – with Valiant and Canberra bombers attack-
ing Egyptian airfi elds. The confl ict lasted from 31 October until 
6 November 1956 when, under intense political and economic 
pressures, Britain and France were forced to agree a ceasefi re.6 By 
21 November 1956, a UN force arrived in Port Said, allowing 
French and British troops to complete withdrawal before Christmas. 
As well as the humiliation of withdrawal, accusations of collu-
sion between the three nations soon became rife. When the gov-
ernment came under increasing pressure over these allegations 
Eden lied to Parliament by explicitly denying any pre-knowledge 
of the Israeli attack; ‘We have been accused of being . . . in col-
lusion with the Israelis . . . that Her Majesty’s Government were 
engaged in some dishonourable conspiracy is completely untrue, 
and I most emphatically deny it.’7 Under mounting pressure, on 
9 January 1957, Eden resigned from the Premiership. 
Planning the Intervention
History was important for the decisions made by the Prime Minister. 
There was concern that Britain was losing its position in the world 
5842_Kettle.indd   26 06/09/18   11:37 AM
27
Suez 1956
and in the region; India was granted independence from the British 
Empire in 1947, Burma and Sri Lanka in 1948 and Sudan at the 
beginning of 1956. These events were compounded by the dismissal 
of Glubb Pasha from Jordan and ongoing troubles in Cyprus and 
Malaya, setting a tone of retreat which Eden was keen to rectify. As 
Shadow Foreign Secretary he had been highly critical of the Labour 
government’s ‘scuttle’ from Palestine in 1948 and the ‘appease-
ment’ of the newly installed Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammad 
Mosaddeq, over the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Com-
pany in 1951.8 In fact, lessons identifi ed from the 1951 Abadan 
Crisis loomed large over decisions in 1956. At the time, the Minister 
of Defence, Emanuel Shinwell, had prophetically declared ‘If Per-
sia is allowed to get away with it, Egypt and other Middle Eastern 
countries will be encouraged to think they can try things on; the 
next thing may be an attempt to nationalise the Suez Canal.’9 It 
also created a hard-line Conservative opposition front bench as they 
criticised the government’s decisions, raising expectations for their 
own handling of crises after coming to power later that year. Eden 
himself confi rmed the link between the events of 1951 and 1956 in 
his memoirs. He wrote ‘the troubles fomented on the Shatt al Arab, 
festered on the Nile’.10 
Events in the recent Buraimi dispute and in Nizwa, Oman, had 
also provided some lessons. Eden’s Private Secretary, Guy Millard, 
mused ‘The successful use of force on a small scale at Buraimi 
and Nizwa suggested that it could be employed to resolve larger 
issues; and that, provided force was swiftly and effectively applied, 
American and world opinion would acquiesce.’11 In fact, Eden had 
taken the personal decision – as he would do in Suez – to send 
British troops to the region without informing the Americans in 
advance, and had done so without repercussion. 
At the same time, Eden was infl uenced by lessons identifi ed from 
his personal experience with Nasser. Despite repeated demonstra-
tions of friendship, Nasser openly spoke against the British gov-
ernment on Cairo Radio,12 payments due for the 1954 agreement 
– which Eden had steered as Foreign Secretary – remained unpaid, 
UK–US attempts at recruiting Nasser for peace talks with the 
Israelis – project Alpha – had failed and Egypt continued to fl out 
the UN Security Council resolution calling for the end of interfer-
ence with Israeli shipping passing through the canal.13 Since 1955 
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Eden had also been receiving reports from the SIS that Nasser 
was tilting towards the Soviet Union, which appeared to be con-
fi rmed by the Czech arms deal – whereby the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) agreed to supply Egypt with weaponry 
through Czechoslovakia.14 Then, six weeks before nationalisa-
tion, on 10 June 1956, Nasser had signed an agreement with the 
Suez Canal Company on fi nancial arrangements which encouraged 
the investment of large sums of money into Egypt, an agreement 
that directly impacted Britain and France as the company’s major 
shareholders.15 Nationalisation, therefore, was the fi nal straw. 
For the Prime Minister, the grabbing of state assets was reminis-
cent of the pre-Second World War years and the events of the cri-
ses of Abyssinia, the Rhineland and the Anschluss when Eden had 
resigned as Foreign Secretary over appeasement and the Munich 
Agreement.16 Consequently, Eden began to view Nasser as a ruth-
less dictator, akin to those of the 1930s, who was also not to be 
appeased. Eden’s later autobiography, Full Circle, was so-called 
to emphasise the repetition of history and he stated in his fore-
word ‘The lessons of the thirties and their application to the 
fi fties . . . are the theme of my memoirs.’17 To him, Nasser looked 
like a new Hitler or Mussolini. He wrote to President Eisenhower 
‘the parallel with Mussolini is close. Neither of us can forget the 
lives and treasure he cost us before he was fi nally dealt with.’18 
These analogies were fuelled by their wide use within Whitehall. 
Even across the aisle the opposition leader, Hugh Gaitskell, declared 
that nationalisation ‘is exactly the same that we encountered from 
Mussolini and Hitler in those years before the war’.19
The secrecy surrounding Musketeer meant that very few people 
were involved in its planning. Instead, Eden used an inner cabinet – 
the Egypt Committee – for all decision-making and, in line with 
wartime protocol, none of the committee papers were circulated, 
keeping all military plans closely guarded. When the argument for 
the use of force was fi nally presented to the wider Cabinet many 
members were reserved. They argued that the UN needed to be fur-
ther consulted, that all diplomatic options had not been exhausted 
and therefore military action was not the last resort. There was also 
concern that public and international opinion would condemn any 
such actions.20 
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Although the Foreign Secretary, (John) Selwyn Lloyd, and his 
Private Secretary, Donald Logan, had both been present at Sèvres, 
offi cials in the FCO were intentionally kept in the dark about the 
conspiracy on the initiative of the Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir 
Ivone Kirkpatrick.21 They were also excluded from most of the 
planning process and therefore unable to implement any lessons 
from past experience. In fact, for many diplomats it was a great 
shock when the news of the bombing of Port Said reached London. 
Donald Hawley, who worked in the Permanent Under-Secretary’s 
Department, described how ‘when the actual operation started, the 
fi rst I knew of its launch was when I bought an Evening Standard 
when I went out for lunch that day’.22 Many within the FCO were 
also horrifi ed at British actions. Ivor Lucas who worked in the 
Economic Relations Department in 1956, but who would later 
go on to become Head of the Middle East Department, described 
how he ‘wept for shame’.23 Such was the strength of reaction that 
Kirkpatrick was forced to urge workers to remain in their posts 
and to offer reassurance that what had happened was an aberra-
tion which would never happen again.24 
In contrast to the FCO, the MoD had more time for planning, 
although the government’s true intentions remained concealed and 
there were still protests when they fi nally emerged.25 Immediately 
after the news of nationalisation, the Chiefs of Staff were asked 
to consider plans to restore the canal to international control by 
armed force. The outline plan developed in July 1956 was visual-
ised as Anglo-French action against Egypt and was to be launched 
in September. Integrated planning with the French began in mid-
August 1956 and initially favoured landing forces at Alexandria. 
Some preparations for Musketeer began, under the telling code-
name Poker, but these had to be kept secret and balanced against 
causing provocation during a time when a peaceful resolution to 
the crisis was still being negotiated.26 Due to security restrictions, 
Headquarters Middle East Land Forces was excluded from the 
planning process.27
In the meantime, lessons were identifi ed from training and 
last minute exercises. 16 Parachute Brigade had conducted exer-
cises in 1952 to ascertain how best to drop personnel, containers 
and heavy equipment into the same drop zone and lessons from 
5842_Kettle.indd   29 06/09/18   11:37 AM
Learning from British Interventions in the Middle East
30
these exercises were implemented in the planning and execution of 
Musketeer.28 In addition, having been embroiled in fi ghting the 
Greek Cypriot guerrilla organisation, the EOKA, the brigade had 
not jumped for nine months and was immediately fl own back to 
Britain from Cyprus for training. The aircrew of Transport Com-
mand also required updated training and it was soon identifi ed 
that there was a lack of trained Forward Air Controllers who were 
also parachutists. Consequently, four Army offi cers from 16 Para-
chute Brigade underwent special training to fi ll the role, which was 
unusual as Forward Air Controllers were usually pilots.29 However, 
there remained a lack of trained air crew throughout the operation. 
In the end, French paratroopers proved to be better trained and 
equipped, whilst the French also had to make up the numbers of 
Forward Air Controllers.30 Lieutenant Colonel Bill Howard, of Air 
2 Corps, later identifi ed in his lessons report ‘wherever the Regular 
Parachute Brigade is located – for whatever reason – the men and 
air crew should be able to keep in training all the time.’31
Early planning and training also allowed for the identifi cation 
of the lack of vehicle waterproofi ng equipment which would be 
required for an amphibious assault. Consequently, a practise exer-
cise in Malta (Septex I) with 1 Commando had to be limited to 
one squadron of tanks and a few vehicles from 6th Royal Tank 
Regiment.32 However, by the time of intervention, 3 Commando 
Brigade had not done any amphibious training for eleven months 
with Musketeer being the fi rst amphibious operation since the 
Second World War.33 General Hugh Stockwell, the Commander of 
2 (BR) Corps, identifi ed these lessons and recommended a review 
of policy. He also proposed that a nucleus Force Headquarters be 
maintained during peacetime to take responsibility for supporting 
inter-service workings, including amphibious warfare and para-
chute operations.34 A working party was subsequently established 
to investigate the lack of waterproofi ng equipment and implement 
lessons identifi ed.35
Once a plan was in place, it was presented to Eden but there 
were political objections, particularly over the required fi fteen 
days’ notice to put it into action. To overcome the objections, a 
new plan was developed to allow a prolonged period of readiness: 
Musketeer Revise. For Revise, the assault would focus on Port 
5842_Kettle.indd   30 06/09/18   11:37 AM
31
Suez 1956
Said rather than Alexandria, an idea which had been rejected in 
August 1956 for tactical reasons.36 Musketeer’s Commander-in-
Chief, Charles Keightley, later identifi ed ‘certain changes of orders 
required for political reasons but clearly unsound militarily inevi-
tably cause a grave lack of confi dence in Commanders’.37 
Throughout planning, the main challenge for the MoD was sync-
ing the political, diplomatic and military priorities and timetables. 
As time progressed, there was also a concern over the changing 
weather. On 1 October 1956, a directive was received to develop 
a new plan – Musketeer Winter Plan. This was to be based on 
receiving ten days’ warning, but the Joint Task Force Commanders 
stated that the impact of weather conditions would mean a warning 
period of fourteen days was required. On 19 October orders were 
issued that Winter Plan was to be dropped and Musketeer Revise to 
return to force.38 The ongoing changes in planning later led to the 
identifi cation of lessons about the need for clear political direction 
from the outset. The ‘Lessons from Musketeer’ document, produced 
by the Deputy Chief of the Imperial Staff Sir Richard Hull in June 
1957, identifi ed ‘The lack of a clear political aim and of consis-
tent political direction bedevilled the mounting and execution of 
the operation.’39 General Keightley had noted the same lesson and 
urged that a ‘sound and comprehensive political appreciation must 
be made beforehand’. To implement the lesson, he recommended 
that Supreme Commanders be given a political adviser with the ear 
and confi dence of the Cabinet.40
Ironically, all of the planning was conducted against the back-
drop of possible operations against – rather than in cooperation 
with – Israel: Operation Cordage. Cordage was devised at the end 
of 1955 as part of the Anglo-Jordanian alliance, to protect Jordan 
in the event of Israeli aggression. Cordage rumbled on throughout 
the following year and in October 1956 a deteriorating situation 
on the West Bank led Sir Gerald Templer, the Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, to advise ministers that Britain could conduct Cord-
age or Musketeer but not both.41 The next day King Hussein of 
Jordan called for British assistance. Flights of Hunters were organ-
ised from Cyprus in a show of British support and a warning was 
issued that British bombing attacks on Israeli territory would be 
used if necessary.42 For much of October 1956 it was clear that if 
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Cordage was put into action it was to take priority over Musketeer 
in terms of resources.
On 14 October 1956, French representatives visited Eden at 
Chequers and presented him with a solution for both his Nasser 
and Israel–Jordan problem. This proposal was formalised at Sèvres 
when the Israelis agreed that – as well as the attack on Egypt – 
they would not attack Jordan during operations against Nasser if 
the British agreed not to support any Jordanian attack on Israel.43 
Therefore, although Cordage was only offi cially abandoned in 
1957, Commanders had to quickly learn that their planned enemy 
was to be their ally in Musketeer. 
Throughout this time, the only reference made to past opera-
tions were concerns in the MoD that an isolated assault force – 
and anything other than a rapid advance – would lead to another 
Operation Market Garden, the unsuccessful Second World War 
operation that failed at Arnhem.44 This memory was also the rea-
son why the Chiefs of Staff tried to avoid Port Said as the initial 
landing target – beaches were shallow, muddy, close to housing, 
with limited room for unloading and a water supply that was eas-
ily cut.45 Most signifi cantly, the drop zone was close to the concen-
tration of Egyptian tanks.46 However, Templer complained to the 
Head of MI6 that his lessons had little infl uence claiming ‘Eden’s 
barely consulting us’.47 
Also prominent in the minds of senior offi cers was ‘the Nurem-
berg factor’. With the Nuremberg war crime trials held only a decade 
before there was nervousness about the level of aerial bombardment 
required for Musketeer Revise in respect of civilian casualties.48 The 
Chiefs of Staff also drew upon the British experience of occupying 
Egypt in the past to provide an assessment of a post-war Egypt.49 
They identifi ed lessons on the large number of resources that would 
be required to set up and support a friendly government whilst coun-
teracting any guerrilla activity or ongoing hostility from Egyptian 
military units. It would, they warned, be ‘prolonged’ and mean that 
other commitments would have to be compromised, including the 
planned ending of national service.50 
The IC suffered similarly from a lack of openness about the 
government’s intentions, despite the Chairman of the JIC – Patrick 
Dean – providing the signatory on the Sèvres protocol. A number of 
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offi cials were bypassed, including MI6’s Head of Political Intelli-
gence, who was removed from the Middle East telegrams circulation 
list, and senior offi cers who soon became aware that they were not 
receiving regular telegrams from Israel.51 The newly appointed SIS 
Director, Richard White – the previous Head of MI5 who had been 
in his new role twelve days when Nasser nationalised the canal – was 
only later informed of the Anglo-French-Israeli collusion. Further-
more, he was only advised of events by Cabinet Secretary Norman 
Brook because Eden needed to use the SIS to communicate with 
the Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion. White was sworn to 
secrecy and remained excluded from any decision-making.52 In addi-
tion, special security measures were placed across all intelligence to 
protect the secrecy of planning for Musketeer, only including people 
on a need-to-know basis. This procedure was codenamed Terrapin.53 
At the same time, the IC had failed to predict the nationalisa-
tion of the Suez Canal and had little understanding of the force of 
Arab nationalism. Whilst MI6 had always had intelligence assets 
within Egypt’s monarchy and Wafd party, they had not penetrated 
the new leaders, the Free Offi cers, forcing reliance on the sharing 
of intelligence by the Americans and GCHQ intercepts. The result 
was that the IC had little understanding of Nasser or his intentions 
but this lesson was not promptly identifi ed and the SIS was still 
debating how to infi ltrate the Nasserite movement years later.54 
After nationalisation, intelligence assets were reduced even fur-
ther when a SIS network in Cairo was uncovered. The Arab News 
Agency had provided local cover for MI6 but in August 1956 its 
offi ces were raided and closed down by Nasser. Thirty people were 
arrested and accused of espionage. Some were expelled, others 
executed and the SIS was effectively neutered. 
Nonetheless, a number of assessments were produced by the 
JIC during the crisis and before operations began. Immediately 
after Nasser nationalised the canal, a report was produced which 
assessed its impact and declared ‘Nasser’s triumph has been spec-
tacular.’ It also examined possible future developments and the 
impact on UK relations with other Arab states.55 The JIC sepa-
rately considered the situation that might arise in the Middle East 
once the Suez Canal Conference concluded, the risk of sabotage of 
the canal by the Egyptians, possible courses of action by Nasser 
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as tensions continued and the ongoing infl uence of the Soviet 
Union.56 From the outset assessments seemed to support the idea 
of an armed intervention.57 One assessment proved to be particu-
larly timely. ‘The threat to United Kingdom interests overseas’ was 
presented on 18 October 1956 and surmised:
it should be emphasised that any concessions made by the United King-
dom under pressure are likely to have repercussions throughout the 
world, encouraging further claims and exacerbating points of friction. 
Conversely, a successful demonstration or resolution and fi rmness by 
the United Kingdom would have the effect of discouraging similar pres-
sure throughout the world.58
It concluded that if Nasser succeeded in the Suez dispute the 
outlook for specifi c threats in Middle East and North African 
countries looked concerning. This assessment supported the anti-
appeasement lessons identifi ed by Eden and emerged just before 
the agreement at Sèvres. However, none of the assessments explic-
itly examined lessons from the past, nor was there any refl ection 
on lessons from events as they progressed in terms of intelligence 
collection and analysis. Even the failure to predict the nationali-
sation of the canal was quickly forgotten and when Doug Nicoll 
– the former Deputy Director of GCHQ – was asked in the late 
1970s to examine the JIC’s warnings of aggression, and identify 
lessons to be learned, Suez was overlooked.59 
The IC was also involved in three other ways during the 
planning of Musketeer. Firstly, there had been Anglo-American 
attempts to destabilise Nasser since March 1956 through eco-
nomic, diplomatic and military means and offering reconciliation 
after each phase. This plan was called Omega and was to be sup-
ported by covert action including the increase of propaganda, the 
encouragement of Canada and France to provide jet fi ghters to 
Israel and intervention in Syria to change the government, code-
named Operation Straggle.60 
Secondly, as the year progressed, the policy of Britain and the 
US diverged as MI6 began to consider a possible coup to overthrow 
Nasser. The MI6 Deputy Director, George Young, had been heav-
ily involved in Operation Boot, the joint UK–US operation which 
orchestrated the 1953 overthrow of Mosaddeq in Iran, and lessons 
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from these events informed his ideas on how to deal with Nasser.61 
On 27 August 1956, the Member of Parliament (MP) and son-
in-law of Harold Macmillan, Julian Amery and two SIS offi cers 
met an Egyptian ‘shadow’ government in France. In the meantime, 
Squadron Leader Isameddine Mahmoud Khalil, Egypt’s Deputy 
Chief of Air Force Intelligence, was recruited into the ‘Restoration 
Plot’ to establish an organisation of Army offi cers in Egypt who 
would help to orchestrate the coup.62 
The fi nal area of activity was the most extreme: planning the 
assassination of Nasser. In March 1956 Nutting had received a 
phone call at the Savoy Hotel from Eden, angry at the mild nature 
of the plans for Omega. On an open phone line the Prime Minister 
shouted ‘What’s all this nonsense about isolating Nasser or “neu-
tralising” him? . . . I want him murdered, can’t you understand?’63 
Young took Eden’s request literally and drew up various plans for 
assassination including the use of dissident military offi cers, kitting 
out an electric razor with explosives, using poison gas and sending 
assassins.64 Young later denied such conspiracies, although at this 
time there were no set guidelines or restrictions for covert action.65 
Despite none of these activities proving successful, there was no 
attempt by the IC to identify lessons for the future.
During the Intervention
Once the operation started, the FCO was forced into a state of dam-
age control as the shockwaves from British actions extended beyond 
London to the Middle East and across the world. Support for Arab 
nationalism increased as a result of British failure and, for many, 
went on to infl uence events which led to the start of the Oman war 
in 1957, the 1958 Lebanese civil war, the 1958 Iraqi revolution and 
the 1967 Six Day War. There was wide dismay that Europeans had 
attacked a Muslim country; Saudi Arabia broke off relations, the 
situation with Palestine was set back and terrorists attacked the 
Middle East Centre for Arab Studies (MECAS) – the Arabic lan-
guage school in Lebanon where Britain sent young diplomats for 
training.66 Even in Kuwait, where Britain had enjoyed a long friend-
ship, Sir Anthony Acland described how ‘It was different’ and that 
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the Kuwaitis ‘wanted to remain friends with Britain but they didn’t 
want to be seen to be too friendly to the representatives of Britain 
after the Suez affair’.67 Most of the Commonwealth countries were 
equally unimpressed, with widespread opposition to British actions. 
The Commander-in-Chief’s post-operational report identifi ed ‘The 
one overriding lesson of the Suez operation is that world opinion 
is now an absolute principle of war and must be treated as such.’68 
The affair also damaged relations with the US; the Americans 
were furious that they had not been consulted and they objected 
to the imperial nature of the actions. Eisenhower was particularly 
unhappy that he had explicitly warned against war and that Eden 
had chosen the inopportune moment of the run-up to his presiden-
tial election to launch such an operation. He wrote in his diaries 
‘October 20, 1956 was the start of the most crowded and demand-
ing three weeks of my entire Presidency.’69 Guy Millard, Eden’s 
Private Secretary, later identifi ed the lesson that Britain had not 
fully understood US preoccupation with domestic politics during 
the run-up to an American general election, nor their predisposi-
tion to leave foreign policy to the UN during this time.70
As a result, the FCO spent the time during the intervention 
trying to repair relationships. The new British Ambassador to the 
US, Harold Caccia, was spared the initial anger in Washington by 
being sent from London by boat, leaving him at sea throughout 
the intervention. However, Lord Wright, who would later become 
British Ambassador to the US, explained that Caccia still ‘had a 
fearfully diffi cult time, picking up the pieces post-Suez, when large 
parts of the American administration were virtually not speaking 
to us’.71 It was later identifi ed in both the FCO and the MoD that 
Britain would need to liaise closely with the US throughout all 
future wars. Keightley identifi ed ‘it was the actions of the United 
States which really defeated us in attaining our object’ and the 
Chiefs of Staff concluded that in the future ‘the United Kingdom 
would only act in cooperation with the United States and/or the 
United Nations’.72
In the UN, the UK Representative, Pierson Dixon, was forced 
to defend the Anglo-French ultimatum despite his own moral 
objections and suspicions of collusion. He was instructed to play 
for time, in order to prevent UN intervention before the Canal was 
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recaptured and Nasser suffi ciently weakened. Dixon had already 
refused to support America’s calling of the Security Council on 
30 October 1956 and then used Britain’s fi rst ever veto against 
a resolution labelling Israelis aggressors and calling for a cease-
fi re.73 In fact, Suez forced a number of historic fi rsts in the UN. 
In response to the deadlock, the Americans transferred the issue 
of a ceasefi re to the General Assembly for its fi rst ever Emergency 
Special Session, which Dixon again opposed.74 Eventually the 
Canadian delegation proposed sending a UN Emergency Force to 
Egypt – again the fi rst of its kind – to act as peacekeepers. This 
time Britain only abstained from the vote as political and fi nancial 
pressure for a ceasefi re was mounting.75 
Despite these events, it took some time for the FCO to iden-
tify lessons about the importance of the UN in interventions. 
In the short term there was some resentment for the part it 
played in British humiliation by forcing a ceasefi re. In February 
1957 Ivor Pink, the Superintending Under-Secretary in the UN 
Department, produced a memorandum for the Anglo-American 
Bermuda Conference which called for a reduction in power 
of both the General Assembly and the Secretary General, Dag 
Hammarskjöld. The memo was approved by the FCO but not 
the Americans and instead both states agreed to coordinate bet-
ter through the UN and not to grant it primacy in their foreign 
policy. By mid-1957 the mood in the FCO had changed and the 
ongoing role of the UN in international relations was fi nally 
identifi ed. This eventually led to an acceptance of the institu-
tion, whilst work continued to restore the Security Council to its 
primacy for decision-making in matters of peace and security.76 
In the MoD, once Musketeer began, damage limitation man-
agement took over as lessons needed to be quickly implemented 
due to planning inaccuracies and changes in circumstances. As 
soon as the fi rst bomb landed in Port Said the Joint Task Force 
Commanders were asked if they could bring troop landing for-
ward from the planned 6 November 1956.77 This was something 
that the Commanders found ‘impossible’ as plans had already 
been delayed by an American display of disapproval; the US 6th 
Fleet fl ew aircraft and submerged submarines in the path of the 
Anglo-French invasion fl eet.78 However, the Egyptian Air Force 
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was eliminated much quicker than anticipated, further hastening 
the need for an earlier landing of troops at a time when the lead-
ing force, 3rd Infantry Division, was sailing from the UK and was 
not due to reach Port Said until 9 November 1956.79 
Challenges in adapting to changes in plans and the slow arrival 
of troops were partly due to the lack of force fl exibility. Keightley 
identifi ed this lesson and made a number of recommendations for 
implementation, including always having two parachute brigades 
fully staffed and equipped and suffi cient transport carrying aircraft. 
The Chiefs of Staff agreed with Keightley’s proposal but concluded 
‘For various reasons, including fi nancial ones, there is little possibil-
ity of implementing most of General Keightley’s proposals.’80 They 
could not, for example, afford to increase the airborne element of 
the Army but did set a new focus for infantry brigade groups to be 
trained for rapid movement by air. 
A further reason for last minute changes was the lack of intelli-
gence on Egyptian capabilities during the military planning phase. 
Commodore Charles Moore had complained to the Chiefs of Staff 
and JIC that the Air Ministry were worried about the lack of up-
to-date intelligence on the Egyptian Air Force and Air General 
Stockwell found the same was true for ground forces.81 One report 
revealed that, due to the lack of intelligence, the Assistant Naval 
Attaché in Port Said had to plan an urgent afternoon picnic to 
the coast whereby he could report that vital landing beaches were 
inhabited by happy Egyptian families, not Egyptian land mines.82 
The problem was exacerbated by the inability to run advance 
reconnaissance missions in order to avoid political diffi culties. 
This was especially challenging as it soon became clear that many 
of the British maps of Egypt were out of date leaving parachutist 
dropping zones and bomb targeting to be based on air cover which 
was several years old. In fact, the key bombing target of Cairo 
Radio’s transmitter was postponed because outdated maps sug-
gested it was in the centre of the capital, when in fact its transmit-
ters were in the desert.83 Lieutenant Colonel Howard identifi ed 
in his lessons report ‘A dropping zone cannot be selected from 
air cover that is two or three years old . . . The lack of PR [photo 
reconnaissance] in August was a handicap.’84 To implement the 
lesson Stockwell recommended an earlier inclusion of the War 
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Offi ce’s Survey Directorate in operational planning and to impress 
upon an initial assault force the urgent need to capture maps from 
the enemy.85
To make matters worse, poor communications and inaccuracy 
of bombing caused further diffi culties once Musketeer began. The 
bombing of the fi rst target, the airfi eld at Cairo West, was rapidly 
cancelled because news reached London that US citizens were being 
evacuated by a nearby road.86 However, the signal only reached 
Malta after six Valiants and fi ve Canberras had departed. These 
aircraft were successfully recalled but Canberras in 139 Squadron 
had already left from Cyprus and, in the ensuing confusion, incor-
rectly bombed Cairo International Airport instead.87 In addition, 
this was the fi rst active operation for Bomber Command since the 
Second World War and it was going through a re-equipping pro-
cess; only 50 per cent of the 1,962 bombs dropped were within 
650 yards of the aiming point and Egyptian propaganda soon 
claimed excessive use of force.88 The international outcry led the 
MoD to fund its own propaganda in return. The fi lm Suez in Per-
spective dismissed the Egyptian claims as ‘absolute nonsense’ and 
utilised video from the air to demonstrate the controlled nature of 
the bombing of Port Said.89 The need to produce the fi lm reiterated 
the lesson identifi ed in planning: the requirement for future bomb-
ing campaigns to focus on precision targeting and the avoidance 
of civilians.
There were also other incidents to overcome. In one case air 
support was allocated at the request of a destroyer without ref-
erence to the troops on the ground. This led to a British strike 
on its own troops with the lesson immediately identifi ed: ‘the 
need to conform to established procedures when engaging targets 
within the bombline, and the importance of recognition methods 
between the ground and air’.90 Another incident was the shoot-
ing down of a Canberra aircraft by a Syrian Meteor. The Syrian 
government had refused Britain permission to overfl y its terri-
tory, leaving the Royal Air Force (RAF) to fl y illegally and haz-
ardously to provide essential supplies.91 However, the lesson of 
securing overfl ying rights was not identifi ed in any key learning 
documents and would become a repeatedly re-identifi ed lesson in 
future operations. 
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In addition, equipment defi ciencies remained, despite a pro-
gramme of re-equipping having taken place before the operation. 
There continued to be a lack of waterproofi ng equipment for vehi-
cles, no appropriate headquarters ship or parachutable anti-tank 
gun and no hospital ship was available. Similarly, the amphibious 
squadron could only transport part of the Commando Brigade and 
Transport Command could only lift a small number of the Para-
chute Brigade, whilst much ammunition proved unsuitable for the 
hot climate – a lesson that was later considered an ‘urgent require-
ment’ for implementation.92 Most embarrassingly, when the para-
troopers landed they were amazed to discover that the Egyptians 
were armed with more modern and effective weapons than them-
selves. This lesson was quickly identifi ed and it was ‘most earnestly 
recommended that Para Battalions should be re-equipped with the 
best and latest British weapons as soon as possible’.93 In the short 
term, the lesson was implemented through the rapid repair of jeeps, 
trailers and parachute equipment as well as the purchase of recoil-
less rifl es and ammunition from the US.94 However, equipment dif-
fi culties persisted throughout Musketeer and were compounded 
by logistics failures. One post-operational report identifi ed ‘Many 
items were misdirected, all shipping schedules were late and some 
items were never found.’95 
A separate area of concern throughout the campaign was the 
management of public relations (PR). PR had not been included 
in planning and was hampered by inexperienced offi cers, new 
correspondents and poor communications. General Keightley 
identifi ed ‘We had no time to organise our press representatives, 
to study the confl icting claims of would be accredited correspon-
dents or to try out press communications.’96 This meant that 
there was inadequate reporting of the assault phase which had 
the knock-on effect of causing political pressure. This lesson was 
quickly identifi ed and – in the end – learned; forces received good 
press, partly due to the implementation of full and authoritative 
daily press briefi ngs, and partly due to the morale of troops under 
diffi cult circumstances.97 Following the operation further lessons 
were implemented on issues of press accreditation and liaising 
with the press over communications equipment, with a study 
commissioned into Service requirements.98 
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Successful liaison across the MoD – the Force Headquarters, 
Service Ministries, Allied Force Headquarters, General Headquar-
ters Middle East Land Forces and with the Ministry of Transport – 
was identifi ed as a positive lesson. This was achieved through reg-
ular conferences across departments and visits between London 
and theatre as well as daily meetings with a Liaison Offi cer who 
worked between Allied Force Headquarters and Rear Headquarters 
Middle East.99 Positive working relations also continued further 
down the chain of command at the divisional and brigade level and 
below, including with the French Airborne Forces. Sir Frank Cooper, 
Head of the Air Staff Secretariat at the time of Suez, identifi ed 
the importance of Anglo-French cooperation and to highlight the 
cordial relations between the two countries the front sheet of the 
British news was always printed in both English and French.100 
The lesson identifi ed by Stockwell was ‘As far as possible this liaison 
should be maintained by joint exercises, since the mutual confi dence 
and respect that exist between the Services are battle winning fac-
tors’ and, in addition, ‘the exchange of offi cers between French and 
British Airborne Forces, especially on the technical side, should be 
maintained’.101 The British also learned a number of lessons from 
the French, both by observing their equipment and organisation on 
operation but also from the sharing of their lessons reports.102 
For the IC, once the operation began, the focus was on defence 
intelligence, much of which was delayed and therefore ineffective. 
The Deputy Chief of the Imperial Staff, Richard Hull, complained 
to the Executive Committee of the Army Council that Intelligence 
Branch ‘was unable to acquire background quickly enough to 
become fully effective’.103 This was, in part, due to coordination 
diffi culties between the three intelligence branches of the Services, 
between these and the broader IC and across British and French 
intelligence. No existing structure was in place for the immediate 
coordination of operational and political intelligence and this iden-
tifi ed lesson was quickly implemented by establishing an ad hoc 
emergency Joint Intelligence centre in an empty offi ce. However, 
challenges of effective coordination continued in both the collec-
tion and dissemination of intelligence throughout Musketeer.104 
There were also challenges with image intelligence (IMINT) as 
the necessary image developing and printing equipment did not 
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arrive on time at Akrotiri meaning that fi lm had to be sent by road 
or helicopter to Episkopi. This caused a seven hour delay for prints 
to be available to intelligence staff. The French, on the other hand, 
had arrived at Akrotiri with all their equipment and were able to 
provide results in less than three hours.105 Air Vice Marshal John 
Stephenson later noted that ‘The Air Ministry were well aware 
of the shortcomings revealed by Operation Musketeer and were 
doing their best to correct them.’ To implement these lessons he 
advised that improvements were being made to the organisation 
for processing and interpreting of photos, but the details of these 
changes remain unknown.106 
Even psychological operations (psyops) were limited. There 
was no existing policy for this type of warfare at the time, and 
very limited training.107 The appointed Director of Psychological 
Warfare, Brigadier Bernard Fergusson, had no previous experi-
ence in this area and there were diffi culties in securing the required 
voice aircraft from Kenya where they had been used against the 
Mau Mau.108 In addition, planned leafl et drops had to be can-
celled. Canberra bombers were technically incapable of carrying 
out the operation and the reservists responsible for the production 
of the leafl ets were unfamiliar with the machinery for the scat-
tering devices. As a result blocks of leafl ets – which were due to 
explode at 1,000 feet in order to scatter – were actually exploding 
at head height or not at all, causing injury to civilians.109 None-
theless, the value of psyops was identifi ed by Stockwell as having 
‘enormous potential value . . . particularly in an area such as the 
Middle East’.110 Keightley agreed and made a number of recom-
mendations for implementation, including the creation of a ‘really 
fi rst class psychological warfare cadre’ which would have regular 
exercises.111 Whilst progress on implementing these lessons was 
slow, it did not forestall the use of psyops in Britain’s next military 
intervention in the region – Oman in 1957.112
Other challenges included the shortage of linguists – interpreters, 
translators and interrogators – available to gather human intel-
ligence (HUMINT). General Keightley identifi ed to the Chiefs of 
Staff ‘The inability to have enough offi cers or Ors [other ranks] who 
speak foreign languages is now a national failing, but it will affect 
our future operations unless improved.’113 Following the operation 
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the MoD applied to the Treasury for funding to support implemen-
tation in this area.114
One part of the IC which continued to work well, in contrast 
to all other parts of the government, was UK–US liaison. In fact, 
as operations began US U-2 reconnaissance planes were over-
fl ying Egypt, and the CIA passed the images to the British; the 
RAF telegrammed ‘Warm thanks. It’s the quickest bomb damage 
assessment we’ve ever had.’115 The CIA also produced and shared 
an assessment – partly based on further reconnaissance – when 
the Soviets threatened to become militarily involved in Suez.116 In 
fact, even as Eisenhower was condemning Britain in the UN, the 
CIA was still liaising with the SIS and much of Britain’s post-Suez 
‘special relationship’ was reignited due to the network of UK–US 
covert operations taking place in the Middle East; the political 
quarantine placed by Eisenhower on the Eden administration was 
lifted just over a week later in an effort to reignite the joint Opera-
tion Straggle in Syria and the importance of the Anglo-American 
intelligence liaison for broader relations would later become an 
identifi ed lesson. 
After the Intervention
After seven eventful days – from the start of the operation on 
31 October to the ceasefi re on 6 November – there was much 
from which to learn and, as time went on, there were increasing 
demands for a formal, external inquiry. Although the rationale for 
an inquiry was predominantly led by MP calls for scrutiny of the 
executive and the public right to ‘truth’ over rumours of collusion, 
such an inquiry would have provided the opportunity to ascertain 
policy and procedural lessons for the future. Initially, the grounds 
for denying such an inquiry were ‘The Government do not believe 
an inquiry should take place into a matter which is primarily the 
responsibility of the Government.’117 However, as time passed, a 
range of reasons were given for its dismissal. In 1960, the Prime 
Minister, Harold Macmillan, denying the benefi t of learning from 
history, declared he could not conceive of ‘any purpose, national 
or international, that can be served’.118 In the run-up to the 1959 
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debate on the Anglo-Egyptian Financial Agreement, when the Suez 
question seemed likely to be revisited, Norman Brook produced 
a memorandum on the precedent of inquiries. He concluded that 
since criticism was towards the honour of ministers, rather than 
their professional wisdom, precedent suggested that any debate 
should be confi ned to the fl oor of the House of Commons rather 
than any form of inquiry.119 Even in 1967, when debate was reig-
nited over the publication of Anthony Nutting’s memoir, the gov-
ernment was still discussing ways in which an inquiry could be 
avoided.120
The FCO also did not wish to support an external inquiry. Dip-
lomats were concerned that it would reopen wounds which they 
were trying to repair, particularly with the US, and would only 
serve to benefi t President Nasser.121 Even years later the Foreign 
Secretary, George Brown, informed Richard Crossman, the Chair 
of the Cabinet’s Legislation Committee, that he believed any inquiry 
would have harmful effects worldwide. He concluded that whilst 
the relationships that would be most greatly affected would be 
with the US, France, Israel and other Arab countries, in no country 
would such an inquiry bring Britain any benefi t.122 Consequently, 
the power of the present day politics and diplomacy overtook the 
necessity to learn from the past. 
However, whilst the FCO refused to support any external les-
sons inquiry, there was also no desire for an offi cial history to be 
produced. In fact, Suez was notably rejected for consideration on 
a number of occasions. In 1957 when Norman Brook was funding 
his history initiative across Whitehall, Suez did not even make the 
shortlist and the pilot history project was completed on the 1951 
Abadan crisis instead. In 1963 – when the employment of offi cial 
historians on the offi cial histories of 1939–45 were coming to a 
close – Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend suggested moving to begin 
writing accounts of other major events. In so doing, he specifi cally 
asked ‘How, for example, would the Foreign Offi ce and the Com-
monwealth Offi ce react to the suggestion that we should publish an 
offi cial “history” of the Palestine mandate or the Suez episode?’123 
Having highlighted this particular quote Douglas-Home responded 
that he did not much like the idea but preferred to produce work 
which could be released once the required fi fty year time rule had 
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passed.124 Trend pressed the Prime Minister after a Cabinet meet-
ing and a compromise was struck, albeit one where Suez remained 
explicitly off limits: 
He agreed that discussions might now go forward with a view to 
producing a scheme or making contemporary accounts of certain 
episodes. These should be in the political fi eld, e.g. Britain’s history 
of decolonisation; or the independence of India; rather than in the 
military fi elds e.g. Suez.125
As the ten year anniversary of Suez approached the ranks closed 
further around any offi cial history of Suez. Trend declared that 
‘nobody should write anything on Suez’ whilst the Permanent 
Under-Secretary, Paul Gore-Booth, agreed that ‘the less said about 
Suez the better’.126 
There was the same nervousness over the publication of mem-
oirs from offi cials involved in Suez – an unoffi cial way of recording 
individual lessons from the experience. In part, this raised debates 
over political party loyalty, ministerial collective responsibility, 
protection of serving members of the service and offi cial secrecy 
but also the role of the FCO in vetting history. There was con-
cern from the Foreign Secretary, for example, in 1959 when Eden 
wanted to publish his memoirs that he had quoted confi dential 
discussions with people who remained infl uential, that there was a 
strong anti-American bias, a negative attitude towards the Arabs 
and a lack of any acceptance of fault. For Lloyd, such an account 
was too soon after events, when relations remained raw.127 How-
ever, in the event, the FCO could only advise on the manuscript 
and publication proceeded for 1960.
Anthony Nutting’s book ten years after events also caused 
much concern. Even as Nutting was considering publication Mac-
millan tried to dissuade him from providing specifi cs on Suez. 
Gore-Booth recorded how Macmillan ‘using all his best politi-
cal experience and persuasiveness’ suggested to Nutting ‘that it 
would be far more useful, dignifi ed etc. if he published something 
rather broader in its consideration of the Middle East question, 
rather than more spicy revelations about Suez’.128 In so doing, 
Macmillan again allowed the politics of the day to overtake the 
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emphasis on history, both for the protection of international rela-
tionships and for the protection of his party in the forthcoming 
general election. 
It was not until Nutting’s print proof was made available that 
greater concerns were iterated by the FCO: the risk of relations 
with France, the US and the Arab world, the adverse way in which 
the methods of British diplomacy may be questioned, the nega-
tive effect of revealing – that in at least one case – telegrams from 
Ambassadors were doctored to conceal the degree to which they 
were being deceived, and concerns over security, with Nutting 
quoting from secret telegrams and highly classifi ed documents.129 
It was at this point that the dangers of public revelations associ-
ated with learning from history were more vigorously articulated 
by the FCO and the diffi cult tensions between history, policy and 
politics became truly exposed.
Even so, the FCO did not completely rule out a confi dential 
internal history. Upon completion of the Abadan history project 
by Rohan Butler, the question of completing such a review of Suez 
was reconsidered. Having been impressed by Butler’s works the 
Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, inquired:
I would be grateful if you would consider whether a similar confi den-
tial report could be prepared within the Foreign Offi ce on the lessons 
of Suez . . . This might be of use when the time comes for a fuller 
analysis to be done of Suez. I think also that just as we have learned 
some useful lessons from Abadan, so something worthwhile could 
emerge from a study of Suez.130
Clearly, Stewart appreciated the benefi t of learning from his-
tory although he also stated ‘this would have to be done most 
carefully because I am sure it would be most unfortunate if the 
fact that this study was being undertaken became public knowl-
edge’.131 However, Gore-Booth was quick to dissuade the Foreign 
Secretary from pursuing the matter further. In a stinging response 
he replied:
The lesson to be learned from Suez was a simple one. It was this: if 
Ministers consulted their offi cials and then rejected their advice this 
was perfectly proper and might on many occasions give them the 
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right answer. If, however, a government undertook operations by 
a process of deliberately refraining from taking offi cial advice, or 
keeping offi cials informed, then the result in due course would be 
disastrous.132
As a result, Gore-Booth fi rmly laid any required learning at the 
door of particular ministers, rather than the acceptance of lesson 
learning for the FCO. Stewart relented and conceded that ‘while 
in due course the true story ought to be told’ in the circumstances 
such an inquiry ‘would look like a vindictive diversion of time and 
effort’.133 Consequently, the matter was promptly dropped, with-
out further recorded discussion.
However, what Stewart did not know was that Guy Millard 
had already written a history of Suez which had remained 
secret. The document – ‘Memorandum on relations between the 
United Kingdom, the United States and France in the months 
following Egyptian nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company 
in 1956’ – identifi ed two key lessons. Firstly, Britain had endeav-
oured to solve both the issue of passage through the Suez Canal 
and declining British prestige through a single operation. For 
Millard ‘It was perhaps a British mistake to try to solve two 
problems simultaneously; and this was a criticism of British 
policy made during the crisis by the Americans.’134 In reality 
Musketeer had sought to achieve even more objectives than this, 
simultaneously aiming to protect Jordan, weaken Syria and top-
ple Nasser.
Secondly, Suez revealed that British policy-makers had not 
understood Britain’s international or economic limitations. The 
day after Eden and Lloyd had been in Paris to discuss a possible 
joint intervention, the French had made the move to protect their 
currency reserves. However, no such protection was given to ster-
ling and when Musketeer began, a run on the pound lead to an 
$85 million loss of reserves by 6 November, just as the amphibi-
ous assault arrived in Port Said in support of the paratroopers.135 
Washington then blocked any International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
fi nancial assistance to the UK until a ceasefi re was agreed.136 As 
a result of both of these lessons, a complete re-evaluation was 
required:
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we could never again resort to military action, outside British ter-
ritories, without at least American acquiescence. Our capacity to act 
independently had been seen to be closely circumscribed by economic 
weakness. The experience of Suez may have led to a reassessment of 
British interests and of our relative position in the world.137
Nine months earlier, Eden had identifi ed the same lessons. Five 
pages of general thoughts on the crisis were sent by the Prime 
Minister to the Foreign Secretary, Minister of Defence and Lord 
President and the concluding paragraph reassessed Britain’s place 
in the world and its international relationships. Eden wrote ‘The 
conclusion of all this is surely that we must review our world posi-
tion and our domestic capacity more searchingly in the light of the 
Suez experience, which has not so much changed our fortunes but 
revealed our realities.’138
It was not long before the same lesson was identifi ed within the 
FCO itself. In April 1958, the FCO produced a planning paper for 
its Foreign Affairs Steering Committee which stated: 
The last fi fty years have seen a drastic diminution in our world 
status . . . our policies have outstripped our capacity or willingness 
to provide the means to meet them . . . This looks like the classic 
picture of an Empire in decline.139
Looking specifi cally at the Middle East, the paper revealed that 
Britain had been unable to resist recent attacks on colonial, stra-
tegic and commercial interests due to post-Suez domestic and 
world opinion about actions in the region and because of the 
prohibitive costs. The stark lesson was identifi ed; ‘we are no lon-
ger in a position to “go it alone”’.140 Instead, to achieve British 
objectives in the region it was identifi ed that it was necessary to 
‘Promot[e] United States involvement and the harmonisation of 
Anglo-American policy.’141 
A further opportunity for the FCO to identify lessons arose 
in 1963 when the Permanent Under-Secretary asked diplomats to 
respond to a call by Lord Strang to critically review British diplo-
macy. Thirty-four replies were received from Ambassadors around 
the world and their ideas were compiled into a paper by Rohan 
Butler: ‘A New Perspective for British Diplomacy’.142 The third 
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section of the paper focused on obstacles for a stronger British 
foreign policy of which three main problems were specifi ed: the 
propensity to always seek good relations rather than pursuing 
tough policy lines, British economic weakness and failure at Suez. 
Suez was described as ‘a traumatic humiliation’ comparable only 
to Munich. The difference, it was claimed, was that the defeat in 
Munich was wiped out within a year by war whereas the ‘long 
shadow from Suez . . . still lies heavy across our thinking’ and the 
concern that ‘the error of Suez should become a defeatist bogey 
to be regularly trundled out, without fresh or keen appraisal’.143 
This concern would prove prophetic. The paper was twice dis-
cussed by the Foreign Affairs Steering Committee and the lessons 
were widely distributed, with a copy sent to the heads of all FCO 
departments and a truncated version distributed to all Foreign 
Service posts.144
The implementation of these lessons is less tangible to discern. 
The attempts to work more closely with the Americans were cer-
tainly observable over the next few years and Britain would go 
out of its way to incorporate Washington in an intervention two 
years later in Jordan. There were also some structural changes 
which slowly emerged in the aftermath of Suez including the 
establishment of a new FCO section to deal with the repercus-
sions.145 In addition, the FCO, in line with Eden’s conclusions, 
did appear to learn and re-evaluate Britain’s position in the world 
and in 1964 the recommendation was made to merge the Foreign 
Offi ce and Commonwealth Offi ce as part of an endeavour to 
reinforce Britain’s international infl uence.146 
In contrast, the MoD had a more proactive and positive 
approach to historical learning from Suez than the FCO. As the 
Commander of 16 Independent Parachute Brigade stated in the 
opening lines of his lessons report ‘suffi cient lessons of lasting 
importance have emerged from the planning and execution of 
this operation to warrant a detailed and extensive review’.147 As 
early as 26 November 1956 the School of Land and Air Warfare 
requested a team from Suez to be fl own home to discuss lessons 
from the emergency, which Brigadier Weston and Air Commodore 
Radford considered would be ‘of great benefi t’.148 Although this 
request was refused, it was on the basis that General Stockwell, the 
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ground Commander of the Allied Task Force, wished to submit 
his own report to Allied Force Headquarters before any ‘piece-
meal discussion of lessons’.149 However, learning was not rejected, 
merely delayed, with two offi cers fl own back to discuss the Suez 
operation with the School before Christmas.150 
By 14 November 1956 a report on the air aspects of the opera-
tion at Gamil Airfi eld had been produced and included lessons 
from air transport, technical, signals and the Army. This report 
was shared by the Air Ministry with the War Offi ce in January 
1957 and declared ‘The Air Ministry considers that the Report dis-
closes a number of points . . . which merit closer examination and 
follow up action in order that the lessons learned from the opera-
tion are not lost.’151 In order to ensure that these lessons were dis-
seminated and implemented, a conference was held and relevant 
actions were appropriately attributed.152 
On 4 February 1957 separate loose minutes were sent to all 
of the large departments involved in Musketeer to announce a 
cross-departmental lesson initiative and the collection of ‘major 
lessons . . . which you consider could be drawn from the opera-
tion, other than purely departmental matters with which you are 
dealing yourself’.153 The request revealed the expectation that 
learning would occur within all departments and a volume of evi-
dence suggests that this was the case; working committees were 
established, conferences held and actions attributed. In addition, 
the response to the request ensured the collection and retention 
of lessons across defence departments.154 These were then col-
lated into a paper entitled ‘Lessons from Operation Musketeer’ 
by the Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir 
Richard Hull.155
 ‘Lessons from Operation Musketeer’ demonstrated the MoD’s 
commitment to historical learning by aiming to identify important 
lessons, irrespective of the practicalities of implementation. The 
paper examined lessons in planning, mobilisation, operational effi -
ciency and administration and recognised that many of the diffi cul-
ties experienced were the result of factors outside the MoD’s control, 
including policy decisions and fi nancial limitations. However, 
although the paper was circulated, it was given very limited distribu-
tion and whilst some actions were taken to implement lessons it was 
5842_Kettle.indd   50 06/09/18   11:38 AM
51
Suez 1956
suggested that the list of lessons were not tabled at the meeting of the 
Executive Committee of the Army Council.156
Concurrently, the Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces, Gen-
eral Sir Charles Keightley prepared his own despatch on the Suez 
campaign, with the second half offering a critical analysis of the 
lessons of Suez.157 Initially this report had a very tight distribu-
tion list – to the MoD’s Deputy Secretary Sir Richard Powell, the 
Permanent Under-Secretary, the three Chiefs of Staff and Patrick 
Dean at the FCO – with requests that the report be returned to 
the Chiefs of Staff Committee once read.158 It was later exam-
ined by the Chiefs of Staff and studies were commissioned to 
implement a number of identifi ed lessons, including issues sur-
rounding command and control which were implemented by the 
1961 intervention in Kuwait.159 Requests for immediate imple-
mentation of lessons on intelligence were also sent to the JIC, on 
psyops and PR to the MoD and on inter-service subjects to the 
Joint Planning Staff.160 Furthermore, lessons reports were regu-
larly followed-up to ensure implementation, including updates to 
the Chiefs of Staff as late as 1958.161
However, in May 1957, to Macmillan’s horror, the MoD pro-
posed publishing Keightley’s report and the Chief of the Impe-
rial General Staff quickly ordered a withdrawal of all circulated 
copies.162 After some persuasion by Richard Powell, Macmillan 
agreed to the report’s publication on the understanding that it was 
to provide a purely factual and military focused account.163 More 
specifi cally, the version was to be ‘harmless’, not give rise to ‘pub-
lic diffi culties’, ‘political controversy’ or ‘friction in foreign rela-
tions’.164 In order to enforce such requests it had to be approved 
for publication by Macmillan, Lloyd, the Minister of Defence 
Duncan Sandys, and Eden himself. Unsurprisingly, as a result, the 
second part of the report, where lessons were the most prominent, 
was not published externally. Consequently, despite the MoD’s 
best attempts to widely circulate lessons, politics had again won 
over history.
Later, in 1963, the question of lessons from Suez again arose 
when the Chiefs of Staff approved a study by the Combined Staff 
College. This was the perfect opportunity for the MoD to imple-
ment lessons in the training of their personnel and would provide 
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an ongoing method to ensure the lessons of Suez were not for-
gotten. However, even six years later Macmillan’s view had not 
changed. He instructed the study to be immediately abandoned 
and his decision came to be considered as a comprehensive ban 
across Whitehall for any such study of the Suez crisis, including 
any form of history.165 
Even before this, the Working Party on Joint Service In-House 
Histories had shied away from tackling the thorny topic of Mus-
keteer and as late as 1973 the Party concluded ‘Suez would have to 
be excluded because of political sensitivity.’166 It also reported that 
even a purely military history of Suez would ‘meet diffi culties’.167 
Little had changed fi ve years later, in 1978, when the concerns 
over the ramifi cations from producing a history of Suez remained 
prevalent. In writing to the Head of the Air Historical Branch, one 
section head emphasised the legal issues surrounding the internal 
history programmes, with a specifi c reference to Suez:
. . . even ‘in house’ documents which impugn someone’s character or 
reputation are open to damages. We have to think about refl ections 
upon both individuals and organisations . . . it would be amazing if 
the top people in the MoD did not make mistakes in the diffi cult time 
from 1956.168
Therefore, even though the Air Historical Branch Steering Com-
mittee demonstrated a recognition that the history programme 
was benefi cial to ‘meet a genuine professional need of the RAF and 
of the Air Force Department’, and Suez offered some important 
and relevant lessons, it was rejected as a subject for a standalone 
history.169 Even with the protection of classifi cation, and a distri-
bution list as small as 200, learning from Suez through internal 
histories was abandoned. 
In 1957 a formal defence review was carried out allowing 
for more refl ection and formalisation of lessons.170 The Defence 
White Paper re-evaluated British defence needs based upon eco-
nomic constraints, decolonisation, nuclearisation and lessons from 
Suez. An early draft of the paper explicitly stated ‘The operations 
undertaken in Egypt at the beginning of November 1956 have 
been studied.’171 Furthermore, just as Eden had identifi ed lessons 
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for the FCO, he had also written notes on the strategic lessons 
for the MoD and sent a copy to the Minister of Defence, Antony 
Head, who was soon replaced by Duncan Sandys.172 There had 
been severe diffi culty and delay in putting together an expedition-
ary force for Suez and, embarrassingly, the French had been able 
to send almost double the numbers of paratroopers; by the end of 
Musketeer 668 British and 1,014 French paratroopers had been 
dropped. Eden therefore identifi ed that the MoD required a more 
mobile force supported by modern equipment: ‘This probably 
means that we have in proportion to our total Army too much 
armour and too much infantry but too small a paratroop force.’173 
The lesson was echoed by Keightley and the White Paper.174 Con-
sequently, the lesson was implemented through force restructuring 
and by the time of the 1958 intervention in Jordan a new, more 
mobile force was ready to be sent to Amman. 
However, few other lessons identifi ed from Musketeer were 
included within the review. The reality was that Suez had only re-
emphasised that defence policy had to be compromised due to the 
economic situation and consequently it was not possible to imple-
ment all lessons as requested. The Chiefs of Staff wrote to the 
Secretary of State for Defence on the topic of Keightley’s identi-
fi ed lessons, ‘their value will depend on our ultimate resources 
and commitments arising from our new defence policy’.175 In 
addition, time and resource would continue to remain a barrier 
to learning. One handwritten note on a report by 2 Corps on 
Musketeer stated that they agreed with the lessons identifi ed but 
asked ‘What is happening about M [Musketeer] lessons in gen-
eral? We are supposed to be processing but have almost too much 
on our plates.’176
In the IC, despite prediction and covert operation failures, 
the disbanding of intelligence links and ongoing operational 
challenges, there was little refl ection on lessons from the events 
of Suez. Instead, a remarkable continuity remained. Soon after 
the ceasefi re all intelligence departments were asked to fi nd fresh 
evidence that they could give to the Americans to persuade them 
that Nasser was a tool of the Soviets.177 However, there was no 
improvement in British intelligence assets in Egypt, leaving the 
JIC unable to provide any intelligence on the post-Musketeer 
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internal situation and forcing the FCO to beg other nations to 
share their assessments.178
A number of the pre-Suez crisis operations also quickly resumed 
with the search for an alternative government continuing into the 
Premiership of Macmillan. The Restoration Plot to overthrow 
Nasser only ended on 23 December 1957 when the President him-
self revealed the conspiracy during a speech at Port Said. At this 
speech he triumphantly handed over £166,500 to the port’s recon-
struction fund; money that had been paid by MI6 to Squadron 
Leader Khalil, who had been recruited into the plot but who turned 
out to be a double agent.179
In addition, the IC did not have the same mechanisms and pro-
cesses in place for learning as the FCO or MoD and, as the existence 
of the SIS was not formally recognised by the government until 
1995, there were no calls for any form of external inquiry, over-
sight, scrutiny or review. Internally, Dick White decided against 
commissioning a post-Suez report where lessons could be identi-
fi ed. He considered that such an investigation would be unsettling 
when he was already managing a number of other changes across 
the department.180 The JIC only commissioned one specifi c report 
on Musketeer: to examine security measures around the secrecy 
of Musketeer.181 Any other refl ections were made through much 
broader assessments of Egyptian and Soviet behaviour rather than 
refl ections upon British conduct.182 
However, the regional Chair of the JIC Middle East (JIC(ME)), 
Henry Hainworth, was much more refl ective and produced a 
report which identifi ed a number of lessons ‘which may be of use 
in any future limited war’ and was sent to London.183 These les-
sons included increasing communications with Whitehall during 
planning and coordination as well as lessons on command and 
liaison of intelligence throughout the operation. In particular, the 
JIC(ME) stressed the importance of collection and assessment 
of intelligence locally, where there was expertise. It emphasised 
that local assessment of Middle East intelligence was important 
because of understanding the specifi c tendency of sources in the 
region to ‘exaggerate and dramatise the most ordinary events’. It 
was also identifi ed that ‘the intelligence plan produced in London 
failed to take important local problems into account’.184
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In Whitehall, the report was quickly dismissed. The British 
Defence Coordination Committee considered it without offering 
any comment and it was agreed that the report was to be shelved 
until General Keightley’s report was produced.185 Once Keightley’s 
report was complete, Patrick Dean asked his Secretary to take a 
view on referring the JIC(ME) report to the JIC in London. By then 
it was August 1957 and the Secretary sceptically concluded ‘that 
an inquest on intelligence in “Musketeer” per se would be profi t-
less, the more so since the episode is now nearly a year old and the 
offi cial reports to be suppressed’.186 Dean noted on the minute that 
he agreed leaving the identifi ed lessons not to be implemented or 
further distributed.
The one signifi cant lesson which was implemented was the 
lack of oversight of the IC within government, which had allowed 
Eden to bypass the FCO and Cabinet to the SIS in pursuit of 
his own agenda. This loophole was compounded by the lack of 
guidelines for the covert operations Eden pursued and that the 
new SIS director, Richard White, had little understanding of the 
SIS machinery and ways of working. Consequently, this lesson 
was implemented by moving the JIC into the Cabinet Offi ce and 
giving the JIC Chair a clearer structure of management. It also 
restricted MI6’s pursuit of extreme operations, which may have 
led to Young’s eventual disillusionment and resignation in 1961. 
Additionally, Dean took advantage of the opportunity to reor-
ganise the SIS Information Research Department used for covert 
propaganda. He split the section into two, with one solely focused 
upon the Middle East.187 
Musketeer Learning
In planning the intervention it was clear that Eden was infl uenced 
by the recent past. His lessons were in the individual sphere, from 
personal experience of appeasement, observing imperial decline, 
managing smaller scale interventions and his relationship with 
Nasser. These lessons overrode any considerations of learning 
from elsewhere and the secrecy surrounding Musketeer meant 
that there was little opportunity to gain opposing views. He did, 
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however, try to identify further lessons after the intervention and 
distributed these to key ministers for implementation.
In the FCO there was no opportunity to learn during planning 
but little was learned from Suez either. For many, the learning that 
needed to occur was within No10 and the Cabinet, not within the 
FCO itself. For other offi cials, the concern was to look forward 
rather than back and to avoid the connotations surrounding what 
was often negatively referred to as a ‘post mortem’. For many, they 
wished the episode to be forgotten; for others there was nothing 
left to learn. Kirkpatrick, who played a key role during this time, 
refused to discuss Suez any further after the operation, even in 
writing his memoirs.188 
The one exception for the FCO was learning in the institutional 
sphere through the paper ‘British Obligations Overseas’ which 
internally identifi ed lessons echoing many of those identifi ed by 
Eden in the individual sphere months before. Nevertheless, there 
is no evidence that these institutional lessons were formally imple-
mented. Although they were distributed, this was limited and the 
failure to provide clear, institutional lessons allowed subjective 
and individual lessons to have primacy.189 
In the MoD, learning occurred during planning through 
exercises, training and some refl ection upon past operations. In 
addition, in contrast to the FCO, many lessons were formally 
identifi ed and implemented within the institutional sphere after 
Suez. A plethora of methods were used, with many lessons 
reports produced quickly after the operation. In particular, the 
learning process surrounding the airborne operation worked 
well; a report was produced, circulated, a conference held and 
actions attributed to ensure identifi ed lessons were implemented, 
whilst the Chiefs of Staff also monitored progress on implement-
ing General Keightley’s identifi ed lessons. In addition, reports 
and working groups were set up to examine specifi c diffi cul-
ties. As a result of the effi ciency of learning, there was less need 
for outspoken individual learning and lessons were retained 
for future use. Although the learning was restricted to internal 
learning and the lessons were identifi ed as part of a routine pro-
cess of post-operational refl ection, the scale of this process was 
extraordinary.
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A number of strategic lessons which were identifi ed were fur-
ther formalised in the institutional sphere and distributed publicly, 
through the 1957 Defence White Paper. This paper echoed some of 
the lessons identifi ed by individuals, including Eden and Keightley, 
but it is unclear whether it was individual learning which infl u-
enced the institutional sphere or simply that the same lessons were 
identifi ed independently in the different spheres.
There was, however, still scepticism about learning lessons. 
General Keightley’s dispatches warned of drawing broad military 
conclusions as much of the operation could have turned out very 
differently had there been either any opposition from the Egyptian 
Air Force or poor weather. In addition, a number of senior mem-
bers of the MoD felt that the unique circumstances surrounding 
Suez meant that the operation was not worth studying for lessons. 
In response to the School of Land and Air Warfare request for an 
account of the operation it was stated ‘I don’t see that the peculiar 
circumstances of the Musketeer operation afford good cause for 
altering general doctrine and policy.’190
As time passed the pressure to restrict even internal histori-
cal learning documentation was increased. Although cross-defence 
departmental learning was encouraged through ‘Lessons from 
Operation Musketeer’ it received a limited circulation and was not 
tabled at the Executive Committee of the Army Council. Keightley’s 
report was published but only under much duress, editorial persua-
sion from ministers and the deletion of the second half of the report. 
Even an internal study by the Combined Staff College caught minis-
terial attention and resorted in a political battle between the Chiefs 
of Staff and the Prime Minister. While the internal reports and inqui-
ries became slowly muzzled, the internal and external histories were 
also silenced; Macmillan’s strong reaction against historical learning 
from Suez was felt across Whitehall and as a result the MoD histo-
rians were reluctant to pursue a political hot potato. Further bar-
riers to learning were also revealed, including the lack of time and 
resources to implement identifi ed lessons.
In contrast, learning within the IC was limited. Although much 
could have been learned, the mechanisms for learning were not in 
place and Suez had little impact upon the institution; many of the 
operations continued, Arab nationalism remained, the relationship 
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with the CIA continued throughout and policy was still focused 
upon the Cold War divide. This continuity meant that there was 
little incentive for self-refl ection. Moreover, the SIS had a reputa-
tion of being stuck in the past and failing to change – something 
Dick White was keen to alter. The CIA representative Chester 
Cooper was shocked by the British IC’s archaic tendencies. He 
described his fi rst meeting with the JIC as a room full of tall men 
wearing identical Savile Row suits and Etonian blue striped ties. 
Greek verse was handed around along with the latest intelligence 
documents and the meeting was briefl y interrupted for an update 
of the cricket scores.191 
For the IC, the main learning from Suez occurred in the insti-
tutional sphere, through restructuring, and in the individual sphere 
by the Chair of JIC(ME). However, this learning was on a much 
smaller scale than the MoD and the response to the lesson docu-
ment produced by JIC(ME) in London revealed this method of les-
son identifi cation was not part of a routine process. Instead, many of 
its lessons were ignored. Unlike the MoD, no lesson documentation 
was formally produced.
The approach to learning from Suez demonstrated some key 
themes across all three departments of government. In particu-
lar, Suez revealed the impact of politics upon learning. Many his-
tories and reports were suppressed due to political diffi culties, 
allowing politics to overtake the importance of drawing lessons 
for the future. Suez also revealed how history is shaped: offi cials 
with their memoirs, nations through propaganda and institutions 
through the destruction of documentation. During Suez some 
documents were destroyed at Eden’s explicit request but there is 
plenty of other evidence of destruction throughout the govern-
ment archive, including Cabinet documents discussing the publi-
cation of Anthony Nutting’s book and routine destruction of FCO 
documents.192 Gore-Booth acknowledged this fact when trying to 
dissuade the Foreign Secretary from producing an internal history 
on Suez. He noted that any investigation would prove diffi cult 
as little evidence had been retained and that it would quickly be 
discovered that ‘sometime after the nationalisation the records 
would, so to speak, thin out and that on the crucial events leading 
up to the hostilities there would be no confi dential evidence in the 
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Foreign Offi ce offi cial archives at all’.193 Even Lord Mountbatten, 
who objected so strongly to Musketeer, removed all Royal Navy 
records containing any evidence of conspiracy.194 No copy of the 
Sèvres protocol exists in British archives and Eden specifi cally 
ordered members of the Egypt Committee to stop recording in 
personal diaries. In addition, no minutes from Egypt Committee 
meetings exist between 17 October and 1 November 1956.
The examination of learning from Suez demonstrates the fi ne 
line between the positives to be gained from history and the nega-
tives of looking back. Learning from history can have an impact 
for a country in terms of precedent, domestic politics and interna-
tional relations. At some moments after Suez politicians banished 
historical learning for selfi sh reasons, at other times there was a 
feeling that there was an importance for the country to look for-
ward to the future rather than refl ect on the past. Consequently, 
it would soon be demonstrated that the events of Suez offered a 
number of relevant lessons for other British interventions in the 
Middle East which needed to be learned.
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3 More like Korea – Jordan 1958
With the loss of our positions on the Canal and the outcome of mili-
tary intervention at the end of 1956, we were far worse placed from 
a military point of view. On the other hand the Western world had 
learnt much in the last two years and we no longer stood alone.
(Harold Macmillan, refl ecting upon the events of 1958)1
On the morning of 14 July 1958, news arrived in London that 
the Iraqi monarchy, which had been installed by Britain upon the 
foundation of Iraq in 1922, had been unexpectedly overthrown 
in a bloody coup d’état. Members of an Arab nationalist group 
named the Free Offi cers – after the Egyptian nationalist offi cers led 
by President Nasser – had rounded up and brutally murdered the 
Royal Family. The insurgents quickly took over Baghdad Radio. 
Using this platform they announced to the nation that the Iraqi 
people had been liberated from the corrupt regime which had been 
installed by powers of ‘imperialism’. They also advised that the 
body of the Crown Prince, Abd al-Ilah, was hanging outside the 
Defence Ministry for all to see. His mother Queen Nafi sa, his sister 
Princess Abdiya and King Faisal II had also been killed. The new 
Prime Minister, Defence Minister and Commander-in-Chief was to 
be Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim.
Initially, the events caused chaos in Iraq. The frontiers and 
airports were immediately closed and rioting and looting broke 
out. British buildings and expatriates were targeted by mobs as 
symbols of imperial domination. At a Cabinet Defence Commit-
tee meeting at 16:30 it was confi rmed that there had been no 
contact from the British Ambassador in Baghdad, Sir Michael 
Wright, since 9:00 and reports had advised that the British 
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Embassy had been overrun and set on fi re.2 The Embassy had 
been the secretariat of the British High Commissioner, Sir Percy 
Cox, during the British mandate over Iraq (1920–32) and was 
fronted by a statue of General Frederick Maude, who had led 
the British Mesopotamia campaign during the Second World 
War and captured Baghdad. It therefore provided an icon of 
humiliation to be attacked; the statue was toppled and the mob 
ransacked the buildings whilst the staff took refuge in the regis-
try. After some hours all members of staff were released, includ-
ing the Ambassador. They moved to a Baghdad hotel where 
they set up a temporary Embassy on the third fl oor. It is specu-
lated that the staff only survived because Qasim had learned his 
own lessons from history. In remembering the failed 1941 Iraqi 
coup, when British forces sent from Jordan crushed Rashid Ali 
al-Gaylani’s rebel government, he quickly restored order, apolo-
gised for property destruction, promised to honour all Anglo-
Iraqi oil agreements and guaranteed the safety of foreigners.3
Since Suez, the dynamics of the Middle East had changed sig-
nifi cantly with increased feelings of Arab nationalism and anti-
imperialism. In February 1958, Syria and Egypt had merged to 
become the United Arab Republic (UAR), under the leadership of 
President Nasser, and received funding and arms from the Soviet 
Union. To counteract the power merger, less than two weeks later, 
the British allies of Jordan and Iraq had formed the Arab Union 
and a propaganda battle between the two unions began.4 The coup, 
therefore, had a substantial ripple effect in the region: suspicions 
were rife that Nasser – as the embodiment of Arab nationalism – and 
the UAR were behind the actions; a Western ally, the Arab Union, 
had effectively dissolved; the 1955 Baghdad Pact – the British-led 
regional defence agreement aimed at preventing Soviet Russian infl u-
ence in the region – was threatened; and the visible rising tide of 
Arab nationalism left many Middle Eastern leaders nervous over 
their own positions. 
On the same day as the coup the President of Lebanon, Camille 
Chamoun, called the UK and US Ambassadors to request the 
sending of Anglo-American forces to protect his presidency from 
a similar fate. The Americans agreed to oblige and when it became 
clear to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan that the US had taken 
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a unilateral decision to land in Lebanon and the American Fleet 
were approaching Beirut, he joked to President Eisenhower ‘You 
are doing a Suez on me.’5 Two days later King Hussein of Jordan 
also formally requested a British and American military interven-
tion for protection against a coup.
Britain’s long established relationship with Jordan had recently 
gone into decline. Britain had been awarded a mandate over Jor-
dan after the First World War. While the country had offi cially 
become independent in 1946 Britain had retained infl uence and 
connections through advisers, experts and military Command-
ers. However, in 1955 anti-Baghdad Pact riots began the shift in 
Anglo-Jordanian relations and pro-Nasser opposition called for 
the expulsion of the British from the country. In March 1956, 
under severe pressure, King Hussein dismissed General John 
Glubb, the British Commander of the Jordanian military and 
replaced all British offi cers with Jordanians, causing much resent-
ment in London.6 When Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal, 
King Hussein was the fi rst Arab leader to send congratulations 
on removing the ‘shadow of exploitation’ from the region.7 In 
March 1957, the newly elected Nationalist Socialist Party leader, 
Sulaiman al-Nabulsi, abrogated the Anglo-Jordanian treaty of 
1948. The treaty agreed the presence of British military bases 
in Jordan with the promise of mutual assistance in war and an 
annual subsidy to be paid to King Hussein. It was supposed to last 
twenty years but its abrogation led to the withdrawal of British 
troops and the removal or disposal of all British stores, equip-
ment, installations and other property in Jordan.8 
By 1958 the Jordan relationship had declined to a level of 
resentment towards the British. Anthony Parsons, First Secretary 
in the Embassy in Amman, explained ‘We were not popular . . . 
Some of the more old-fashioned East Bank grandees clung to their 
British friends, but the younger, educated generation could not for-
give us for having created the Palestine problem, [and] for Suez.’9 
Furthermore, the US had replaced the UK as Jordan’s most promi-
nent and popular Western ally, asking the Americans for help fi rst 
before turning to the British.10 Consequently, when King Hussein 
did request assistance it offered the opportunity for the British to 
improve Jordanian relations, reposition Britain’s role in the Middle 
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East, re-establish a good working relationship with the US, demon-
strate that Britain had learned lessons from Suez and overcome what 
the Lebanese Foreign Minister, Charles Habib Malik, described as 
a ‘guilt complex’ from the Suez intervention.11 As a result, Britain 
agreed to intervene. On 17 July 1958, 16 Independent Parachute 
Brigade arrived in Jordan to secure the Amman airfi eld, protect 
King Hussein and the Jordanian government as well as the lives 
and property of British and friendly nationals. This military inter-
vention was codenamed Operation Fortitude.12 Forces remained in 
the country until 2 November 1958 as a deterrent and a coup did 
not transpire.
Planning the Intervention
Following Suez there was cross-Whitehall identifi cation of the les-
son to work closer with the Americans. The new Prime Minister, 
Harold Macmillan, and his Foreign Secretary, John Selwyn Lloyd, 
spent a considerable amount of time implementing this lesson by 
mending the UK–US relationship.13 During the Second World War 
Macmillan had served with Eisenhower in North Africa as his 
British political advisor and, in January 1957, Macmillan drew on 
his personal connection with US President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
in inviting him to work on improving the Anglo-American alliance 
and publicly demonstrate the UK–US friendship.14 The result was 
the Bermuda Conference of March 1957 where mutual plans for 
the future of the Middle East began to be discussed. By the end 
of the year a second conference was hosted in Washington and 
Anglo-American cooperation became institutionalised through 
several joint working groups to coordinate planning and policy 
for the region. These included one such group on Lebanon.15
In the meantime rumblings within the region throughout 1957 
made diplomats nervous about the position of the rulers in Lebanon 
and Jordan. In October 1957 the FCO asked the Chiefs of Staff to 
examine the possibility of British military assistance to those coun-
tries in the event of outside aggression, insurrection or subversion.16 
Macmillan saw this as the perfect opportunity to further formalise 
the new US–UK relationship and by November 1957 Macmillan 
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began to focus on securing joint contingency planning for an inter-
vention in Lebanon or Jordan in the event of a coup.17
The FCO was signifi cant in these working committees and 
also endeavoured to implement the lesson of promoting the UK–
US relationship, even with animosity towards the Americans 
from Suez remaining amongst some diplomats.18 As Macmillan 
stated on the eve of the Lebanon and Jordan landings, ‘We would 
rather be wrong together than right separately’ and the attempts 
at reconciling the relationship were largely successful.19 Indeed, 
by June 1958, when Macmillan visited the US, The Washington 
Post reported ‘Mr Macmillan will fi nd the scars of Suez all but 
healed here.’20 
At the same time the IC encouraged closer Anglo-American 
workings too, through the establishment of a Joint Intelligence 
Liaison Committee based in Washington. This body endeavoured 
to provide the structure ‘to act as a link between the Intelligence 
authorities in this country and in the USA’21 and at the time of the 
coup proved to be invaluable as the US shared news and intelli-
gence on Iraq, including the information on the state of the British 
Embassy in Baghdad.22 
However, the MoD found implementing the lesson of working 
with the Americans the most challenging as UK and US political 
and military objectives often did not align. During joint contin-
gency planning neither the British military, nor their US counter-
parts, were prepared to sacrifi ce national autonomy or command 
structure to create a truly joint enterprise. On 19 November 1957, 
the Chiefs of Staff admitted that whilst ministers assumed effec-
tive military plans existed, hesitancy on both sides had meant that 
‘nothing of the sort was taking place’.23 Instead, Britain developed 
clear contingency plans for independent interventions. For Jordan 
this was codenamed Operation Broil and would be executed almost 
exactly as planned nine months later under the codename Opera-
tion Fortitude.24
In the end, the failure to plan jointly did not cause any dif-
fi culties. When Lebanon requested assistance there was concern 
amongst the Cabinet that a similar request from Jordan may not 
be far behind and that they did not have the resources available 
to act in both states. There were also concerns over the security 
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of Kuwait and a question over whether intervention in Iraq was 
a possibility. Jordan, Kuwait and Iraq were areas where British 
interests were described as ‘paramount’ in comparison to Lebanon 
and therefore had to take priority. The Cabinet concluded that the 
Americans should be allowed to take the lead in Lebanon with 
only ‘a small token British contribution’.25 However, Eisenhower 
was keen to work independently.26 Macmillan noted the irony in 
his memoirs: ‘This was indeed a strange reversal of the situation 
only eighteen months before.’ In fact, he declared that American 
actions were ‘a recantation – an act of penitence – unparalleled in 
history’.27 A division of labour was subsequently agreed, with the 
US intervening in Lebanon and British forces sent to Jordan. 
The arrival of British troops in the Middle East so soon after 
Suez was risky and controversial, with UK–Arab relations still 
damaged and accusations of imperialism echoing around the corri-
dors of Whitehall. Even within the Conservative government there 
were serious concerns about another embarrassing diplomatic and 
military situation. Macmillan described the proposed intervention 
to the Cabinet as a ‘quixotic undertaking’ and noted in his mem-
oirs ‘It was impossible to foresee the end of the operation. It might 
have grave consequences for the nation and for the Government.’28 
The FCO was also extremely nervous and had separately iden-
tifi ed the lesson that any British intervention in the region would 
be unpopular and lead to accusations of imperialism, even with US 
support. As a result, it had already been stated that any assistance 
would have to be requested by King Hussein and involve a lim-
ited operation for troops.29 Consequently, when news of the Iraqi 
coup arrived in London, the FCO quickly began implementing this 
lesson by working with the US State Department to recommend 
wording for the King of Jordan, should a formal appeal for help 
become necessary.30 The appeal had to be written satisfactorily 
for both public and international opinion. The FCO wrote to the 
Embassy in Jordan:
We have also considered the precise form of wording which the King 
should use if he decides to make a formal appeal for help from the 
two governments. This question, which is important in terms of pub-
lic opinion and the United Nations, will be discussed in Washington.31 
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In the meantime, continuing to implement the lesson of working 
with the Americans, the Prime Minister contacted Eisenhower to 
urge for a UK–US ‘joint intention’ for an intervention and dis-
patched Lloyd to Washington to secure as much support as pos-
sible.32 Whilst Lloyd was en route, on the evening of 16 July 1958, 
the formal request for a military intervention in Jordan arrived 
but Macmillan refused to provide any commitment until he had 
received confi rmation of support from the US President. As a 
result, the fi rst consideration listed on notes taken from a meeting 
with the Minister of Defence and the Chiefs of Staff, as to whether 
military assistance should be provided to Jordan, was ‘the reply 
from President Eisenhower’.33
Macmillan also called an emergency Cabinet meeting. During 
the course of the three hour meeting, he twice phoned the US Sec-
retary of State, John Foster Dulles, to gain assurance of US support 
and to confi rm the American position.34 In the early hours of 17 
July, once Macmillan had received assurances from Dulles and had 
Cabinet agreement, the FCO was advised to inform the King that 
his request for military assistance had been granted.35 The telegram 
sent to the British Embassy in Amman emphasised that this decision 
had been made in consultation with the Americans. 
In addition, Macmillan had identifi ed his own lessons from 
Suez about managing support for the operation within Parliament. 
From the outset of the crisis he had decided to keep the opposition 
informed, taking Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell into his confi dence 
and agreeing with him how to handle the House of Commons. 
This implementation had worked well and he noted ‘The whole 
atmosphere, tho [sic] charged, was different to Suez’ and ‘There 
is none of the rancour of Suez.’36 The learning implemented in 
this careful planning appeared to pay off. Once Britain agreed to 
send troops even Anthony Nutting, one of the most vocal critics 
of Suez, was quick to support the Prime Minister’s decision and 
declared that Jordan was not another Suez because Britain was 
acting at the ‘specifi c request [of the] victims of aggression’.37
Macmillan had also identifi ed the necessity of keeping the 
Cabinet informed and committed to the operation. He wrote in 
his diary ‘I was determined not to repeat Anthony’s [Eden] mis-
take and let them say – if this venture were attempted and proved 
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a disaster – that they had not been properly informed.’38 Conse-
quently, he implemented the lesson by insisting that the Attorney 
General sat in on all relevant Cabinet meetings and providing 
the opportunity for each member to ask questions, and express 
doubts and views, before taking a fi nal vote for intervention.
The MoD had also identifi ed from Suez the importance of poli-
tics in any operation, particularly understanding the political con-
text and agreeing the political aims in advance. For the Chiefs of 
Staff this lesson was easier to implement than working with the 
Americans and, by example, a combined contingency plan pro-
duced by the Washington Working Group in November 1957 was 
fi rmly rejected because of the lack of political information and 
direction included. Writing to the Minister of Defence, Duncan 
Sandys, the Chiefs of Staff advised:
The Chiefs of Staff have examined this plan and fi nd it quite unsuit-
able as a basis for detailed planning since it disregards all political 
factors . . . The Chiefs of Staff have instructed the British team in the 
working party in Washington not to resume military planning until 
the political background has been agreed.39
Digging their heels in worked and by the start of Fortitude the 
operational plans had been amended to include limited political 
objectives: ‘secure the airfi eld, and support the King and Govern-
ment of Jordan . . . confi ne operations to the Amman area’.40 
Throughout the campaign the Chiefs of Staff also continued to 
ensure the regular updating of contingency plans with similarly 
focused objectives and the FCO provided clear directives on 
actions to be taken should certain events arise.41 
The MoD was also conscious of avoiding appearing imperial. 
Aware of local political sensitivities to the arrival of foreign forces 
Brigadier Tom Pearson – the Commander of British forces in 
Jordan – sought to secure a plan which minimised British presence. 
His outline plan specifi cally stated ‘Politically the deployment of 
British forces to assist the Amman Garrison in performing their 
task in maintaining law and order in the capital is highly undesir-
able’ instead ‘action must be limited to that required to maintain 
the morale and confi dence of the Garrison Commander and his 
units’.42 Consequently, should the events get out of hand, assistance 
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was to be strictly limited to the Royal Palace, British Embassy, two 
surrounding hills and the road communications to these areas and 
Amman airfi eld. It was also to involve the minimum use of force 
to extricate the King, the government, and British and friendly 
nationals if required.43 There were even very strict limitations on 
the use of British force expressed by Pearson as he handed over 
to his successor, Colonel Chaplain, at the end of the operation. In 
particular, Britain was not to get involved in any dispute which 
may emerge between Jordan and Israel or any civil disturbances 
which did not directly impact British lives or property. It was also 
emphasised that all ranks pay proper compliments to offi cers of 
the Jordanian Arab Army and conform to their wishes.44 
At the same time as the concern for Jordanian and local politics, 
no serious discussion was ever held over whether British troops 
should be sent into Iraq to counteract the coup. The Chiefs of Staff 
did initiate some precautionary moves for such an operation but 
further action never materialised.45 British diplomat and Soviet spy 
Donald Maclean believed this decision was ‘strongly infl uenced by 
the disastrous experience of the attack on Egypt eighteen months 
before’ but it was also likely to be because of Qasim’s immedi-
ate reassurances over oil agreements and Britain’s continuing mili-
tary commitments, and threats, elsewhere.46 In fact the FCO soon 
considered Qasim to be more Iraqi nationalist than Nasserite and 
initially thought that he may even wish to remain in the Baghdad 
Pact after all.47 In addition, the IC was caught unawares by the 
coup and was too rattled to identify means of resistance against 
the new regime. They also warned against any interference in 
the country.48
For the IC a lot had changed since 1956. On 14 October 1957 
the JIC was moved from the MoD into the Cabinet Committee 
structure and the JIC Secretariat became part of the Cabinet Offi ce 
– allowing closer government supervision of activities and a shift 
away from purely military intelligence to also include intelligence in 
the political, economic and scientifi c fi elds.49 The JIC(ME) was also 
made obsolete. At the beginning of 1958, local British intelligence 
organisations were re-evaluated and the British Defence Coordina-
tion Committee (Middle East) suggested that the JIC(ME) – whose 
responsibility included Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt – be replaced 
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by a smaller organisation at a lower level that would receive evalu-
ated evidence, thus providing more of a liaison role.50 The proposal 
removed the benefi ts of a local intelligence headquarters in favour 
of a more centralised intelligence structure, going against the lessons 
identifi ed from Suez. Nonetheless, the proposal was agreed.51 
Consequently, by the time of Fortitude the IC had very few 
Arabists in the region. Responsibility for the Middle East had been 
assigned to a European expert, Bruce Lockhart, whilst the new sta-
tion chief sent to Beirut was Paul Paulson, a former solicitor who 
only spoke French.52 In light of these limitations, on 7 July 1958, 
seven days before the Iraqi coup, a meeting was held with the 
Prime Minister and it was identifi ed that in the Middle East ‘fur-
ther expenditure would be necessary on political intelligence and 
counter subversion’.53 However, this lesson was identifi ed too late 
to be implemented and the IC – just as they had in Egypt – failed 
to offer any warning of the Iraqi coup. In fact, in a repeat of the 
events bringing Nasser to power in Egypt, MI6 had committed the 
same intelligence error of recruiting agents amongst allies rather 
than within anti-British and pro-nationalist groups. As a result, 
the SIS station chief in Baghdad, Alexis Fforter, had no idea of the 
political views of those who had led the violent attack against the 
Iraqi monarchy.54 
Intelligence from within Jordan had also reduced. In the 1950s 
Britain had developed the Jordanian security forces, including the 
training of Jordanian military intelligence personnel, and the Arab 
Legion had a British Director General of Intelligence, Colonel Sir 
Patrick Coghill. Although Coghill had been dismissed by King 
Hussein, with General John Glubb, the British initially retained 
close personal contacts within Jordanian intelligence circles, lead-
ing to some informal sharing of information.55 However, the events 
of Suez disrupted many of the intimate relationships upon which 
the SIS had come to rely for information. Although Paulson had 
tried to improve the collection of intelligence on Jordan through 
the recruitment of informants, including one operation under the 
codename Operation Jester, these attempts largely failed.56
Nonetheless, the IC had kept an eye on Arab nationalism and 
provided an assessment on its impact at the beginning of 1958. 
The problem was that this assessment focused strictly on the threat 
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to the Gulf Peninsular of nationalist and radical movements, there-
fore neglecting to examine either Iraq or Jordan.57 This issue had 
also been raised as an important agenda item for the Heads of 
Middle Eastern Mission Conference which was due to be held 
in London in early August 1958.58 In addition, in support of the 
ongoing military contingency planning, the IC had considered the 
likely Soviet reactions to any UK military action in Lebanon, but 
not in Jordan.59
When the coup emerged, the IC made a short intelligence 
assessment on the situation in Iraq and Jordan by 15:00. The 
lack of British sources meant that it relied on American sources, 
press reports, Cairo and Baghdad radios and reports from RAF 
Habbaniya – over sixty miles away from Baghdad.60 The IC also 
could not confi rm or deny whether the coup had spread to Jordan 
and advised that it was awaiting information from the British 
Embassy in Amman. Nonetheless, on 16 July 1958, British intel-
ligence were able to provide King Hussein with an assessment 
that a coup would take place against him the following day, 
orchestrated by President Nasser.61 This assessment was based 
upon the monitoring of UAR subversive activities and it was this 
intelligence briefi ng which convinced the King to make a formal 
request for military assistance.62 Suspicion over IC asset availabil-
ity and capability at this time has since led to some suggestions 
that the IC manufactured the assessment as part of a conspiracy 
to allow British troops to return to the region.63 However, US 
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had also seen intelligence 
reports of an impending coup and took the threat equally seri-
ously. He spoke to the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen 
Dulles, about the situation who advised that the US had also sent 
a warning to the King.64
During the Intervention
Despite the FCO and Prime Minister learning from history in the 
planning of the operation, Fortitude was almost immediately placed 
in jeopardy because of an identifi ed but forgotten lesson. In April 
1958, the FCO had identifi ed that the UAR and Israel presented an 
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air barrier for the military to move between Europe and the Arab 
states, especially from the bases in Nicosia in Cyprus. It concluded 
‘The value of these overfl ying rights, the measures necessary to secure 
them and the prospects of their being denied to us . . . are at pres-
ent worth active study.’65 In the confusion of the Foreign Secretary 
being sent to Washington, the lesson was implemented by request-
ing authorisation to overfl y Israel but not until the last minute and 
the Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, initially refused the 
request. This was especially concerning given that illegal overfl ying 
of Syria during Musketeer had led to the shooting down of a RAF 
plane. It soon became clear that the Israelis had also identifi ed the 
lesson from Suez of securing US support and Ben-Gurion would not 
give his consent until he received assurances from Washington that 
aid would be provided to him in the event of any retaliatory action 
from Arab countries. Similar to Macmillan, Ben-Gurion only con-
ceded approval after having awoken Dulles at 2:30 in the morning 
to receive personal assurances.66 
Consequently, whilst some aircraft, under the orders of Briga-
dier Pearson, continued to Amman with a parachute brigade to 
secure the airfi eld, others were forced to turn around. In fact, by 
the time the recall was received one Beverley had already landed. 
Four Hastings were successfully recalled but one Hastings and 
four further Beverleys continued on to reach their destination 
without overfl ying permission.67 Once landed, Pearson and his 
men were required to wait for the rest of 16 Independent Para-
chute Brigade at the airfi eld – exposed and without any support 
– until the situation was rectifi ed. The British Ambassador to 
Jordan, Charles Johnston, recorded in his memoirs that he was 
in a meeting with the Commander-in-Chief of the RAF at the 
time of the sending of the fi rst wave of British paratroopers to 
Amman. During the meeting the Commander-in-Chief was called 
away and returned white faced to announce that the operation 
had been cancelled by London. Johnston recalled ‘We looked at 
each other and I sensed that everyone in the room had the same 
thought: was this another Suez; had the British government taken 
fright in the middle of the operation?’68 Similarly in Whitehall 
Macmillan had to announce to the Cabinet that the entire opera-
tion was in danger as only 400 men had landed.69
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Even once initial permission was granted, the use of the Israeli 
route proved problematic throughout Fortitude. The British were 
reliant upon the provision of supplies by air but Ben Gurion quickly 
came under heavy domestic and Soviet pressure to renege on any 
overfl ying agreements.70 The British, therefore, came to rely upon 
the Americans to manage the situation with Israel throughout the 
campaign and eventually Eisenhower agreed to US Globemasters 
taking over all of Britain’s airlift requirements. Lessons from these 
events were quickly identifi ed and implemented when the con-
tingency plan was made by the FCO to request overfl ying Israel 
in the event of emergency caused by a coup in Jordan.71 In addi-
tion, Israel and Lebanon were approached over two weeks ahead 
of planned withdrawal to secure overfl ying rights.72 Ironically, 
in the end, the UAR allowed the evacuation to take place over 
Syrian airspace.73
The FCO also continued to implement the lesson of working 
with the Americans throughout the campaign, despite some strong 
disagreements. From the outset Washington was sceptical about 
the benefi ts of an intervention in Jordan and believed that the mon-
archy would collapse upon withdrawal of troops.74 On the ground 
in Amman, Ambassador Johnston strongly disagreed with a num-
ber of American assessments, including that King Hussein was only 
supported by 10 per cent of the population. Johnston wrote to the 
FCO ‘I distrust these facile statistics which rest on no scientifi c evi-
dence whatever.’75 When the Americans began evacuating women 
and children he accused them of being ‘well-known panickers’ 
and in his annual dispatch he also concluded ‘The line taken by 
the United States Embassy here during the crisis was often faint-
hearted, or wrong-headed, or both.’76 Nonetheless, it also revealed 
that he had managed to work with the Americans in Amman, 
whilst in Washington an informal working committee was soon 
established within the British Embassy to coordinate issues specifi -
cally related to Jordan. This committee met once a day and was 
described by Dulles as performing ‘an excellent job’.77 
Meanwhile, Macmillan worked hard throughout Fortitude to 
liaise with Washington and to secure support, for practical and 
political reasons. As well as persuading Eisenhower to take over 
the airlift of supplies and funding for the initial supplies of oil to 
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reach Aqaba, there was close cooperation throughout the cam-
paign with UK–US local operational liaison for forces and plan-
ning liaison in London.78 Although Macmillan never succeeded in 
his ultimate ambition of a truly joint operation he was determined 
not to repeat the secrecy and lack of understanding between the 
two nations that had occurred during Suez.79 He was also keen to 
continually reiterate to the President that they were ‘in it together’. 
On 18 July 1958, the Prime Minister wrote to Eisenhower ‘My 
great consolation is that we are together in these two operations 
in Lebanon and Jordan. We must at all costs not be divided now 
when we have been forced to play for such high stakes.’ He ended 
by stressing ‘our close and intimate cooperation together’.80 Eisen-
hower would later describe his relationship with Macmillan at 
this time as being in ‘fi nger-tip communication’ and at the end of 
the campaign the President wrote to the Prime Minister ‘We can 
take special satisfaction in the complete understanding and special 
cooperation which was evident between our two governments.’81 
In fact the events were so successful for reinstating the relation-
ship that by December 1958 the Foreign Secretary began working 
towards achieving a joint Anglo-American policy on Iraq and its 
new regime.82
Throughout this time the FCO also recognised that securing 
UN support for the operation was required to implement a num-
ber of other lessons identifi ed from the past: evade accusations of 
imperialism, save British resources, keep the public happy through 
a quick withdrawal, and avoid the abrupt and embarrassing with-
drawal scenes reminiscent of the Suez crisis.83 Therefore, from the 
outset of contingency planning for Jordan, the FCO had considered 
ways to make British actions ‘look more like another Korea and 
less like another Suez’.84 There was also concern throughout the 
operation that, unlike during Suez, the UN was to be ‘handled’.85 
The FCO began to implement this lesson by negotiating with the 
UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, for the replacement 
of British troops with a UN force shortly after the operation com-
menced and eventually a resolution was passed which paved the 
way for British withdrawal.86
Macmillan also leveraged his relationship with Washington for 
diplomatic support in handling the UN and Russian responses to 
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the intervention, and all policy decisions came after full consulta-
tion with Washington.87 In a revealing telegram from London to 
the UN delegation in New York, the FCO advised:
In continuing your discussions with the Secretary General I hope you 
will take care to emphasise their informal, exploratory basis. Our 
present views are still tentative and until we have discussed them with 
the Americans we do not want to give Mr Hammarskjold [sic] the 
impression that they represent fi rm policy decisions.88
In fact the one nation who was angered during this time was France. 
General de Gaulle complained that he had not been consulted and 
pointed out the impact that the actions would have on French inter-
ests in the region if the operations in Lebanon and Jordan went 
wrong.89 Perhaps infl uenced by the tri-nation Suez plot, de Gaulle 
quickly became deeply suspicious of the Anglo-American action and 
it was reported by the French Foreign Minister that he was con-
vinced that he had been deceived by the Prime Minister and Mr 
Dulles when they had previously visited Paris. It was advised ‘the 
General now has no doubt that there had been, what he called, an 
Anglo-American Turkish plot of long standing’ for the occupation 
of Lebanon and Jordan.90 The FCO, therefore, had to work hard to 
repair the damage.91
The FCO had also identifi ed the dangers of declining press and 
public opinion at home and abroad and was conscious to try to 
avoid any direct comparisons between Fortitude and Musketeer 
where possible. Immediately after the coup The Herald had declared 
that it did not want Britain intervening in the region through the 
bold headline ‘Keep Out!’ and asking ‘Has nothing been learned 
from Suez?’92 The Daily Mirror reported ‘The Mindless Muscle 
Men, who learned nothing from Suez, are all for trying it once 
more’ and the next day, under the headline ‘Blind Blind Blind’ 
declared ‘Suez will go down in history as a blunder. The British 
landings in Jordan are charged with even greater perils.’93 None-
theless, overall the British public were inclined to support the gov-
ernment, with a Gallup poll in the News Chronicle revealing two 
to one in favour of intervention.94 Macmillan and the FCO wanted 
to keep it that way and the Prime Minister immediately sanctioned 
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the creation of an FCO news executive which paid close attention 
to monitoring public opinion domestically and internationally, 
particularly in the US, and worked to maintain support by man-
aging the reporting of actions in Jordan.95 This included avoiding 
the publication of undesirable news stories which could infl uence 
public perception. In one case Johnston had to persuade King 
Hussein against the public execution of opposition collaborators, 
advising that such actions would be received badly in Britain and 
diminish confi dence towards the operation. In understanding the 
need to cultivate public support Hussein agreed to commute the 
death sentences.96 
The MoD had also identifi ed the importance of media man-
agement and maintaining public support from the 1956 interven-
tion. Lessons reports from Suez featured PR and world opinion as 
high amongst the lessons identifi ed across the three services and, 
as a result, the MoD ensured that an Embassy Press Offi cer and 
PR Offi cer were assigned to the British Forces on the ground – 
although the Air Ministry could not detach a PR Offi cer for sev-
eral days forcing them to rely on Army PR to look after its pub-
licity ‘which somewhat naturally suffered’.97 The MoD also took 
the decision not to impose a ‘D-Notice’ – an offi cial request to 
the media not to publish or broadcast specifi c stories for reasons 
of national security – upon journalists in the fi eld.98 In addition, 
the MoD worked with the Central Offi ce of Information to put 
together a documentary on the operation and provided illustrated 
profi les of service personnel to the press to secure more personal 
stories. There was even some competition amongst the services to 
secure the most positive publicity, with reporters and cameramen 
being treated to ground and fl ying sequences to provide interesting 
footage.99 However, some members of the press were still unhappy 
and complaints were made that much information remained with-
held. Even worse, information was often only censored locally, 
with Whitehall providing more details of the operation to journal-
ists in London than those in theatre, leading correspondents to 
send a telegram in protest to the War Offi ce.100
Another lesson which the FCO identifi ed and implemented dur-
ing the operation was the need to protect the British economy. The 
FCO had already recognised Britain’s diminishing means to achieve 
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its ambitions but just before the intervention, on 7 July 1958, a 
Cabinet meeting – which included Selwyn Lloyd and his Permanent 
Under-Secretary, Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar – considered a report 
entitled ‘The Position of the United Kingdom in World Affairs’.101 
As part of this meeting the Chancellor of the Exchequer empha-
sised the steady increase in the size of fi nancial commitments to aid 
allied and dependent states – of which Jordan was one – and the 
requirement to reduce government expenditure overall. A British 
subsidy of approximately £1 million a month was being used to 
fund the Jordanian Army and the intervention, therefore, provided 
the opportunity to redress this balance.102
At the outset of the operation the minister in the Washington 
Embassy, Lord Hood, was asked to stress the British economic 
position to President Eisenhower, including that there was 
already great pressure on the pound which meant a lot of money 
being spent to maintain its value.103 By 25 August 1958 Macmil-
lan and Lloyd had decided to persuade the Americans to pay for 
Jordan on an ongoing basis, to be negotiated by the FCO.104 This 
was successfully implemented and by the time of withdrawal the 
Americans had taken over the funding of the Jordanian Royal 
Family and Army – totalling around $40.5 million per year – and 
earmarking $10 million for Jordanian development.105 Despite 
the British inability to pay this large sum, Macmillan noted 
‘It will be cheap if it helps get our troops out’ whilst Johnston 
remarked ‘it is only a fraction of what the United States spends 
each year on Korea’.106
Furthermore, in an awareness of the fi nancial pressures that 
were placed on the government to withdraw from Suez, Macmillan 
was keen to ensure that economic issues, as a result of Jordan, 
were minimalised. In a personal minute to the MoD Macmillan 
suggested cost savings to offset the expenditure of Fortitude: ‘Inev-
itably the military operations that we have had to undertake in 
the Middle East must have led to increased expenditure . . . Per-
haps we should temporarily restrict training especially in fl ying, 
and other manoeuvres which cost money.’107 These concerns were 
set against the backdrop of trying to manage the defence budget 
more broadly, and debates about investment into Britain’s nuclear 
weapons programme.108
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In the MoD, the Jordan campaign was very different to Suez. 
As soon as the coup occurred immediate moves were made by the 
Chiefs of Staff to prepare for an operation but in the end only 
two parachute battalions, a parachute brigade headquarters and 
an RAF signals detachment, totalling around 1,500 men, were 
sent from Cyprus.109 Decisions on force size had to be made in the 
context of ongoing attacks in the region which required British 
troops, including in Oman and Yemen as well as a possible attack 
on Kuwait by Iraq and the defence of other UK interests in the 
Persian Gulf.110 The operation was later supported by reinforce-
ments, one battalion of Cameronians, which landed on 6 August 
1958.111 It did, however, immediately test lessons from Suez. Dur-
ing Musketeer there had been severe diffi culty and delay in put-
ting together an expeditionary force, which was only mobilised 
as a result of retaining National Servicemen beyond their usual 
time period. Although this was successful the cancellation of leave 
caused much resentment and a degeneration of discipline amongst 
the servicemen.112 As a consequence, plans were developed for 
an expeditionary force which would mount ‘limited operations 
in overseas emergencies’ and avoid such situations.113 This was 
formalised in the 1957 Defence White Paper and soon after its 
publication contingency planning for Jordan began in earnest. 
Consequently Jordan became a testing ground for the long-term 
changes that were being commissioned. 
In some senses the lessons were implemented. The restructuring 
of forces proved benefi cial but revealed that further lessons needed 
to be learned. Whilst Duncan Sandys had envisaged that the Stra-
tegic Reserve would ensure British troops arrived quickly into 
trouble-spots, Jordan demonstrated the restricted capabilities that 
remained in air power, specifi cally limited fl ying routes and take-
off bases. No British transport aircraft could fl y direct from Britain 
to the Middle East without passing through the air space of other 
countries or refuelling, and Israel’s diffi culties in this area revealed 
the precariousness of the situation. At one point the Chiefs of Staff 
were even forced to consider attacking Israeli airfi elds or jamming 
their radar in order to provide safe passage for the airlift.114 In fact 
airlift diffi culties remained throughout Fortitude and a proposal 
was put forward by the Joint Planning Staff to the Chiefs of Staff 
5842_Kettle.indd   77 06/09/18   11:38 AM
Learning from British Interventions in the Middle East
78
for a new system of Joint Planning Instructions and Joint Opera-
tions Instructions with the specifi c aim of improving the system 
of planning the air movement of troops, following the diffi culties 
of entering and withdrawing from Jordan.115 Suggestions included 
the re-examination of air routes as well as, crucially, that respon-
sibility for ensuring clearance for overfl ying other countries would 
be given to the Air Ministry for future operations. 
Despite the diffi culties during planning, the MoD did continue 
to try to implement the lesson of working with the Americans 
throughout the operation. Prior to sending troops, Britain and the 
US had set up operational liaison of forces locally and planning 
liaison in London, with this relationship continuing throughout 
the Jordan campaign.116 As the operation progressed UK–US mili-
tary liaison became increasingly important as the Americans took 
over the airlift responsibilities and the Chiefs of Staff continued to 
consider ways to engage the Americans further. Ideas included the 
provision of civilian technicians to maintain US aircraft fl ying into 
Amman and ancillary forces to open up communications.117 Two 
weeks later, further suggestions were made at the Cabinet Defence 
Committee meeting including, perhaps controversially, asking the 
US to charter merchant vessels to fl y the American fl ag and bring 
supplies to the British down the Suez Canal. Requests were made 
for everything from the transport of drummed aviation fuel to 
maintenance of an airstrip and refrigerated containers.118 As the 
operation came to an end there was a need to coordinate simulta-
neous withdrawal of US troops in Lebanon and British troops in 
Jordan, to ensure that Britain was not left exposed in the region.119 
This was successfully achieved and it was hoped that the relation-
ship which developed between the two militaries during the opera-
tion would aid more successful UK–US joint military planning for 
the region in the future.120 In fact the Anglo-American joint Plan-
ning Group soon produced a paper for the Chiefs of Staff on the 
coordination of plans for the Persian Gulf.121
Overall, the operation went very smoothly for the MoD. The 
only disturbances occurred on 29 July 1958 when a bomb exploded 
in the British Council library in Amman, without any injuries, 
and on 2 August when another bomb exploded at the Jordanian 
Development Board in Amman.122 There was one accidental fatal 
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shooting of a Jordanian civilian by a British soldier but both sides 
agreed to maintain silence over the incident.123 However, much of 
Fortitude’s success was due to good fortune. From the outset the 
Minister of Defence and Chiefs of Staff had warned that ‘The force 
would be very vulnerable if the Jordanian Army became hostile – 
particularly in the face of an attack by Jordanian Armoured units’ 
and ‘there is little direct military advantage and a certain amount of 
risk’.124 As the days went by, the MoD remained aware of the vul-
nerability of British forces and stressed ‘should any portion of the 
Army in or near to Amman, however, actually march on Amman 
and attack the Government or the British forces in the area, the lat-
ter would be placed in a very perilous military position’.125 In fact 
British troops had only been sent to support the regime and it had 
never been the intention to send land forces on the scale required 
to fi ght the Jordanian Army if an internal coup occurred.126 Conse-
quently, contingency plans were made in case the position of Brit-
ish forces was threatened but in the end troops were not engaged 
by opposition.127 Nor was there any real threat to counter, includ-
ing skirmishes between the Jordanians and Israelis, or the need to 
evacuate the King. In addition, the constant threat of supplies being 
halted by the closure of the Suez Canal did not become a reality. As 
a result, the dangers of intervening without a full strength force was 
not identifi ed as a lesson and single brigade groups would go on to 
be sent to Kuwait and Rhodesia.128
Even withdrawal was relatively straightforward, despite con-
cerns. Plans began in mid-September 1958 but the Chiefs of Staff 
were worried that forces may be required to return at short notice 
and so contingency plans were made for various eventualities.129 In 
the end withdrawal began on 20 October and was completed by 
2 November 1958 without event. The troops returned to Britain 
alongside two horses as gifts for Queen Elizabeth from King 
Hussein.130 The King wrote ‘The British force was small, but its very 
presence had given us a chance to breathe. The famous red berets in 
the streets made people realise we were not alone, that this was no 
time to despair.’131 Ambassador Johnston stated ‘[the intervention] 
was extremely well conducted both by London and by the Com-
manders-in-Chief in Cyprus. It was a model politico-military opera-
tion and achieved everything that it set out to do.’132
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For the IC no further lessons were identifi ed or implemented. 
With the main objective focused upon looking to the future and 
providing predictive assessments, there was little refl ection on the 
past. Instead, assessments were made on the outlook for Jordan, 
Soviet reaction to British actions in the Middle East and how 
Jordan would affect President Nasser’s ambitions and objectives 
for the Middle Eastern region. Reports also examined the ongoing 
subversive activity of the UAR in Jordan but none of the reports 
assessed the past actions of the IC itself.133
The lack of attempt to identify lessons was surprising con-
sidering the number of intelligence limitations and failures that 
occurred during the intervention. In particular, intelligence sources 
predicted a Jordanian coup on 12–13 August 1958 – causing all of 
the fl ying squadrons in Cyprus to be brought to a state of readiness 
– but, similar to the predicted coup of 17 July, it did not materi-
alise.134 However, there is no record within the JIC fi les of attempts 
to learn from either the inaccurate predictions or the conduct of 
intelligence gathering and assessment.
After the Intervention
Despite the success of the intervention, the FCO made little refl ec-
tion upon lessons from Fortitude. No internal inquiries took place, 
nor were there parliamentary calls for an external inquiry or any 
offi cial or internal histories written. Instead, the only identifi ed les-
sons came from Ambassador Charles Johnston in his annual review 
despatch. Primarily, Johnston identifi ed that the decision to support 
allies in their time of need was correct and benefi cial. He claimed:
We have showed both types of Arab extremists that we (the West 
in general and the British in particular) are people to be reckoned 
with . . . We have not only gained time for the Nasser-Qassim split 
to develop, but have made sure that we are still in the game, with a 
political foothold.135
For him, the intervention revealed two key lessons: fi rstly, ‘it 
proved that Anglo-American cooperation in the Arab world is 
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possible, not only on the inter-governmental level, but in the fi eld’, 
and secondly, ‘Britain still can and should play in the Arab world.’ 
Johnston mused that the British were still the best placed West-
erners to act in the Middle East and concluded that ‘[we] should 
not be inhibited by unnecessary feelings of guilt or mistaken com-
plexes of inferiority’. Thinking about relying on the Americans in 
the future he advised ‘we shall, I fear, fi nd the Americans alone 
unequal to the task. (Their performance in Jordan this year shows 
how badly they need interjections of good sense and resolution 
from us in times of crisis).’136
The despatch – and consequently its identifi ed lessons – was 
distributed to only four offi cials before submission to the Foreign 
Secretary. Whilst one offi cial simply signed in acknowledgment, 
a further commented ‘a beautiful despatch’. The other two were 
quick to dismiss the identifi ed lessons because they felt much of the 
content was self-congratulatory and overestimated the importance 
of the operation and Jordan’s continued survival.137 There is no 
record of the Foreign Secretary’s response.
Nevertheless, changes in the region, coupled with a major review 
in the US of its Middle East policy, led the Cabinet’s Offi cial Com-
mittee on the Middle East to reconsider Britain’s policy towards 
the region and the FCO began to produce the paper ‘Points for a 
Middle East Policy’ in October 1958, whilst British troops were 
still stationed in Amman, but concluded after withdrawal.138 The 
paper was written in two parts: part one dealt with UK aims in the 
region in a stable setting and in the long-term; part two examined 
UK aims in the region in the face of unrest and in the short term. 
Each identifi ed a number of lessons for the future which mirrored 
the recent Jordan experience and some of the lessons identifi ed by 
Ambassador Johnston. In particular, both parts acknowledged the 
stabilising factor and deterrent to President Nasser of the presence 
of British troops.139 The paper also suggested that although the 
operation could not be repeated in Jordan again with the same 
level of success, British troops could be used to advantage, with 
the consent of the government concerned, to prevent or forestall 
crises or coups elsewhere in the region in the future.140 The paper 
also reiterated the lesson that any future interventions would 
have to occur with American support: ‘It seems clear that the UK 
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cannot now successfully use force in the Middle East without at 
least moral support from the US.’141 The Prime Minister’s Private 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Philip de Zulueta, had reached the 
same conclusion two months before. He wrote to Macmillan iden-
tifying ‘I doubt whether action without the United States now has 
a chance of success.’142 
The paper went on to emphasise the importance of working 
with the UN, especially to aid in British disengagement from the 
region.143 The management of public opinion for any future inter-
ventions was also stressed and the paper prophetically considered 
that whilst the public may rally behind interventions, providing it 
was in defence of a British interest, ‘it is not certain that it would 
remain steadfast over a long period of occupation’.144
Some individuals did question the role and ability of the FCO 
during the operation but failed to interpret these into lessons 
which could be implemented. Ivor Lucas, who worked in the East-
ern Department of the FCO, thought that during 1958:
expertise was on occasions rather sadly lacking . . . The Iraq Hash-
emite monarch was overthrown and assassinated; there was trouble 
with Jordan and the Lebanon . . . and all these crises seemed to have 
occurred without the Foreign Offi ce or the embassies on the ground 
foreseeing them at all.145
There were similar concerns externally. Three years later Lord 
Plowden’s report on the use of manpower in the Foreign Ser-
vice noted that the FCO suffered recruitment diffi culties between 
1956 and 1958 because there was a view that the FCO had not 
improved since Suez. It reported that there was ‘dissatisfaction in 
some quarters with British Foreign Policy’ and a feeling that there 
was ‘diminished importance of work within the Foreign Service’.146 
The MoD also failed to thoroughly consider lessons from the 
events and the records are not fi lled with the same plethora of 
internal inquiries and identifi ed lessons which were present after 
Suez. Instead, the majority of post-operational reports were pre-
sented on specifi c issues, such as from the technical offi cer on pilot 
training requirements, some of which led to further investiga-
tion.147 In fact, there is only evidence of one signifi cant attempt to 
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learn lessons from Fortitude: the Commander of 16 Independent 
Parachute Brigade Group held a debriefi ng conference at General 
Headquarters Middle East Land Forces (GHQ MELF) ‘to hear 
from Brigadier Pearson the outstanding lessons of Op “Fortitude” 
from his point of view’. The conference was attended by members 
of the brigade and GHQ MELF, and it was intended to examine 
and record ‘the major lessons of this op, against the time when we 
have to undertake a similar one in the future’. The lessons identi-
fi ed included the requirement of a Staff Offi cer from the Transport 
Task Force to be made available during planning phases. It also re-
identifi ed a lesson from Suez: the need for interpreters, stating ‘the 
need for interpreters for the initial contacts between troops and 
civilians. Shooting could result from a failure to understand each 
other.’148 However, the conference record is very short and does 
not state that actions for implementation were attributed. In addi-
tion, identifi ed lessons were not widely distributed. Beyond the 
attendees of the conference, who were involved in the operation, 
the record was only distributed to four others, including the assis-
tant to the Commander-in-Chief and Staff Offi cer for the Chief 
of Staff.
Nonetheless, it is diffi cult to know for certain whether all docu-
mentation on the operation is available for analysis. Despite the 
1958 Public Records Act gaining royal assent during the Jordan 
intervention, a 1977 study of the MoD Departmental Record Sys-
tem revealed a high level of destruction of documents at an early 
stage.149 Even Service Historians ‘concerned in trying to discover 
the reasons for past policy or organizational decisions’ had dif-
fi culties in tracing archival material.150 In part this was due to the 
decentralised nature of the MoD, with many documents destroyed 
locally. The report also suggested that narrative accounts of opera-
tions were not regularly produced, nor were new recruits trained 
in lessons learned despite recognition that this would be ‘useful’. 
In addition, the few studies which were produced were not widely 
circulated or well publicised.151
An offi cial history of Jordan was not considered until 1973. At 
that time the Working Party on Joint Service In-House Histories 
described the Jordan intervention as a ‘minor operation’, arguing 
that a history of Fortitude did not warrant a monograph, only a 
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narrative, and so did not merit a full Joint Service History. How-
ever, it was concluded that the history of the Jordan intervention 
was to be researched and written as part of a wider study, examin-
ing the history of post-war deployment and intervention opera-
tions, written as an account without any analysis of lessons.152 
Therefore, whilst other commissioned histories addressed diffi cul-
ties and developments of operations within their terms of refer-
ence, the Jordan in-house history was written primarily utilising 
chronological, factual information from the war diary without any 
analysis.153 It was not until 1989, when the Air Historical Branch 
published Wings in the Sun, featuring a small section on Jordan, 
that a few additional lessons were identifi ed and retained by this 
method, including the identifi cation of poor accommodation and 
the subsequent attempts at implementation: converting marquees 
into covered messes, taking rooms at Amman’s Philadelphia Hotel 
and persuading the Jordanian government to allow the British to 
use some of the old RAF Amman buildings.154
Learning from the intervention in the IC was also limited. 
There is no record that internal refl ections upon the improvement 
of intelligence for the future were made either institutionally or 
individually and, with the removal of JIC(ME), no lessons reports 
were produced. Externally, some lessons were identifi ed in the indi-
vidual sphere. Philip De Zulueta wrote to the Prime Minister to 
complain that ‘the MI6 activities in the area ought to be looked at 
very carefully in any case. We have lamentably failed to get infor-
mation of any of the recent major events.’155 Nonetheless, very 
little was done to counteract this problem. Instead, the broader 
focus remained on Arab nationalism, Nasser and the infl uence of 
the Soviet Union in the region. A review of intelligence targets in 
November 1958 focused almost entirely on the Soviet Union and 
Sino-Soviet bloc, with countries in the Middle East barely receiv-
ing a mention.156
Instead, the only attempt to identify lessons was focused not 
upon the conducting of intelligence gathering and assessment but 
the impact that the operation had in securing Jordan and on ten-
sions elsewhere in the region. These suggested that Fortitude had 
very little long-term benefi t: ‘the situation remains fundamentally 
unstable, with only a fi ne balance between loyalist elements and 
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those with pro-UAR leanings’.157 However, the assessments also 
identifi ed that as a by-product the operation had created unrest 
elsewhere in the region. The JIC noted the impact of British 
actions upon a possible coup in Lebanon and the threat to Aden 
and the Aden Protectorate if the operation failed.158 In addition, 
in Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar a relationship with the British was 
beginning to be viewed as a liability.159 The Ruler of Kuwait had 
become particularly nervous, believing a connection with the Brit-
ish to be ‘outmoded’ and that any further success by Nasser, or an 
additional Western intervention, would spark riotous demonstra-
tions within his own country. A JIC assessment stated ‘The Anglo-
American interventions in Jordan and Lebanon have not reassured 
him – rather the contrary – since he does not believe his regime can 
in the long run be bolstered.’ In addition, the Ruler considered that 
‘the introduction of British troops, even with the Ruler’s consent, 
would stimulate unrest and might provoke strikes and sabotage in 
the oil fi elds’.160 This would be proven to be an incorrect conclu-
sion by the end of 1961.
Macmillan’s son-in-law, the MP and SIS agent Julian Amery, did 
write one paper which identifi ed the need to strengthen Britain’s 
subversive and propaganda activities in the Middle East in order 
to help counteract the rising tide of Arab nationalism.161 Anthony 
Parsons, in the Amman Embassy, agreed:
During my short stay in Jordan I had experienced the palpable infl u-
ence which Nasser’s activities exercised over the political climate . . . 
Everyone read the Cairo newspaper (except when they were banned) 
as their main source of information and political guidance, just as they 
listened to Cairo Radio . . . Cairo was the centre of the Jordanian uni-
verse and, love him or hate him, Nasser was the man who made Cairo’s 
heartbeat audible.162
By December 1958 the JIC had written a full report on ‘The activi-
ties and infl uence of Cairo Radio’, as they had in 1956, but again 
the nature of the document was to report, not to identify any les-
sons for the future.163 Even with the 1958 Iraqi coup and Leba-
nese crisis changing the dynamics of intelligence sharing within 
the region, continuity of security communications continued 
through the Liaison Committee of the Baghdad Pact, which was 
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later renamed the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). Bian-
nual meetings between Britain, America, Turkey, Pakistan and 
Iran continued to offer a forum to share intelligence, particularly 
on communist activities, until CENTO’s dissolution in 1979. 
Outside the formal methods of learning, the success of the inter-
vention did allow the British to reinstate some intelligence net-
works within the country. In particular, in October 1958, Duncan 
MacIntosh, the former British security advisor to Baghdad who 
had escaped the recent coup, was appointed advisor to Jordan. 
He identifi ed the need to reorganise the Jordanian police and laid 
the foundations for the General Intelligence Department which 
remains today, with the responsibility to ‘safeguard the security 
of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan domestically and abroad by 
means of carrying out necessary intelligence operations’.164 
Fortitude Learning
The UK intervention in Jordan in 1958 was an intervention that 
occurred in the shadow of Suez and presented the opportunity to 
demonstrate that lessons had been learned from that experience. 
Although little was formally learned from Suez in the institutional 
sphere of the FCO it is clear that thoughts of Musketeer infl uenced 
its, and the Prime Minister’s, actions during the Jordan operation. 
In fact, the learning which had the greatest impact in the plan-
ning of Fortitude came from the driving forces of learning in the 
individual sphere from Harold Macmillan and, to some extent, 
Selwyn Lloyd. Although similarly identifying the lessons of work-
ing with the Americans and managing British decline and eco-
nomics, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary moved the 
learning process forward to the implementation of these lessons 
at a strategic and operational level, through the establishment of 
working committees and joint contingency planning. Following 
their lead the FCO also implemented these lessons which were, 
therefore, learned. 
Whilst most of the lessons from Suez were negative in nature – 
what not to do – there were many positive lessons to be learned from 
Jordan. However, equally to Suez, very little lesson identifi cation 
5842_Kettle.indd   86 06/09/18   11:38 AM
87
Jordan 1958
took place in the FCO, revealing that learning from history was 
not dependent upon the outcome of an intervention. There was no 
attempt to identify lessons through specifi c inquiries or full histories 
and, unlike Suez, the idea was not even debated. Instead, there is only 
evidence of two attempts to learn from the operation itself: one in the 
individual and one in the institutional sphere. 
In the individual sphere, Ambassador Johnston identifi ed pos-
itive, strategic lessons through the formal and routine method 
of the annual review despatch. However, the despatch was only 
distributed to fi ve offi cials, two of whom dismissed its content. 
Consequently, despite some lesson identifi cation, there is no evi-
dence that the identifi ed lessons were implemented or retained 
for learning purposes. In the institutional sphere, ‘Points for a 
Middle East policy’ identifi ed lessons through an extraordinary 
method, formalising and retaining them for the future. This 
included the identifi ed lesson that British troops could be suc-
cessfully used again in a similar situation; a lesson which would 
become signifi cant three years later.
Overall, learning in the FCO was primarily within the individ-
ual sphere. Little consideration was recorded of tactical or opera-
tional lessons and more lessons were drawn from the negative 
experience of Suez than identifi ed from the positive experience 
of the Jordan operation. The incident with Israel also revealed 
a barrier for learning: whilst Britain had identifi ed the need to 
secure overfl ying rights, Israel had learned to secure US support 
before granting such permission. This demonstrated the potential 
of other learners to inhibit implementing the lessons of history.
In the MoD, during the planning phase of the operation, a 
number of lessons from Suez were implemented but were success-
ful to different extents. In particular, the Chiefs of Staff insisted 
upon establishing the political aims and direction of an operation 
before they would consider contingency planning and the newly 
restructured force was tested for the fi rst time. Other identifi ed 
lessons were not successfully implemented during the operation. 
These included the management of the media and ongoing work-
ing relations with the US military. The experience reiterated the 
new barrier to learning: opposing external actors. For the media 
specifi cally, the methods of personnel provision, access to increased 
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information and the lack of imposed restrictions did not go far 
enough, especially as the MoD did not manage a consistent policy 
in both London and Jordan. For the US, working together was 
successful in terms of coordinated, if not integrated, action but it 
did not last long term, with the working group collapsing shortly 
after Fortitude. However, although the MoD struggled to connect 
with their US counterparts in a meaningful way, the experience of 
working with American support in Jordan would set a precedent 
for all future British interventions in the region.
In addition, although the MoD had the methods available for 
retention, through in-house histories, these were not maximised. 
The Jordan operation was dismissed as ‘minor’ despite its stra-
tegic and political importance.165 Lesson identifi cation after the 
intervention was also limited, perhaps refl ecting – in compari-
son to Suez – the size of the operation. This lesson identifi cation 
remained internal and any strategic and operational lessons were 
not widely distributed.
During planning the only evident implementation of lessons 
for the IC was working with the Americans but, unlike in the FCO 
and MoD, this cannot be formally traced to an identifi ed lesson. 
During the operation itself lesson identifi cation was restricted 
to the institutional assessment of other actors, not an internal 
refl ection upon the conducting of the intelligence operation or 
learning in the individual sphere. Once the operation was com-
plete, some learning occurred externally in the individual sphere 
by Philip de Zulueta, Ivor Lucas and Julian Amery. However, 
although the identifi cation of lessons by Amery led to a further 
JIC report, it was written in the same way as previous reports 
and assessments, without any refl ection upon lessons. Overall, 
whilst the IC learned little from Suez, even less was learned from 
Jordan. The lessons which were identifi ed were negative and stra-
tegic. Consequently, the biggest barrier to learning was revealed: 
the lack of a learning culture.
Consequently, learning was primarily in the individual sphere 
in the FCO, the institutional sphere in the MoD and signifi cantly 
limited in the IC. This is likely to have been heavily infl uenced by 
the structure of these organisations as well as their general culture 
and specifi c approach to learning. For the FCO there was a clear 
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driver of learning, the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, in the 
MoD the driver was the institutional post-operational process of 
reporting, whilst in the IC a driver was lacking post-Suez. 
Learning across all three government bodies was primarily 
at the identifi cation and implementation stages, from internal 
sources and methods. There was little evidence of wide distribu-
tion or retention. In fact, no external inquiries took place and no 
histories were written with any form of analysis. Those lessons 
from Suez which were both identifi ed and implemented – such 
as the FCO working with the Americans, the MoD creating a 
new force and the IC restructuring – can be claimed to have been 
learned. However, despite Fortitude lasting twelve times as long 
as Musketeer, more appeared to be learned from the latter than 
the former. 
One element that was noticeably absent throughout Jordan was 
the use of historical analogy. Macmillan did continue to use analo-
gies in regards to Nasser during this time, with frequent references 
to his actions ‘as a sort of Mussolini’.166 However, in comparison 
to the debates over Suez, this form of the use of history was almost 
non-existent. The only prominent analogy was the result of the 
lesson of working with the Americans and the UN to make Jordan 
look ‘more like Korea’.
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4 Suez in Reverse – Kuwait 1961
History this weekend is staging a brief fl ashback of the far-off days 
of Pax Britannia. It is nothing to be ashamed of. It is not, of course, 
another Suez . . . Rather it is Jordan and the Lebanon again, without 
the Americans.
(Author unknown, Sunday Telegraph, 2 July 1961)1
Three years after the intervention in Jordan, events in the Mid-
dle East led the British to return to the region to defend Kuwait 
against the threat of annexation by Qasim’s Iraq. This intervention 
was codenamed Operation Vantage. It provided the opportunity 
to utilise and implement lessons from Suez and Jordan, and to 
demonstrate to the British public and the international community 
that lessons from these previous crises had been learned for the 
long term. Furthermore, policy-makers at the time could not have 
predicted that the lessons from Vantage might prove invaluable for 
informing the planning of an operation almost thirty years later, 
when the need to defend Kuwait against Iraqi attack reoccurred.
Following the 1958 Iraqi coup, attempts were made to estab-
lish diplomatic relations between Britain and the Iraqi revolutionar-
ies. Humphrey Trevelyan, who had been the British Ambassador 
to Egypt during the Suez crisis, was sent to represent the govern-
ment on the ground but relations between the two nations did not 
improve. A few months later Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact. 
At the same time, the dynamics between Britain and Kuwait – a 
British protectorate – were also changing. Kuwait had been signifi -
cant to Britain for decades as part of a major trading route between 
India and the Mediterranean. It offered one of the few harbours in 
the Northern Gulf with waters deep enough to dock British ships 
and in 1775, when the Persians invaded Basra, many trading routes 
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had been diverted to Kuwait where the British East India Company 
established new offi ces.
Kuwait was run by a line of hereditary Sheikhs owing alle-
giance to Turkey, but had operated semi-autonomously since 
1756. In 1896 the hereditary line was broken following the assas-
sination of Sheikh Muhammad Al-Sabah by his half-brother, 
Mubarak. This change in leadership, combined with resurgent 
Ottoman aggression, made Mubarak concerned over annexation 
by Turkey. In 1899, fearing invasion or political interference, he 
requested British military protection. At this time the Ottomans 
were receiving economic and diplomatic support from Germany. 
Plans had been made for a railway from Berlin to Baghdad to 
allow Germany access to Iraqi oil fi elds and a quicker trading 
route to the eastern parts of its colonial empire.2 The railway 
plans included an extension as far as Kuwait and the British, fear-
ing displacement in the region, were quick to agree to Mubarak’s 
request for support. On 23 January 1899 Kuwait was made a 
British protectorate; Britain provided naval protection and an 
annual subsidy to the ruling family. In return the Kuwaiti author-
ities allowed Britain infl uence over foreign policy decisions.
During the next decade Britain sought to defi ne the limits of 
Ottoman jurisdiction in the Gulf, including the boundaries of 
Kuwait. This was eventually formalised in the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman 
Convention which agreed that Kuwait was ‘an autonomous kaza 
of the Ottoman Empire’, and that the Baghdad railway would not 
extend into Kuwaiti borders. The Convention was never ratifi ed and, 
after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, the 
British invalidated the agreement, declaring Kuwait an independent 
Sheikdom under British protection.3 
In 1936 the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the American 
Gulf Oil Group drilled the fi rst well in Kuwait. Commercial activ-
ity continued after the Second World War and Kuwait’s prosperity 
fl ourished. During the 1951 Persian Oil Crisis, when the Iranian 
government voted to nationalise the assets of the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company, Britain pressured foreign countries not to purchase 
Iranian oil. The revision of oil company negotiations led to a 
review of Kuwait’s Concessionary Agreement and Kuwait’s annual 
oil income rose from £5 million in 1950 to £90 million in 1954; 
Britain had become increasingly reliant upon Kuwaiti oil whilst 
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the protectorate was rising in wealth and becoming less reliant 
upon British patronage.4 Consequently, there were increasing calls 
from Kuwaitis for formal independence from Britain and in June 
1961 a compromise was reached; independence would be granted 
but, in order to protect British assets and interests, Kuwait could 
call upon British military protection if required. This agreement 
was formalised through an Exchange of Letters on 19 June 1961.5 
Days after the declaration of Kuwaiti independence, President 
Qasim of Iraq caused alarm by verbally annexing Kuwait, assert-
ing it as part of Iraqi territory based on historic claims. By 28 June 
1961, Trevelyan was reporting from Baghdad that a military attack 
on Kuwait, to annex the country forcefully, was imminent.6 On 30 
June, the Ruler of Kuwait – Emir Abdullah III Al-Salim Al-Sabah 
– made a formal, urgent, request for British military assistance – 
under the terms of the Exchange of Letters – for protection against 
such annexation. The fi rst forces landed the next day.
The military operation in Kuwait was the largest mobilisation of 
British forces in the region post-Suez and the scale of operation would 
not be exceeded until the British troop contribution to the Gulf War 
in 1991. On 1 July 1961, Royal Marine Commandos landed by heli-
copter from HMS Bulwark, paratroopers arrived by air, Centurion 
tanks landed from HMS Striker, the Coldstream Guards were fl own 
in from Bahrain and 24 Brigade from Kenya. Transport aircraft from 
the Royal Rhodesian Air Force helped in the build-up of forces and 
units of the Kuwaiti Army were also deployed. By 7 July, the force 
had been substantially reinforced. All three services had major units 
involved with a total of 7,000 servicemen taking part and an addi-
tional 3,000 on standby and auxiliary duties.7 Despite this demon-
stration of force, and in similarity with Jordan, not a single shot was 
fi red. Redeployment began on 20 July but British troops remained 
in the country until 19 October 1961, when Kuwait’s security was 
handed over to an Arab League Security Force (ALSF). 
Planning the Intervention
For the FCO very little had changed since Jordan. Attempts to 
develop a meaningful relationship with the US over long-term 
planning for the Middle East region had faltered and, with the 
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Berlin crisis starting in November 1958, almost all of Wash-
ington’s focus had quickly turned away from the region. When 
the crisis in Kuwait began to unfold, the US, by now under the 
administration of President John F. Kennedy, took very little inter-
est, providing a new, high risk backdrop to British military action 
in the region. 
The FCO was, however, deeply involved in the run-up to the 
Kuwaiti crisis and therefore had the opportunity to incorporate 
identifi ed lessons into the planning of the intervention. It was 
Ambassador Trevelyan who provided a stream of reports from 
Baghdad and advised on troop movements and the Iraqi threat. 
Initially, Trevelyan dismissed Qasim’s speech as sabre-rattling 
but his tone soon changed and he advised ‘We shall watch Iraqi 
actions closely here and in Basra. Rumours of troop manoeuvres 
in Baghdad.’8 By 27 June, Trevelyan appeared more alarmed, ‘On 
further consideration I am inclined to think that . . . Qasim’s origi-
nal plans may have been further developed than we guessed and 
may have included an early internal coup supported by military 
action.’9 The next day two further telegrams were sent: the fi rst 
emphasised that an early warning of an Iraqi attack could not be 
given,10 the second recommended a pre-emptive, deterrent British 
force be sent to Kuwait. He advised: 
My most recent information reveals Qasim’s intention to build up in 
Basra a striking force suitable for an attack on Kuwait. It would help 
to deter him from using it if he could see that we had collected forces 
in the vicinity which he would have to meet.11
In some quarters of the FCO post-Suez nervousness towards 
intervention still remained and the Eastern and Arabian Depart-
ment were split over Trevelyan’s recommendation.12 Earlier in 
the year, in a letter to Sir Roger Stevens, the Governor of Aden, 
Charles Johnston – who had been Ambassador to Jordan during 
Fortitude – had written:
As I see it, one of the worst things that have happened to us since the 
war, and more particularly since Suez, is that in the Middle East we 
have lost our confi dence in our own ability to deal with situations 
. . . Our Suez fi asco seems, in effect, to have left a far deeper mark on 
ourselves than on the Arabs.13
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In addition, in the run-up to the crisis, Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan had written of his own concerns regarding ‘a show of 
animosity against Britain for interfering in Arab affairs’.14 To make 
matters worse, Qasim’s press statement had already set the media 
tone by accusing Britain of behaving imperially in the Middle East 
since the eighteenth century and providing a history of ‘British 
imperialism for military and economic purposes’.15 Sir William 
Luce, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, advised ‘I cannot 
believe that even Kuwaiti oil could make it worth our while to take 
part in such a putting back of the clock, with all its dire political 
and military consequences.’16 Consequently, once the decision had 
been made to intervene, the FCO worked hard to avoid accusa-
tions of imperialism. Lessons identifi ed from Jordan – which had 
shown that British troops could be used to benefi t in such a situa-
tion with the consent of the government concerned – were drawn 
upon. The FCO advised, ‘What we wish to achieve, if we have to 
move, is something like the Jordan situation.’17 
In the fi rst instance, lesson implementation meant insisting that 
the Emir of Kuwait formally request British military assistance 
under the terms of the Exchange of Letters. Although the Ruler 
had been reluctant in asking for British military measures, for fear 
of jeopardising his support from Arab countries, it was important 
to the FCO to present the intervention as a Kuwaiti initiative. This 
would ensure that the FCO could circumnavigate any accusations 
of imperialism and that Britain would not be viewed as under-
mining Kuwaiti independence or delegitimising its position in 
the region.18 
The FCO also endeavoured to maximise Arab support, which 
was not straight forward. Although initially supportive of Kuwaiti 
independence, the Arab response to Qasim’s statement had been 
indecisive and hesitant. Jordan was particularly reluctant to offer 
support, having developed friendly relations with Iraq founded 
on a common aversion towards Nasser. In addition, King Hus-
sein was frustrated that, despite his best efforts, Kuwait had not 
established diplomatic relations with his country and was con-
cerned that suspicion would surround any British intervention 
in the Middle East; he advised the British Ambassador that he 
had to be careful not to meet with him in order to avoid any 
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possible accusations of collusion.19 King Hussein only changed his 
mind when the Iraqis rejected his proposal of a Jordan–Kuwait–
Iraq federation.20 On the other hand, King Saud quickly declared 
his solidarity with Kuwait and a small detachment of thirty-one 
Saudi paratroopers landed with the fi rst British troops. However, 
as Saudi Arabia had also broken off traditional diplomatic rela-
tions with Britain in 1956 – leaving the FCO to rely upon the 
US government as a diplomatic intermediary – the paratroopers 
refused to liaise with British forces.21 
The return of British troops to Arab soil did lead some com-
mentators to revisit the events of 1956 and draw unfl attering com-
parisons. Many Cairo newspapers declared disgruntlement, with 
headlines including ‘A bad day for all Arabs’ and ‘Forces of British 
imperialism fi nd the opportunity and land in Kuwait’. However, 
in an ironic turn of events, President Nasser of Egypt allowed Brit-
ish warships to pass through the Suez Canal to reach the Gulf 
state and he used the intervention to scold Iraq for attacking fel-
low Arab nations rather than criticising Britain for its response.22 
These sentiments were echoed by Mohamed Heikal, the editor of 
the popular Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram, who declared Van-
tage to be ‘Suez in reverse’.23 For him, Suez had been hailed as a 
triumph of Arab rights over British imperialism but, by threaten-
ing Kuwait, Qasim had directly caused the return of British troops 
to the region. Paradoxically, therefore, fi ve years after Suez, the 
‘imperialists’ had returned by invitation to protect the rights of an 
Arab nation.
Outside the region the FCO worked to gain and maintain the 
support of the wider international community. After the scuffl e dur-
ing Fortitude the FCO had learned the lesson of informing France 
of the situation, although this may also have been due to the ongo-
ing European Economic Community (EEC) negotiations.24 Britain 
was also quick to explain its position to Commonwealth coun-
tries and kept them informed of its intentions throughout.25 The 
response from most countries was overwhelmingly supportive, 
with the exception of Pakistan.26 Pakistan advised that they could 
not publicly be seen to take sides over the Iraq–Kuwait dispute 
however sympathetic they felt because of the prestige they lost in 
the Arab world after supporting the British over Suez.27
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From the outset the FCO also paid special attention to the UN. 
The FCO wrote to the British Ambassador in Washington, Harold 
Caccia, ‘We are very conscious of the United Nations angle on 
this.’28 Learning from the successful action in Jordan, the FCO 
was keen to replicate the experience in Kuwait and the UK repre-
sentative in New York, the former Chairman of the JIC, Patrick 
Dean, agreed ‘we should aim to follow the Jordan precedent as 
closely as possible’.29 The US also agreed to support Britain in the 
UN and follow the ‘Jordan precedent’ to gain a good position in 
the Council. This precedent required the Ruler of Kuwait to send 
a letter to the President of the Council as a deterrent for Iraqi 
aggression. Once British action had been taken Britain and the US 
would take the initiative to call the Council to meet and would 
report on the situation. No resolution would be tabled, for fear of 
Russian veto, but the British case would be stated and supporting 
speeches welcomed from other delegates so as to provide a form 
of international political endorsement.30 In addition, British forces 
were instructed not to enter Kuwait before 7:00 on 1 July 1961 in 
order to comply with UN formalities.31
Given the importance of history in Iraq’s claim over Kuwait, in 
preparation for the Security Council meeting, the FCO’s Arabian 
Department prepared three historical works for reference.32 The 
UK’s UN Mission advised that the information was useful but that 
the information would have been even more worthwhile if it had 
been available more promptly.33 This demonstrated the benefi t of 
producing ongoing and timely histories. 
The FCO further implemented the lesson of keeping the Ameri-
cans informed throughout the planning stage of the intervention. 
Anglo-American discussions about the possibility of an Iraqi 
threat, and consequences of military action in Kuwait, had taken 
place for some time and by the summer of 1961 a specifi c study 
had been produced. Immediately after Jordan, in September 1958, 
a UK–US Planning Group was set up for this purpose. Macmillan 
expressly wrote to Washington in 1959 requesting that the Group 
be used to develop ‘joint planning on the lines we prepared for 
Lebanon’ for the protection of Kuwait.34 In the early stages of 
planning Britain experienced the same challenges of working with 
their American allies as they had in planning Fortitude, with the 
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US continually reluctant to share any military plans.35 In 1960, an 
agreed paper concluded that ground operations would be under-
taken by either UK or US troops but in each case logistical support 
would be provided by the other due to the shared American and 
Western interests in Kuwait’s independence. By June 1961, how-
ever, the Arabian Department at the FCO identifi ed the American’s 
lack of commitment: ‘The net result therefore is that we have no 
details of American plans, the Americans have always refused to 
discuss joint planning and seem now, on the military level, likely 
to close the door.’36 In the end, coordination was never achieved; 
US forces did not take part in the operation and Washington was 
keen to leave the British to manage what they deemed an essen-
tially Arab affair.37 
Nonetheless, as a result of the attempts at joint planning Prime 
Minster Macmillan was confi dent of gaining US support for the 
operation and declared ‘I think the Americans will be alright on 
this occasion’, although reassurance from Washington was still 
sought.38 On 28 June 1961, the FCO instructed Caccia to advise 
the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, of London’s intentions to 
intervene. Macmillan explicitly referenced the close working rela-
tionship between John Foster Dulles and the former Foreign Secre-
tary, Selwyn Lloyd, during the Jordan intervention and advised of 
his hope that ‘we could act in the closest cooperation’ again.39 He 
was quickly reassured ‘Your thinking coincides with ours . . . and 
we are prepared to render the full political support you request.’40 
Rusk offered the assistance of a small naval force, if required, and 
vital diplomatic, moral and political support. This support was 
quick and forthcoming.
The IC also continued to work on the UK–US relationship, which 
the FCO considered to be invaluable. In fact, diplomats were con-
vinced that it was ongoing intelligence sharing that persuaded the US 
to support British actions in Kuwait. In the FCO’s Arabian Depart-
ment, Edwin Maynard wrote ‘The way we took the Americans and 
Canadians fully into our confi dence on Iraq/Kuwait intelligence mat-
ters is believed to have infl uenced their policy.’41
In the meantime, Macmillan also remained aware of the lessons 
which he had identifi ed from Suez and Jordan on the importance 
of maintaining Cabinet and parliamentary support. In the fi rst 
5842_Kettle.indd   97 06/09/18   11:38 AM
Learning from British Interventions in the Middle East
98
instance, to implement the lesson and try to avoid the ‘dithering’ 
that had occurred over launching Musketeer and Fortitude, Mac-
millan convinced the Cabinet to leave the management of the crisis 
to him. However, he was also cautious with this approach and 
wrote in his diaries: ‘Remembering Suez, I was careful throughout 
to have meetings of ministers (including Chancellor of the Exche-
quer, Lord Chancellor and Home Secretary) and also – before the 
fi nal decision to launch the forces – of the whole Cabinet.’42 In 
fact, Macmillan went around the Cabinet table and asked minis-
ters individually if they had all the information that they wanted to 
make a decision, and whether they agreed to send troops.
For the MoD, much had changed since Jordan but not because 
of it. Jordan had occurred during a period of transition in the mili-
tary – after Suez and the reforms of the 1957 Defence White Paper 
– and had provided an initial, small scale, test of these changes. 
The Defence White Paper was subject to a fi ve year development 
plan that was coming towards its conclusion and Kuwait offered 
the fi rst large scale test of the amendments under emergency con-
ditions. As a result, the success of the operation was politically 
important. Similarly, lessons identifi ed from the operation would 
be signifi cant for feeding into the 1962 Defence White Paper, shap-
ing Britain’s future defence policy as it withdrew east of Suez. 
Despite MoD diffi culties of working with the Americans, con-
tingency planning had continued and military plans for Vantage 
had been drawn up since November 1959, even further in advance 
than the contingency plans for Jordan or Suez. Movement appen-
dices for Vantage had been revised in December 1960 and equip-
ment had been stockpiled to improve readiness. At the beginning 
of 1961 a rehearsal exercise had also been conducted in the 
Trucial States allowing further lessons to be identifi ed. A revised 
concept was in preparation to implement these lessons – code-
named Bellringer – and was due to become effective in Septem-
ber 1961. When the Iraqi threat emerged sooner than expected 
a number of elements of Bellringer were quickly incorporated 
into Vantage.43
In July 1960, the state of readiness was relaxed to no less than 
four days due to intelligence on Iraqi intentions. However, the 
events of June 1961 progressed rather more rapidly than expected 
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and the FCO quickly recommended a military, rather than diplo-
matic, route be pursued. In the event, Commander-in-Chief Middle 
East, Air Marshal Charles Elworthy, criticised the assumption of 
a four day warning as ‘ill found’ and ‘might have led to the most 
dangerous situation’, openly accusing the JIC of providing assess-
ments too late.44 The last assessment had been provided on 12 June 
1961 and stated that it was unlikely that Iraq would risk attack on 
Kuwait, that for political reasons such an attack would probably be 
preceded by an attempted insurrection and that a warning period 
could be expected. However, for Elworthy, much of the revised 
assessment provided on 18 August would have been equally valid 
in June and the lack of the planned warning period caused prob-
lems in the build-up phase; the imperative of getting troops quickly 
into Kuwait delayed the arrival of headquarters and administrative 
personnel. In addition, pre-planned reinforcements – to be dropped 
off in Cyprus and Aden – had to make way for the parachute bat-
talion, 45 Commando and 11th Hussars.45
For the IC concerns over the spread of communism had con-
tinued to dominate its agenda since 1958. Nonetheless, the IC had 
been warning of the threat of Iraqi aggression and, in contrast to 
Suez and Jordan, the IC had been predicting Iraqi actions towards 
Kuwait for years. As early as January 1957, the JIC had described 
the Iraqi government, suffering from fi nancial diffi culties, as ‘hav-
ing for some time been casting covetous eyes on Kuwait’ and 
between 1958 and 1961, the IC demonstrated some lesson iden-
tifi cation and implementation through the continual re-evaluation 
of assessments on the Iraqi threat to Kuwait, often at the request 
of the MoD.46 
Immediately after the 1958 Iraqi coup, the Joint Planning Staff 
produced a paper for the Chiefs of Staff which considered means 
of rapid intervention in Kuwait to protect British oil interests.47 
The ability to intervene was also reconsidered on 17 September 
1958, whilst the political and economic implications for military 
intervention were considered in December 1958.48 At the same 
time, assessments from the IC predicted that the new Qasim regime 
would maintain claims to Kuwait but aim to achieve its objectives 
of annexation through internal subversion rather than outright 
aggression.49 In fact, the early capability assessments of the JIC 
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suggested that Iraq was incapable of going to war abroad, being 
both disorganised and lacking training and experience, largely due 
to the anti-nationalist purge of offi cers in 1959. In March 1959, 
military planners asked the JIC to disregard assessing the likeli-
hood of an invasion and focus upon how an Iraqi invasion into 
Kuwait might take place. The JIC assessed Iraqi attack scenarios 
and provided predicted warning times for Iraqi aggression which 
fed into the MoD plans. It was this assessment which concluded 
that Britain could expect ‘to receive not less than four days’ warn-
ing of the assembly of an invasion force in the Basrah [sic] area, 
but, once this is assembled [Britain] could expect little or no warn-
ing of an actual invasion’.50 
At the beginning of 1961, the JIC provided another long-term 
assessment which concluded that Qasim was focused upon improv-
ing relations with Arab countries and was therefore unlikely to 
act aggressively towards Kuwait, another Arab country.51 The 
report also concluded that the Iraqi Army was incapable of con-
ducting an operation outside Iraq, reinforcing its disorganisation. 
The JIC concluded ‘The Iraqi Armed Forces, at present capable of 
little more than an internal security role, are unlikely to show any 
marked improvement in their capability’, a conclusion which had 
also been reached by the Military Attaché in Iraq, Colonel J. W. 
Bowden, in January; ‘Due to lack of experienced commanders, the 
state of training and lack of the normal supply organisation, it is 
not considered probable that the General Staff would consider, let 
alone launch, an offensive operation.’52 This assessment led to a 
lack of urgency in updating the contingency planning of Vantage 
with Bellringer.53
The IC also had more intelligence assets available in 1961 than 
they had in the areas of crisis in 1956 or 1958. A new SIS sta-
tion had opened in Kuwait, in 1958, after pressure from British 
Petroleum executives. It was opened by one of the few Arabists in 
the service at the time, John Christie, who was dispatched from 
Bahrain to persuade the Al-Sabah ruling family that Kuwait’s 
security depended upon an SIS created counter-intelligence service 
to infi ltrate Kuwaiti society. He was also to escort British Army 
offi cers to the Mutla Ridge on the Iraqi border to prepare maps 
in case Iraq invaded.54 Across the border in Iraq there was also 
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a SIS station in Baghdad, under Henry Coombe-Tenant, which 
exploited long-term relations with offi cers in the military and 
security services to get intelligence.55 
Once Qasim issued his threat of annexation on 25 June the 
intelligence reporting from on the ground came thick and fast. 
With assessments required from both the Embassy in Baghdad and 
the Consulate in Basra information was gleaned through a vari-
ety of informants, sources and means. These included confronting 
senior offi cers, speaking to rail offi cials and interviewing friends 
and families of regiment members.56 One telegram even suggested 
monitoring the demands for large quantities of diesel fuel as a 
possible indicator of the mobilisation of armoured regiments.57 
In addition, propaganda monitoring of the Iraqi press and radio 
continued, as did liaison with the Kuwaiti military intelligence. 
However, the SIS station in Baghdad assessed the announcement 
as propaganda whilst intelligence reaching the FCO soon contra-
dicted this conclusion, with reports from the Ambassador and 
Colonel Bowden showing increasing concern over the movement 
of troops.58 Bowden also liaised with the other Military Attachés 
in Iraq in order to pool resources, despite some of their dubious 
competences; the Turkish offi cer was described by one diplomat 
as really ‘off the wall’.59 Britain’s alert status was heightened on 
28 June 1961 and it was also on this day that Trevelyan advised 
that he could no longer guarantee the anticipated warning time 
that had been determined by the IC for the military contingency 
planning. In fact, it was Bowden’s assessment of Iraqi prepara-
tion for invasion which led to the MoD’s preparatory moves on 
29 June and over time the IC leaned increasingly on the mem-
bers of the British Embassy in Baghdad and Consulate in Basra 
for intelligence.60 In his memoirs Ambassador Trevelyan described 
the different methods through which information was sought and 
summarised some of the evidence that was collected by himself 
and his team. These included large orders for aviation spirit, req-
uisitioning of railway wagons and the widening of the road from 
Basra to Kuwait at night for heavy traffi c.61 Asking FCO staff 
to gain intelligence on the ground put personnel under pressure 
and in danger but on 5 July 1961 the FCO wrote to Baghdad 
‘War Offi ce greatly appreciate information Her Majesty’s Consul 
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General Basra has been able to supply under diffi cult conditions 
and much regret lack of other sources compels them to ask for 
more.’62 This left one government representative in Kuwait to con-
clude ‘One lesson of the recent events appears to be that we cannot 
rely solely on accurate intelligence of Iraqi troop concentrations.’63 
In fact, it had been assumed that intelligence of any force concen-
tration in Basra would solve this problem but it was confused by 
preparations for a military parade to celebrate the 1958 coup on 
14 July.64
Where Trevelyan and his team were unable to provide further 
intelligence was on Qasim’s intentions.65 There were some suspi-
cious signs: rumours were circulating that the Minister of Housing 
had been ordered to visit Kuwait to draw up plans for housing 
projects, there was a report that a senior offi cial in the Ministry 
of Finance had his leave cancelled to draw up a new budget to 
incorporate Kuwait and it was announced that Kuwaitis no longer 
had to conform to foreigner regulation in Iraq.66 However, this 
was speculation and the information passed to the Cabinet failed 
to emphasise that intentions remained unknown. The IC seemed 
to be able to offer little more on Iraqi intentions. Certainly none 
of the JIC assessments released in the public archives made clear 
the distinction between capabilities and intentions. Trevelyan did, 
however, portray Qasim as obsessed with history and the histori-
cal justifi cation for the annexation of Kuwait. He was described as 
displaying Ottoman documents, letters and old maps ‘like a child 
displaying its toys’ and went to great effort to produce materials 
about Iraq’s historical claim.67
The IC had already identifi ed its collection weaknesses during 
planning. In an attempt to corroborate HUMINT the IC relied on 
signals intelligence (SIGINT) from Baghdad and Cyprus, the con-
tinued monitoring of Iraqi media and increasing the observation 
of trains on the Baghdad to Basra line.68 The IC also placed much 
emphasis on the use of IMINT to substantiate HUMINT reports. 
The benefi t of reconnaissance for substantiating HUMINT had 
been identifi ed as a lesson by the Commander-in-Chief in Musketeer 
and the IC had agreed.69 Upon reading the Commander-in-Chief’s 
report the JIC stated ‘this report only serves to re-emphasise the 
pressing need for the maintenance of an adequate and up-to-date 
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reconnaissance force . . . in any theatre of operations’.70 Further-
more, in January 1960 the Air Ministry had suggested that Can-
berras could deliver blanket coverage of photo reconnaissance of 
Southern Iraq to implement this lesson.71 
However, there soon proved to be a number of diffi culties at the 
operational level with lesson implementation of IMINT. In par-
ticular, entering another state’s territory during peacetime required 
approval from the Cabinet and this caused signifi cant delays in the 
process. Once approval was given, reconnaissance did not solve 
the problem as missions were unable to locate an armoured regi-
ment which was reportedly on the move. Canberras were routinely 
fl own but severe haze often degraded their images and by mid-
August the JIC was still unable to confi rm any reports of move-
ment.72 This was signifi cant as George Hiller, the Head of the FCO 
Western Department, admitted ‘[the] decision to send troops was 
based on military appreciation [of the] situation following realiza-
tion Intelligence had lost track [of a] squadron’.73 Furthermore, 
one report from the bridge of HMS Bulwark revealed that the 
ship’s crew were aware of being badly in need of up-to-date intelli-
gence, images and maps, none of which could agree on the nearest 
position to the new civil airport.74
During the Intervention
Once the operation began, the implementation of many lessons 
identifi ed from Musketeer and Fortitude was immediately tested, 
beginning with the movement of troops by air. In fact, the air 
movement of around 700 tons of stores in the fi rst six days of the 
operation revealed a signifi cant increase in speed and effi ciency 
due to intensive and combined training of the Army and the RAF.75 
However, the issue of overfl ying rights immediately re-emerged, 
despite it previously being identifi ed as a lesson. There was already 
a ban on the British overfl ying certain Middle East countries, forc-
ing long routes from Cyprus via Turkey and Iran into Kuwait. 
Although Iran granted permission, Turkey and Sudan initially 
refused to permit fl ying in their air space.76 As a result, within 
hours of taking the decision to implement Vantage, the Defence 
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Committee was recalled and the parachute battalion was forced to 
stand down, just as it had in Fortitude. Emergency alternative fl y-
ing routes were considered, all of which were longer (at least 7,000 
miles more) and had additional complications.77 
The failure to successfully implement the lesson forced the FCO 
to request that the US Ambassador in Ankara, Raymond Hare, 
persuade the Turkish Foreign Minister to grant overfl ying rights. 
Washington agreed and Hare drew upon the analogy of the US 
approval of overfl ying rights from Israel in the 1958 intervention 
in Jordan to provide reassurance.78 He also provided an offi cial 
reply advising of US government approval of UK actions and reas-
suring that any attack from Russia would be treated under Article 
V of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) treaty; that 
an attack on one NATO country would be viewed as an attack on 
them all.79 The next day Turkey agreed to overfl ying, but only by 
night and with specifi c conditions which were to be ‘scrupulously 
observed’.80 This meant that aircraft could not fl y and return in 
one day, leading to congestion and aircraft grounded and exposed 
to attack in Kuwait during the day.81 
In the case of Sudan, the government refused overfl ying and 
refuelling. However, not wishing to irritate the British, the Suda-
nese Minister for Foreign Affairs hinted that fl ying should continue 
without a request. If all went well no one would ever know and he 
advised ‘even if by ill fortune an aeroplane landed in Sudan it could 
easily be hushed up’.82 
Despite these diffi culties, the identifi ed lesson of securing overfl y-
ing rights was still not fully implemented. There was soon an addi-
tional requirement to overfl y Saudi Arabia with troop supplies, but 
gaining these rights proved equally diffi cult. As the Saudis had bro-
ken off diplomatic relations, the FCO initially requested the US to 
gain overfl ying rights on its behalf.83 A positive reply was promptly 
returned.84 However, King Saud insisted the request for overfl ying 
came from the Emir, not from the British or via the Americans, 
and when permission was granted it also was given with strict limi-
tations.85 Even worse, the Air Ministry had been overfl ying Italy 
for four days before it was realised that permission had been over-
looked. The unfortunate British Ambassador was dispatched to 
apologise and handle the situation in Rome ‘in whatever manner 
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you think appropriate’ only to report back to London that the Ital-
ian Air Ministry were ‘maddened’.86 Commander-in-Chief Elwor-
thy would again identify the overfl ying diffi culties as a lesson for 
the future, acknowledging that the delay in obtaining permission to 
overfl y Turkey and the Sudan could have been critical and recon-
fi rmed the existence of an air barrier. For him this meant either 
that deliberate overfl ights without permission would have to occur 
or the lesson could be implemented through ‘the stationing of suf-
fi cient air transport on the right side of any potential air barrier’.87 
Sir William Luce agreed and to implement this lesson in the short 
term it was fi xed that a parachute battalion would be permanently 
stationed in Bahrain, despite the vast expense of building and main-
taining new air conditioned barracks.88 
The operation was also a test for the new Middle East Com-
mand based in Aden. One of the lessons identifi ed from Suez had 
been that the existing command structure was unreliable and ‘not 
a set-up recommended in any future operations’.89 The lesson was 
subsequently implemented through the division of the existing 
Middle East Command into two in 1959: one based in Aden and 
one in Cyprus (which was renamed Near East Command). The 
new Middle East Command allowed for a Commander-in-Chief 
to have regional command of decision-making and report directly 
to the Chiefs of Staff in London. Once the Iraqi threat was per-
ceived to be imminent initial operational management was slow, 
with piecemeal alerting of different parts of the force, delays in get-
ting the Canberra photo reconnaissance detachment to the Persian 
Gulf, further clarifi cation required on actions to be taken in the 
event of an attack and misunderstandings over codewords. The les-
son was identifi ed: ‘There seems a clear need for an organisation in 
the Ministry of Defence to be nominated to perform this function 
in the UK and for parallel action in overseas command.’90
Once troops had landed, Air Marshal Charles Elworthy moved 
1,200 miles closer to theatre – joining Sir William Luce in Bahrain, 
which allowed daily visits to Kuwait and twice daily meetings with 
all Commanders.91 Being situated in the Residency also enabled the 
Commander-in-Chief to be provided with copies of all FCO tele-
grams and intelligence. In his post-operational report Elworthy iden-
tifi ed ‘The Command structure established at Bahrein [sic] worked 
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very well and I am convinced of the need for the source of military 
command and political direction to be situated together in an opera-
tion of this type.’92
However, the command structure was still not successful for 
managing a tri-service operation. Whilst the Army and RAF were 
happy to work within a joint service headquarters, the Royal Navy 
resisted and Admiral Talbot insisted on operating off-shore.93 To 
add further complication, lower down the Vantage command 
structure, infantry came from three brigades, each organised differ-
ently. There were also equipment and communication incompat-
ibilities and, as a result, organisation and standardisation issues 
became overwhelming for the Joint Administrative Headquarters 
in Bahrain. This lesson was quickly identifi ed and a team from the 
School of Land and Air Warfare was despatched to study the dif-
fi culties, implementing their lessons through an update to operat-
ing procedures and techniques.94 Commander-in-Chief Elworthy 
concluded ‘The lack of an established joint organisation and pro-
cedure was seriously felt . . . More practise is required to improve 
inter-service working.’95 This lesson was soon implemented and the 
1962 Defence White Paper announced the set-up of a permanent 
Joint Service Staff within the MoD to improve the framework of 
joint working in the future and to run joint service exercises world-
wide.96 In 1963, an additional White Paper, ‘Central Organisation 
for Defence’, increased defence coordination further with four new 
organisations created to work with the Joint Planning and Joint 
Warfare Staff: the Defence Operations Executive, the Defence 
Operational Requirements Staff, the Defence Signals Staff and the 
Defence Intelligence Staff.97
Once forces had landed, the FCO was aware that the longer 
British boots remained on Arab soil, the more political criticism 
would emerge. A few days into the operation Macmillan recorded 
in his diaries ‘It is going to be diffi cult, and expensive to stay; hard 
to get out. The Opposition in Parliament have behaved pretty 
well – so far. But this will not last.’98 In fact, by 17 July 1961, 
Emanuel Shinwell had submitted a parliamentary question leading 
to comparisons with the failed operation in Suez.99 Luce also 
advised ‘it seems inevitable that the longer we keep any troops in 
Kuwait the greater will become the pressure to force us out of the 
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Gulf altogether’.100 Consequently, in order to avoid a prolonged 
operation and declining opposition, public, Arab and wider inter-
national support, plans for a prompt withdrawal of British troops 
were immediately considered.
As before, the lessons of history were examined to consider 
how the UN could assist. The FCO UN Department identifi ed 
a number of lessons from the past including the emergency UN 
force sent to Suez in 1956 and the observation group which lead 
to a resolution allowing the withdrawal of UK and US forces from 
Jordan and Lebanon in 1958.101 However, in a fi nal ironic turn it 
was the Arab countries, through the provision of the ALSF, who 
came to British aid by relieving its troops. The FCO had encour-
aged the Kuwaiti Ruler to send a diplomat to each of the regional 
capitals to seek support for an Arab League application which 
was eventually granted.102 In addition, it was Patrick Dean, the 
former Chair of the JIC and one of the few people who had been 
aware of the Suez conspiracy and who was now stationed at the 
UN, who advised the US State Department that to secure such a 
force and allow British withdrawal ‘Cairo may be the key’.103 He 
was right. It was with UAR agreement that the ALSF allowed the 
withdrawal of British troops from Kuwait. 
Once the ALSF arrived and the British had withdrawn, there 
was some pressure on the MoD to bolster the ALSF force by pro-
viding tanks and aeroplanes. However, learning from past expe-
rience, Macmillan refused and declared that such action would 
lead to the threat of the weapons being used against the British 
or the Ruler in the future. Not only had there been a close call in 
selling two new Z class destroyers to Egypt just before the Suez 
crisis, but tanks that the British had sold to Iraq had been used to 
overthrow the Hashemites in 1958.104
The alleviation of responsibility by the ALSF did, however, help 
with the previously identifi ed lesson of cost management, which 
was implemented throughout. The economic situation at home 
remained diffi cult and Harold Macmillan wrote in his diary, just 
before writing about the Kuwaiti intervention, ‘Economic situation 
at home has not improved . . . The real question is how to cut down 
military expenditure . . . something must go.’105 As early as 2 July 
1961 it was agreed in a Defence Committee meeting that the FCO 
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should begin to recover as many costs as possible from Vantage.106 
A month later Macmillan wrote to the Foreign Secretary ‘I know 
it is bad manners to talk about money with Sheiks but at some 
point we must raise the question of a contribution by the Sheik to 
our very heavy expenses.’107 The FCO also drew on the identifi ed 
lessons of recovering costs from Jordan in order to negotiate its 
position with Kuwait. The Embassy specifi cally wrote to London 
‘It would be most useful for me to know, in context of forthcom-
ing negotiations with Kuwaiti authorities, what settlement of both 
local and general costs was reached with the Jordan Government, 
after the 1958 operations.’108
Another previously identifi ed lesson – managing the media – 
was also implemented in Kuwait, but with only partial success. 
Securing priority for the movement of PR offi cers and staff to 
Kuwait was challenging. The fi rst offi cer arrived just after the 
troops, albeit that he quickly contracted chicken pox resulting in 
initially incomplete and imbalanced reporting.109 The remaining 
PR team was not effective until forty-eight hours after the troops’ 
arrival, leaving the press without access to offi cial sources. Once in 
place, the team in Kuwait worked hard to keep the media informed 
and onside but were hindered by a number of challenges. Initially, 
no provision was made for RAF representation at Kuwait airfi eld 
– the request got lost in London leading to a ten day delay – and 
only one Army PR offi cer was stationed in Bahrain throughout 
the majority of the operation. There were also restrictions placed 
upon correspondents by the Kuwaiti authorities and poor commu-
nications remained, with MoD announcements being released in 
London before in theatre. There was also a lack of direction from 
the MoD on what could be released to the press. Commander-in-
Chief Elworthy later identifi ed ‘a lack of clear positive guidance 
from London made it more diffi cult to present the situation to the 
Press in the best possible light’.110 
Nonetheless Elworthy and Brigadier Horsford held many press 
conferences accompanied by the FCO Regional Information Offi -
cer in Beirut, who was temporarily despatched to Kuwait, and Sir 
William Luce or one of his staff. The Commander-in-Chief also 
tried to avoid any negative publicity, or political embarrassment, 
through accidental crossing of the Iraqi border; land patrols, Twin 
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Pioneers, Austers, Canberras on photo reconnaissance and heli-
copters were restricted to fi ve miles behind the border and other 
air sorties to ten miles. The 11th Hussars roadblock was seven 
miles within Kuwaiti territory and the use of land mines was for-
bidden to avoid Kuwaiti casualties.111
Despite PR efforts and the success of the operation, the media 
did provide some negative reporting, particularly over the diffi cul-
ties associated with working within extreme weather conditions; 
the surface sand was regularly over 140°F. Extreme temperatures 
caused grenades to smoke, batteries to lose charge, radios to fail, 
boots to degenerate, explosives to give off headache inducing 
fumes and water jerrican linings to disintegrate causing nausea 
and vomiting. In addition, Centurion tanks were too hot to carry 
infantry and it was suspected that, due to disintegration, much 
of the ammunition would have been useless had it been used.112 
The high temperatures were also unfavourable for fl ying helicop-
ters, whilst the maintenance and serviceability of the aircraft and 
pilots meant that helicopters were often kept onboard ships rather 
than in the required vicinity.113 Furthermore, with troops fl own 
in from all over the world, no time for acclimatisation, poor dis-
cipline in heat protection and a lack of suitable equipment and 
food, there were many heat casualties. A report by the Army’s 
Operational Research Group (AORG) identifi ed that 10 per cent 
of troops arriving from the UK were out of action due to heat dis-
orders within the fi rst fi ve days.114 As it happened, HMS Bulwark 
was on its way to undertake hot weather trials in the Persian Gulf 
when Vantage commenced. It was carrying additional Royal Navy 
medical personnel and subsequently diverted to Kuwait allowing 
200 men to board the ship each day for a sleep in air condition-
ing. The Kuwaiti Health Service also assisted, allowing men to be 
nursed in air conditioned wards rather than under canvas.115
However, much to the dismay of the MoD, by 6 July 1961 
the Daily Mirror claimed that a Royal Marine Commando had 
been withdrawn because one third of the men were suffering heat 
exhaustion.116 Another story stated that a Commanding Offi cer 
was forced to pay for ice for his troops out of his own pocket, 
causing one sympathetic member of the public to guarantee the 
supply of £10,500 worth of ice to the troops.117 To ‘damp down 
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any political criticism in this country [Britain] about the living 
conditions of our troops in Kuwait’ the Under-Secretary of State 
for War, James Ramsden, was quickly dispatched to theatre.118 The 
trip achieved its objective and was triumphantly described in a 
letter from John Profumo, the Minister of War, as ‘a great suc-
cess and the publicity here has been splendid’. Upon Ramsden’s 
return Profumo also wrote ‘Well done indeed . . . the more colour-
ful, personal and tough stories you can tell about how good the 
soldiers are . . . the better.’119 However, the visit was not appreci-
ated by all; one War Offi ce bureaucrat noted ‘P.S. Have just seen 
signal from C-in-C [Commander-in-Chief] asking to be protected 
from such visits.’120 Ramsden wrote a report on his observations 
which identifi ed lessons surrounding the conditions of the troops 
and was distributed to relevant departments for the implementa-
tion of these lessons.121 
In addition, as early as 13 July 1961 the War Offi ce commis-
sioned AORG to conduct two pieces of operational research. The 
fi rst sent a scientist to collect data across seven specifi c areas of 
concern, including equipment and weapons. The second saw a 
specialist in physiology survey all factors related to the health 
and effi ciency of serving personnel, particularly heat and accli-
matisation diffi culties.122 Both research groups produced reports 
which identifi ed lessons for the future. The reports led to further 
heat exercises, conducted in Aden in 1962, to identify lessons 
through the study of the acclimatisation of troops, appropriate 
rations for hotter climates and new equipment. Consideration 
for implementation included acclimatising soldiers through heat 
chambers or carrying them to theatre in heated aircraft. The les-
sons identifi ed from the reports and exercises were widely dis-
tributed through lectures to the War Offi ce, Strategic Reserve 
and Southern Command. 
As well as the heat and forty cases of heat exhaustion a day, 
the political agent in Kuwait also mentioned problems caused by 
severe dust storms.123 The fi rst Commandos landed in diffi cult 
weather with poor visibility and aircraft in the initial anti-tank 
role were also severely limited by poor visibility at the beginning 
of July, whilst fl ights into Kuwait New Airfi eld were hampered 
throughout Vantage. In some cases transport aircraft were unable 
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to land and had to return to Bahrain. Lighting and other aids 
were installed at airfi elds for a short time to assist but facilities on 
the ground were limited. Incomplete buildings had to be used as 
accommodation and Elworthy noted ‘such refi nements as ablu-
tions and latrines were non-existent’. On the other hand, the 
Kuwaiti Oil Company opened its doors to British troops offering 
a large swimming pool for recreation and exercise and private 
homes for washing, sleeping and eating.124
As well as the heat challenges, many of the communications 
diffi culties of past operations remained. The Commander-in-Chief 
advised ‘the diffi culties which were experienced with communi-
cations had been foreseen and various projects were in hand to 
improve them’. Nonetheless the previously identifi ed lessons of 
infl ated precedents, over-classifi cation and the ongoing need to 
integrate the communications systems of the three services ‘was 
again evident’.125 Communications diffi culties also occurred due to 
the electrical disturbance from sun spots as well as diffi culties in the 
communications between the brigade headquarters and the RAF at 
Kuwait New Airport.126 Even after withdrawal, communications 
diffi culties between London and Bahrain continued.127
During the intervention there was little further learning dem-
onstrated in the IC, with one exception – implementing the lesson 
of working with the US, although this was not without incident. 
A few days after the operation launched, rumours began to circu-
late of a secret collusion between Qasim and the British govern-
ment.128 After the Iraqi threat of annexation, the IC had repeated 
its approach to Jordan by providing intelligence directly to the 
Emir of Kuwait, with daily assessments from Baghdad and Basra 
passed on by John Christie. It was believed that Britain had good 
intelligence on Iraq and the Ruler had limited access to gain his 
own. As a result, these reports soon convinced the Emir of a sig-
nifi cant threat and the need to formally request British military 
assistance.129 Once Vantage began accusations were made that the 
threat had been fabricated or exaggerated to create the environment 
within which Britain could legitimately return to the region. This 
included allegations that the IC had leaked stories to the Kuwaiti 
press to create an atmosphere of fear.130 The rumours were perpet-
uated by the hosting of the Iraqi Minister of Economy in London 
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at the same time as Iraq was opposing British efforts in the UN. 
Eventually the rumours led to serious concerns from allies that the 
British were trying to reassert power and prestige in the region.131 
The US Embassy in Baghdad had been unable to substantiate the 
claims coming from the FCO of a threat, and on 4 July 1961 the 
US Ambassador reported that there was still no direct evidence of 
Iraqi movement in Baghdad and the US Consul General in Basra 
had also not seen any evidence of troop movements.132 Instead, 
American intelligence cited the nature of the road, a dirt track 
between Basra and Kuwait, as impeding any rapid annexation.133 
A US diplomat in Iraq, Holsey G. Handyside, also noted that there 
were not enough tank carriers to transport tanks from Baghdad to 
Basra, nor could they get aboard a river boat and the railroad was 
‘so decrepit as to be non-operational’ with so few fl atbeds that the 
movement of tanks would take three months.134
Consequently, despite ongoing intelligence liaison, the US even-
tually accused the British of intelligence exaggeration. Philip Talbot 
from the Far East section of the US State Department advised Dean 
Rusk ‘the British have placed more force in and on Kuwait than was 
justifi ed by the magnitude or even seriousness of the Iraqi threat’.135 
The US delegation to the UN also expressed concerns over the lack 
of fresh evidence of any Iraqi aggression.136 Rusk even challenged 
the Foreign Secretary, Lord Alec Douglas-Home, on the extent of 
the Iraqi threat and the CIA’s Deputy Liaison Offi cer in London, 
Carlton Swift, demanded that the raw intelligence be shared.137 This 
was embarrassing for the IC and plans were considered to leak the 
contents of the diplomatic telegrams from Trevelyan to a ‘discreet 
American correspondent’ to counteract the accusations. To ensure 
the correct audience was reached, Dana Schmidt of The New York 
Times was suggested. However, the idea was soon dropped, with 
reassurance that ‘arrangements are being made elsewhere’.138 None-
theless, President Kennedy did not approve of the British policy and 
disagreed with the notion that British presence in the region helped 
stability. It was on his orders that requests for joint planning of the 
region’s defence were rejected after Vantage had ended.139
Other lessons which had been identifi ed by the IC were not 
implemented, whilst previous diffi culties which had never been 
formally identifi ed reoccurred, demonstrating the importance of 
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learning lessons. Following Musketeer, a number of learning docu-
ments identifi ed that the security of intelligence, and issues of security 
in IC–MoD liaison, were hindering operations. General Keightley 
had concluded under the subject of ‘Intelligence’ that ‘Security of 
plans and operations generally proved a serious problem’, whilst 
one Commander noted ‘A constant tug-of-war exists between the 
dictates of security and the need for adequate briefi ng.’140 The 
JIC(ME) had agreed and identifi ed that the virtual exclusion of 
the MoD command structure had denied any effective role to the 
Commanders prior to troop arrival.141 However, issues of security 
re-emerged as a problem in Vantage. Commander-in-Chief Elwor-
thy identifi ed ‘there was an over use of Top Secret classifi cation 
which led to delays’.142 
After the Intervention
Following Kuwait, in the FCO, no offi cial history was written 
about the events. This followed the Prime Minister’s express 
request that offi cial histories ‘should be in the political fi eld e.g. 
Britain’s history of de-colonisation; or the independence of India, 
rather than in the military fi eld e.g. Suez and Kuwait’.143 However, 
a debate about what lessons the FCO could identify from the han-
dling of the Kuwait crisis erupted in response to two despatches: 
one from Alan Rothnie, the Chargé d’Affairs in Kuwait, and one 
from Sir William Luce.144 
Rothnie fi rstly refl ected upon the wide acclaim of the British 
intervention and reported that a member of the ruling family had 
specifi cally drawn comparisons between 1961, 1958 and 1956 
and concluded that Britain’s actions in Vantage had been com-
mendable. He advised ‘I would not fi nd one voice raised except in 
praise of the help which the British Government had accorded the 
State of Kuwait.’145 However, he also warned that there were many 
lessons to be learned. In particular, he identifi ed the importance 
of Kuwait becoming part of the Arab community and stressed 
the need for Arab solutions to Arab problems in the future. He 
advised that this was one of the lessons which had been identifi ed 
by the Kuwaiti offi cials, concluding that the country would begin 
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to mark its independence at the expense of the British ‘special posi-
tion’ and become a closer part of the Arab community. 
In fact, at the time of writing the despatch, Kuwait had already 
sent economic delegations to seven Arab countries to discuss invest-
ment opportunities. In addition, the Emir soon chose to accept the 
Saudi Ambassador as his fi rst diplomatic representative, despite a 
request from the FCO for a British appointment.146 Kuwait was 
also beginning to establish itself further internationally through 
diplomatic and goodwill missions and an application for member-
ship of the UN was granted in 1963. To be accepted in these forums 
Kuwaitis had begun to understand that there was a need for politi-
cal reform in their country; from autocracy to democracy. Rothnie 
noted that all such Kuwaiti lessons would have an impact on the 
way Kuwait conducted its political and economic relationship with 
Britain. As a result, many of the lessons learned by Kuwait from 
the crisis would have a greater impact on the FCO than the lessons 
that they identifi ed themselves. In London, the notes made on the 
despatch suggested it was well received, describing it as a ‘useful, 
comprehensive’ and ‘good’ despatch.147 
Sir William Luce took Rothnie’s thinking further and refl ected 
upon the lessons which could be identifi ed to inform the wider 
strategy of Britain in the Gulf. He fi rstly endorsed Rothnie’s sum-
mary of the overall operation and added:
It is indeed remarkable that in this day and age it should be possible 
for British forces to intervene in defence of an Arab country against 
another and, in the process, to strengthen Anglo-Kuwaiti friendship 
without, as I believe, harming British relations with the rest of the 
Arab world.148
However, one of the biggest lessons identifi ed by Luce was that 
Iraq had the ability to attack with little, if any, warning. For him 
this meant that a stronger deployment of British forces was needed 
in the Persian Gulf with the Kuwaiti forces bolstered to withstand 
an Iraqi attack until British forces arrived. This was due to the 
FCO’s ‘inability so far to devise any policy other than the exercise 
of military power to protect our interests in the area and to meet 
our treaty and moral obligations’, hence his agreement to the sta-
tioning of troops in Bahrain. Luce concluded ‘there is at present 
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no policy within Her Majesty’s Government’s grasp which would 
enable us to withdraw from the Gulf’.149 This was also identi-
fi ed by the Cabinet and, as part of a paper produced on Kuwait 
in October 1961, alternative policies to ensure Kuwaiti indepen-
dence were considered. These included changes in Kuwait’s poli-
cies towards Arab countries, including rerouting investment in 
London to other Arab states, and defence by a UN force which 
was unlikely due to UN existing commitments, particularly in the 
Congo. It was concluded that there was no practical alternative to 
maintaining British forces in readiness to come to Kuwait’s assis-
tance.150 Luce’s only suggestion for escaping the quagmire was 
to encourage the US to play a more active role in the region and 
Kuwait’s protection. 
Two months previous the FCO Arabian Department had also 
written a memo on Kuwait which aligned with Luce’s view; Britain’s 
position with Kuwait could not be reviewed without reassessing the 
British position throughout the wider Gulf region. Furthermore, 
having recently given reassurances to the Ruler, it would be dis-
honourable to change British policy and would risk Kuwaiti inde-
pendence which remained important for the balance of payments, 
maintaining stability in the region and preventing the spread of com-
munism. The memo concluded ‘In short, in the Secretary of State’s 
own words, it was of national interest to defend Kuwait on July 1, 
it still is so. We should act accordingly.’151
Notes suggest that whilst Alan Rothnie’s despatch was read by 
at least fi ve recipients, Sir William Luce’s despatch was widely cir-
culated within a number of FCO departments before being further 
distributed to the Head of the War Offi ce, Air Ministry and Admi-
ralty. It sparked a debate inside the FCO which revealed that differ-
ent individuals had identifi ed different, and often confl icting, lessons 
from the same intervention. The Arabist Harold Walker dismissed 
a number of Luce’s points stating ‘he does not come to any original 
conclusions’ but did agree that ‘planning with the Americans is desir-
able, and although we have tried to achieve this in the past without 
success and can hardly be sanguine of obtaining better results if we 
try again, I think we should do so’.152 Other diplomats objected to 
Luce’s assumption that British military presence in the Gulf did little 
harm elsewhere in the Arab world whilst others advised that it also 
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affected Africa and Asia.153 However, all of the FCO offi cials who 
commented on the despatch agreed that working with the Ameri-
cans was an important lesson and that there was a requirement for 
Britain to continue its commitment to the Gulf, but in a manner 
which avoided appearing imperial. This was aptly described by P. S. 
Ziegler as ‘a bad job and all that we can do is to make the best of it 
by making our military presence as inoffensive as possible’.154 
Cabinet Secretary Norman Brook, however, had identifi ed a 
different lesson to the FCO diplomats and advised the Prime Min-
ister that maintaining the position with Kuwait was untenable. 
He wrote to Macmillan ‘We are fi ghting a losing battle propping 
up these reactionary regimes . . . We ought to recognise that our 
policy in relation to each one of these places is a pretty short-run 
affair.’155 The US State Department identifi ed the same lesson and 
noted ‘The West can no longer afford present policy of reliance 
on British military protection, which seems to be the most attrac-
tive one to greedy, short sighted Shaikhs [sic].’156 The FCO did 
not catch up with this thinking for a few years. It was not until 
1965 that Luce revised his position and suggested Britain should 
reconsider its military commitment to Kuwait. The Cabinet Offi -
cial Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy came to a similar 
conclusion a few months later.157
In the MoD, as well as the AORG reports and subsequent 
exercises, many other lessons were identifi ed through a variety of 
methods. As part of the standard process, the Commander-in-Chief 
produced a full report on the operation, with lessons identifi ed for 
the future.158 This was considered by the Chiefs of Staff and referred 
to the Joint Planning Staff.159 In addition, the report noted that the 
Commander-in-Chief’s subordinate Commanders were providing 
their own reports identifying lessons on matters of single service 
concern and detailed reports were being written on joint matters 
including medical and communications ‘through the normal chan-
nels’.160 The Royal Navy and RAF, for example, learned the lim-
its of their hardware in strategic mobility and the Army revealed 
concerns over the adaption for their forces in terrain, language, 
culture and climate. They also felt that the balance of mobility and 
force size had not been achieved and in an effort of self-preserva-
tion wanted a larger force with more armour.161 Furthermore, even 
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the US Continental Army Command used the British experience in 
Kuwait to draw lessons for better air support operations.162
Elworthy’s report identifi ed a number of lessons for the future 
including that greater direction was required from the govern-
ment. He also identifi ed the failings of relying on local cooperation 
as promised accommodation, storage facilities and transport did 
not emerge. In part, this was because the original resources had 
been promised by Sheik Mubarak Abdullah – who had recently 
been relieved of his offi ce – and his successors wished to dem-
onstrate changes in policy.163 Nonetheless, Elworthy identifi ed the 
benefi t of developing a ‘Goodwill with the Kuwaitis’ scheme. As 
there had been no operational role for the Psychological Warfare 
Unit during Vantage, they developed and issued a pamphlet on 
the customs and susceptibilities of the Kuwaitis. These were given 
to all Commanding Offi cers with the aim of encouraging cultural 
awareness and understanding to foster a positive relationship.164 
Elworthy also identifi ed the need for tactical loading of aircraft 
so that men and equipment would arrive together. This led the 
Director of Land Air Warfare to request further lesson identifi ca-
tion and implementation on this issue by the School of Land and 
Air Warfare.165
The War Offi ce held its own debriefi ng and a meeting specifi -
cally to identify the lessons of Vantage, distribute them to relevant 
Commanders and delegate lesson implementation.166 In addition, a 
working party was established to examine Vantage and draw upon 
‘various post-mortem reports’ to produce a report for distribution 
on the lessons to be learned.167 Lesson implementation was then 
pursued by both the War Offi ce and the Minister of Defence.168 
A member of the War Offi ce wrote to General Offi cer Command 
MELF ‘I wish to ensure that follow up action is taken on certain 
of the lessons learnt during Vantage’ before listing such lessons.169 
The Minister of Defence pursued information on the actions from 
the AORG fi ndings from the Defence Council, whilst even a year 
later Minister for War, John Profumo, was still attending meetings 
on Kuwait and following up on lessons.170
However, the distribution of identifi ed lessons was restricted and 
the extent to which the MoD was prepared to admit faults outside 
its own walls revealed a barrier to learning. Even eighteen months 
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later John Profumo’s Private Secretary explained that documents 
needed to be treated in ‘a “need to know” circle within the War 
Offi ce to avoid any subsequent embarrassment’ and it was decided 
that the AORG report ‘will not be distributed to other Government 
Departments in view of the criticisms it contains’.171 In addition, 
the MoD took criticism from outside the department very person-
ally; the Director of the Royal Artillery called accusations relating 
to the heat casualties by the Labour MP George Wigg ‘a slur on the 
good name of the British Army’.172 
Lesson identifi cation also occurred due to the ongoing Iraqi 
threat to Kuwait after the operation ended, which forced the 
revision of plans for intervention in the future. These drew upon 
many lessons from Vantage. For example, throughout the opera-
tion communications diffi culties had persisted due to the electrical 
disturbance from sun spots and the revised intervention plan noted 
‘although communications between London and Bahrein [sic] 
have been improved, they are by no means certain when condi-
tions are adverse’.173 Consequently, authorisation was delegated to 
the Commander-in-Chief to carry out necessary attacks, without 
the go-ahead from London if necessary. 
To inform the revised plans, a working party was established by 
the Chiefs of Staff Committee to report on the operation. It identi-
fi ed that relying on a plan that required a four day warning period 
had been a major weakness of the previous Kuwait contingency 
plan.174 As a result, the new plan, codenamed Operation Sodabread, 
implemented the lesson by reducing the warning period to thirty-six 
hours.175 In 1967, the MoD used the Kuwait contingency plan, by 
this time codenamed Operation Livid, as the basis of a war game to 
identify further lessons on optimum force position and build-up in 
a limited war.176 
Beyond the initial refl ex to draw lessons from the operation, 
the MoD also went on to write a number of offi cial histories from 
which further lessons could be identifi ed. Although the Joint 
Service In-House Historians deemed Kuwait as ‘Essentially a 
Deployment Operation, not justifying more than a monograph’ 
the Naval Historical Branch produced a history summarising the 
operational aspects and the Army Historical Branch produced a 
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factual narrative of the operation following the chronology of 
events.177 Air Chief Marshal Sir David Lee also included Kuwait 
as a chapter in his works, Flight from the Middle East, for the Air 
Historical Branch and specifi cally identifi ed a number of lessons 
including on the availability and readiness of forces and details of 
the air transport plan.178 
Overall, the MoD saw Vantage as a success in two ways. Firstly, 
it demonstrated that the MoD had implemented a number of les-
sons identifi ed since Suez. In Parliament, on 5 March 1962, the 
Minister of Defence, Harold Watkinson, confi dently concluded 
‘there were lessons to be learned, and they have been learned.’ He 
made specifi c reference to the unifi ed command of joint service 
operations and the new mobile task force concept. Secondly, testing 
the implementation of lessons in Kuwait provided the opportunity 
to identify weaknesses and to argue for further investment into the 
development of new policies within the 1962 Defence White Paper. 
Watkinson told Parliament that the operation’s identifi ed lessons 
had been the basis of ‘much of our future planning’.179 In the debate 
over the 1962 Defence White Paper the Secretary of State for War 
also explained that further confl icts were expected in the Middle 
East but that Britain had proved its ability in Kuwait.180
Macmillan was also pleased and wrote in his diaries ‘It afforded 
an admirable example of the effective use of a small British force if 
its deployment was rapid and timely.’181 Both Rothnie and Luce also 
reported to the FCO on how impressed they were with the British 
forces behaviour. Rothnie wrote ‘our forces have left behind them a 
fund of goodwill which has done much for Anglo-Kuwaiti relations 
and, as has often been said, the British servicemen has been his coun-
try’s best ambassador’.182 Even the Americans viewed the military 
operation as a success. The Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, 
cited the example of Kuwait as an illustration of Britain’s value in the 
region to the Senate.183 In addition, the Military Attachés of Turkey, 
Holland, Sweden and Persia all expressed their admiration for the 
operation.184
This success was, as with Jordan, partly down to good for-
tune. The close proximity of HMS Bulwark along with 42 Com-
mando at the crucial time was lucky. There was also the good 
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fortune of a half squadron of tanks afl oat in the Gulf on HMS 
Striker on the way to Aden. The initial deployment of such a 
small force had left those on the ground exposed and vulner-
able and, to make matters worse, the numbers of troops were 
announced by global media sources making Qasim’s need for 
external intelligence negligible. Trevelyan, aware of this threat, 
wrote swiftly to the FCO: 
Two sources have suggested to us, on the basis of BBC announcement 
giving details of numbers of troops and tanks landed, that we only 
have very small forces in Kuwait . . . This impression may be danger-
ous and encourage Qasim to think he can have a bash and get away 
with it.185
British forces were therefore fortunate that they did not land in 
a hostile environment and that the military attack did not mate-
rialise. The Commandos were the only complete major land unit 
in Kuwait until 3 July 1961, when an Iraqi attack seemed pos-
sible on 1–2 July. Had hostilities erupted they would have had 
to have formed ‘hastily prepared positions on unfamiliar ground 
and with inadequate communications between units’.186 In addi-
tion, air defence was extremely limited and full capability did 
not arrive until HMS Victorious joined the operation ten days 
after the initial landing. The eventual large deployment of forces 
meant that had a crisis emerged elsewhere in the world at the 
same time the MoD would have been at a loss. British forces 
were also lucky to be relieved of their duties by the ALSF; the 
ALSF was forced to remain in Kuwait for another sixteen months 
until a successful Iraqi coup against Qasim allowed for its fi nal 
withdrawal in February 1963. 
Once British troops withdrew from Kuwait, the JIC continued 
to assess that Qasim had not abandoned his claim to the country 
and provided six-week updates to the Chiefs of Staff.187 Reconnais-
sance fl ights over the Iraq–Kuwait border continued, only reducing 
to bi-weekly intervals in 1964 and ending in 1968.188 The JIC also 
continued to report on tank movements and provide intelligence 
assessments of the Iraqi force and its movements, with an update 
on Iraqi intentions every four to six weeks.189 The ongoing intel-
ligence requirements for Kuwait and Iraq, as well as the imminent 
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threat to British interests, forced some internal refl ection into the 
handling of the operation and what lessons could be identifi ed for 
the future. As early as August 1961 the JIC report, ‘Iraqi threat to 
Kuwait during the next twelve months’, offered a re-evaluation of 
previous assessments and identifi ed that collection capabilities had 
been, and continued to be, unable to provide the required warning 
period for British intervention.190 A Cabinet memo on 2 October 
1961 also admitted that the experience had revealed ‘diffi culties 
in securing accurate intelligence of Iraqi military preparations’.191 
However, instead of implementing the identifi ed lesson to address 
the issues of collection, the IC focused upon the issue of providing a 
warning period. The JIC reassessed scenarios for attack and devel-
oped a list of warning indicators for each scenario, but a heavy 
reliance upon Embassy staff and the Military Attaché continued.192 
By September 1961, the warning indicators had been reassessed 
again and it was identifi ed that they remained insuffi cient.193 Two 
months later, three attack scenarios had been assessed, but for two 
of these scenarios it was concluded ‘We cannot rely on any warning 
of these attacks.’194 To make matters worse, in November 1961, the 
MoD asked the JIC explicitly to assess the likelihood of an attack 
as well as Iraq’s capability.195 The resulting paper revealed that the 
JIC had gained little further intelligence on Qasim and his inten-
tions, offering mixed messages: ‘Qasim has in no way modifi ed his 
claim to Kuwait . . . He is unpredictable and given an opportunity, 
he could move swiftly without warning . . . we can easily over-
estimate Qasim’s capability for crazy action and under-estimate his 
peasant cunning.’196
Nonetheless, by 5 October 1961 the JIC reassured the Chiefs 
of Staff that the lesson of the lack of intelligence collection assets 
had been identifi ed and implemented.197 Liaison with the Kuwaiti 
military intelligence was increased, GCHQ hired additional Arab 
linguists to aid SIGINT and focus was shifted to reporting on 
Kuwaiti internal affairs, as there were fresh concerns that Qasim 
would attempt annexation through subversion.198 
In the meantime, Norman Brook wrote sceptically to the Prime 
Minister and identifi ed ‘Our present intelligence coverage in 
Southern Iraq is, however, inadequate to enable us to assess accu-
rately whether Iraq is capable of launching an attack on Kuwait.’ 
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Brook also identifi ed that the IC continued to rely upon IMINT 
as the best source of confi rming or denying HUMINT: ‘Although 
steps are being taken to improve our intelligence in Iraq itself, the 
best and at present the only means of confi rming the strength and 
dispositions of the Iraqi forces in the Basra/Shuaiba/Zubair areas 
is by vertical aerial photographic reconnaissance.’ He went on to 
advise ‘without this information the Joint Intelligence Committee 
is obliged to use for this purpose unconfi rmed information’ before 
identifying ‘there are at present no alternative means of obtaining 
the intelligence needed’.199 
By the end of November 1961, the situation had not signifi -
cantly improved and the JIC noted that even the reliance upon 
IMINT was strained: ‘every possible effort is being made to 
improve our intelligence coverage of the area but the build-up of 
this coverage takes time’.200 There were also political diffi culties: 
in October the JIC had proposed another reconnaissance fl ight 
over Iraq in an attempt to locate the lost regiment and to inform 
military planning. However, the FCO was concerned about polit-
ical embarrassment and delayed the fl ight by several weeks.201 
When HUMINT reports suggested a new threat of invasion, in 
December 1961, with GCHQ also reporting anomalies in Iraqi 
ground communications, the IC were still reliant upon reconnais-
sance missions alone to collaborate the reports which also contin-
ued to be delayed by the required approval process.202 However, 
this time the lesson was identifi ed and the IC concluded that for 
implementation they needed the collection of intelligence to be 
‘within our control’.203 Macmillan’s Private Secretary, Philip de 
Zulueta, agreed stating ‘It seems inevitable that we shall continue 
to get alarmist bazaar rumours of Qasim’s intention and if we are 
to avoid politically embarrassing and unnecessary and expensive 
military movements we must have means to confi rm or reject 
such reports.’204 The JIC’s suggestion for short-term lesson imple-
mentation was that the UK Political Resident be delegated to 
authorise one reconnaissance fl ight immediately over Iraq should 
indications suggest an impending attack.205 Macmillan approved 
the proposal with a requirement for re-approval every ninety 
days and a Canberra was permanently stationed in Bahrain for 
this purpose.206 




Kuwait demonstrated that many lessons from Suez and Jordan had 
been learned within the FCO. Whilst Suez continued to provide 
negative identifi ed lessons, of what not to do – appear imperial 
or intervene without support, especially from the US and regional 
states – Jordan provided a template of positive identifi ed lessons 
on how to act throughout a crisis. As a result, Kuwait provided the 
opportunity to test both positive and negative identifi ed lessons 
and revealed each as equally useful.
The precedent of Jordan was used as a method of learning for 
issuing a request for assistance and how to handle the UN. It was 
also drawn upon during the operation for negotiating the presence 
of a peacekeeping force to facilitate British withdrawal and ensur-
ing the recovery of costs to protect the British economy. Although 
this proved to be a successful method of learning during Vantage, 
many of the personnel in the FCO had remained since 1958 and 
therefore it was possible for this learning to occur exclusively 
within the individual sphere with the consequent danger that it 
might not be retained over time. 
Learning in planning and from the operation also revealed a new 
challenge within the learning process. Where two spheres overlap 
– in this case the individual and institutional – disagreements can 
occur over which is the correct identifi ed lesson. Where such an 
individual remains within a government institution, their beliefs 
about lessons may be undermined by more senior individuals or 
those of the institution, with their professional role forcing their 
acceptance of working within the environment of a contradictory 
approach. For diplomats, this can cause particular challenges in 
presenting and defending overseas security policy if it runs contrary 
to their own ideas.
A number of strategic and operational lessons remained learned 
within the institutional sphere including the importance of world 
and public opinion and the importance of the US. All of these were 
beginning to form part of the best practice of crisis management 
and overseas military intervention. In the individual sphere, Harold 
Macmillan demonstrated that the identifi ed lesson of Cabinet 
and public support also remained learned; both a negative lesson 
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identifi ed from Suez and a positive one from Jordan. However, 
these lessons were only identifi ed within Macmillan’s personal dia-
ries rather than widely distributed or institutionalised for the ben-
efi t of future Prime Ministers.
A number of lessons were also forgotten, barriers to learn-
ing reoccurred and new barriers emerged. The issue of overfl ying 
permissions was an institutional, operational and negative lesson 
which had been forgotten but also faced a reoccurring learning 
barrier of the actions of other learners. 
Learning by other states also forced new lessons to be identi-
fi ed in the FCO. Offi cials noted that lessons identifi ed by Kuwait 
would propel Britain into a different relationship with the Gulf 
state, and the FCO would have to learn to adjust accordingly. 
However, the inability to think of viable alternatives or means of 
implementation to protect British interests revealed a further bar-
rier to learning. Whilst the FCO identifi ed the lesson that alterna-
tive policies towards Kuwait were required – to avoid ongoing 
military protection – offi cials could not imagine a means by which 
this would be possible. In fact, Vantage revealed that the FCO was 
often uncreative and slow to respond to change in the region. It 
also had a culture of hesitation in implementing strategic lessons 
which risked disruption in policy elsewhere, preferring to main-
tain stability and the status quo. As a result, long-term underlying 
diffi culties remained unresolved; the British were on military alert 
to protect Kuwait again by Christmas and Britain was forced 
to maintain an expensive base in Bahrain to ensure ongoing mili-
tary readiness. 
Nonetheless, Vantage provided the fi rst example of signifi -
cant formal and institutional learning after the operation. This, 
again, was not through offi cial histories or lessons reports but 
through the internal method of despatches which identifi ed les-
sons. However, more signifi cantly, the two despatches from Alan 
Rothnie and Sir William Luce sparked a formal debate about 
which identifi ed lessons were to be learned. This worked well but 
also revealed the power of personality and seniority in the learn-
ing process within the FCO; it was the despatch from the senior 
fi gure, Sir William Luce, which was the most widely debated and 
distributed. 
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Learning within the MoD continued in the institutional sphere 
but was also driven forward, in some cases, by learners in the 
individual sphere. It had increased since Jordan, despite a simi-
lar level of operational success, thus revealing little correlation 
between the learning process and the success or failure of an oper-
ation. Instead, it was arguably the size and timing of the opera-
tion which was crucial to the effort and importance placed upon 
lesson identifi cation – straddled between the end of a fi ve year 
change in strategy and before the next strategic defence review of 
1962. Consequently, in contrast to Fortitude or the response of 
the FCO to Kuwait, there are a relatively large number of MoD 
records identifying lessons from Vantage.
The planning of the intervention demonstrated the ongoing 
attempts to implement the lesson of working with the Ameri-
cans whilst faced with the continual barrier of an uncoopera-
tive ally. However, it also revealed a new method of lesson 
identification through rehearsal exercises. This method was 
hugely beneficial as it allowed lessons to be implemented and 
new lessons to be identified within a safe environment. A simi-
lar method was also used after the operation through the war 
game for Livid.
Once the operation began, many of the identifi ed strategic 
lessons from Suez were demonstrated as learned. This included 
air movement and command and control. Joint service working, 
however, had not been successfully learned and the Commander-
in-Chief called upon the institutional sphere – the School of 
Land and Air Warfare – to study the problem, leaving lesson 
identifi cation internal. The School implemented the lessons they 
identifi ed through the formal methods of operating procedures 
and techniques which acted as a method of lesson retention for 
the future. 
The operation also revealed the role of the media as an external 
learner in identifying lessons. The lessons identifi ed by the media 
forced extraordinary and formal methods of further lesson identi-
fi cation, through the AORG, and implementation encouraged by 
the Under-Secretary of State, James Ramsden. It also led to further 
internal research, development and testing to identify additional 
lessons which were widely distributed through lectures.
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Once the operation was complete, many reports identifying 
lessons were produced, as there were after Suez. However, the 
role of the School of Land and Air Warfare in identifi cation and 
implementation was re-emphasised and the distribution of lessons 
was wider than just the Chiefs of Staff. The War Offi ce debrief-
ing ensured lessons were distributed to all relevant Commanders, 
whilst the working party saw that lessons were learned, pushed 
forward by an insistent minister. This revealed the importance of 
an individual driver of learning and a formal body for overseeing 
lesson implementation. A new method of lesson implementation 
and retention was also revealed through the revised plans for inter-
vention both before and after the operation. 
Overall, much more learning occurred in the MoD from Kuwait 
than Jordan and even the offi cial histories took greater note of 
Vantage than Fortitude. In addition, the MoD continued to learn 
more formally than the FCO and was beginning to reveal itself as 
a learning organisation through routine reporting, research and 
development, exercises, schools, lecturing, training and restructur-
ing. However, there were also warning signs of increasing barri-
ers to learning. Whilst the MoD was refl ective internally, it was 
becoming clear that it did not want to distribute lessons across 
other Whitehall departments or publicly air faults and weaknesses. 
There was a hostile reaction to external criticism and the ministry 
was coming under increasing pressure to implement lessons with-
out the necessary fi nances. 
The IC continued to show much less formal or traceable learn-
ing than either the FCO or MoD during Vantage. Although this 
is partly the nature of the work conducted and the availability of 
archival sources, it is also clear that the IC did not have a culture of 
lesson identifi cation, nor were ‘lessons’ part of the routine lexicon. 
Nonetheless, it is also clear that the IC learned more from Kuwait 
than it had from Suez or Jordan because the ongoing threat to 
British interests, before and after Vantage, forced constant reas-
sessment of intelligence. The identifi cation, implementation and 
retention method of reassessment was internal, routine, formal, 
strategic and operational but was often led by an external driver 
through the intelligence requests submitted by the MoD. In part, 
this is the way in which the IC operates, through the provision of 
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intelligence based upon ‘customer’ requests, but more could also 
have been achieved through proactive reassessment. 
The results of the reassessments were often limited, with a 
focus upon lessons identifi ed from the content of the intelligence 
itself, rather than identifi cation of lessons on how the collection 
and assessment were conducted and could be improved for the 
future. When collection weaknesses were identifi ed, the lesson 
was either forgotten, met with a barrier or was only implemented 
as a short-term fi x. Furthermore, although new assessments 
adjusted the warning period for aggression, at no point did the 
IC attempt to identify alternative indicators to allow for an 
extended warning period.207
Other previously identifi ed lessons were also forgotten, includ-
ing the lesson of security protocol of intelligence, whilst lessons 
which had not been formally identifi ed – or distributed to relevant 
learners – caused problems to re-emerge. In the case of security, 
the lesson being forgotten was unsurprising given that the reports 
identifying the lesson were created by the MoD (and thus unlikely 
to have been widely circulated in the IC) or by the JIC(ME) 
(whose suggestions had been quickly dismissed in London after 
Suez). Nonetheless, this only seeks to emphasise the importance 
of lesson distribution across relevant government departments, as 
well as internally. 
Consequently, an examination of the intervention in Kuwait 
reveals a disparity of learning from history across government, 
both in comparison to the different institutions and in compari-
son to the experiences of Suez and Jordan. The operation itself 
may have been successful – ‘Suez in reverse’ – but the threat to 
Kuwait remained. In 1963, after Qasim was killed, Iraq and 
Kuwait signed ‘Agreed Minutes between the State of Kuwait and 
the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Rela-
tions, Recognition and Related Matters’. This agreement formally 
recognised a boundary between the two nations.208 However, in 
1969, the Research Department at the FCO produced a lengthy 
memorandum which concluded that Iraq continued to pose a seri-
ous threat.209 In addition, British defence responsibility towards 
Kuwait remained whilst its power over the state rapidly declined. 
As a result, the debate over British policy in the Gulf dominated 
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much of the 1960s with full withdrawal of troops from the region 
announced in January 1968 and completed in 1971. In fact, the 
unresolved Iraqi threat would remain bubbling under the surface 
until it re-emerged thirty years later with more disastrous conse-
quences. Britain had not learned to solve the deeper Iraq–Kuwait 
problem. 
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5 A Re-Run of Port Stanley – The Gulf 
1990–1
We were lucky in the Gulf confl ict because a number of people who 
were in the department had served in the department during the Falk-
lands confl ict and there was a departmental memory over what issues 
were important and what lessons we had learned.
(Margaret Aldred, Director of Defence Policy, 1994)1
Almost thirty years after Vantage, the Gulf War – codenamed 
Operation Granby – occurred in a very different international 
context. The recent end of the Cold War had changed the security 
environment and the events of 1990–1 provided an opportunity 
to establish a new world order. Nonetheless, many lessons from 
Vantage – due to similarity of geography, culture, enemy and type 
of intervention – were still relevant and, as a result, Granby offered 
the chance for learning to be demonstrated in the long term and in 
the generational sphere.2 In addition, the lessons identifi ed from 
Granby itself would become highly signifi cant when an interven-
tion against the same foe would occur thirteen years later.
During the 1980s, the West and Iraq realigned as allies with 
Britain and the US supporting the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, 
in his fi ght against Iran in the prolonged and bitter Iran–Iraq War. 
The war left Iraq with severe economic diffi culties; Iraq’s per capita 
income halved and an estimated $67 billion worth of damage was 
done to infrastructure and $80 billion was borrowed from other 
countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. By early 1990, 
foreign debt servicing and defence costs swallowed seven eighths 
of Iraq’s oil export revenue, which was limited by the Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).3 Iraq’s struggling 
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economy, combined with increasing anti-Western propaganda, 
began to raise suspicions about Saddam Hussein’s intentions and 
by 1990 the JIC had concluded that Iraq had returned to being 
‘a potential predatory power, whose victims might be Kuwait 
or Syria’.4 
During the summer of 1990, tensions between Kuwait and 
Iraq rose. Kuwait and the UAE were exceeding their OPEC oil 
quotas leading to the suppression of petroleum prices and, there-
fore, Iraq’s income. Kuwait was also using this economic advan-
tage to place pressure on Baghdad to repay its war loans and to 
settle their long-standing border dispute. On Iraq’s national day, 
17 July, Saddam Hussein delivered a speech threatening the Gulf 
state. Four days later he moved approximately 20,000 troops to 
the Kuwaiti border. These actions were quickly dismissed by the 
FCO and IC as sabre-rattling to generate leverage for negotiations 
at the upcoming OPEC meeting.5 In addition, Saddam assured his 
fellow Arab leaders – King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, King Hussein of 
Jordan and President Mubarak of Egypt – that he had no military 
intentions and agreed to a meeting with the Kuwaitis in Jeddah to 
negotiate a solution.6 OPEC rejected Iraq’s proposal to increase oil 
prices and the Jeddah talks were delayed during which time more 
Iraqi troops, then totalling an estimated 100,000 men, amassed 
along the Kuwaiti border. 
On 1 August the Jeddah talks began but little was achieved and 
it was agreed that talks would resume on 6 August. A commitment 
to participate in these talks soon proved to be a bluff and in the 
early hours of 2 August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait, deposed the 
Al-Sabah ruling Royal Family and maintained a military occupa-
tion of the state as an annexed territory. The same day the UN 
Security Council adopted resolution 660 – the fi rst of twelve reso-
lutions passed during the Gulf War – condemning the invasion 
and calling for Iraq’s immediate and unconditional withdrawal.7 
On 7 August the US announced that, in response to a request from 
Saudi Arabia, they would be sending forces to the Gulf to prevent 
any further Iraqi military action. The next day the British govern-
ment announced that it would be doing the same, contributing 
the second largest force to a coalition of thirty-nine nations in the 
collective defence of Saudi Arabia. 
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As the weeks went by it became clear that Saddam Hussein had 
no intention of leaving Kuwait. On 29 November 1990, the UN 
Security Council gave him six weeks to withdraw before the coali-
tion was authorised to ‘use all necessary means’ to remove Iraqi 
troops.8 The deadline expired on 15 January 1991 and forty-eight 
hours later coalition air forces began attacks. The whole campaign 
was concluded within forty-three days, on 28 February 1991, and 
the responsibility for the demilitarised zone eventually passed from 
the coalition to UN forces.9 
The Gulf War saw the largest deployment of British forces since 
the Second World War. Three times the force involved in the Falk-
lands – 45,759 personnel – and 15,000 vehicles were deployed with 
52,661 tons of equipment airlifted and 300,000 tons delivered by 
over 130 ships. The Royal Navy conducted 3,171 challenges with 
thirty-six boardings, 1st (BR) Armoured Division covered 290 kilo-
metres in the land offensive, 4,000 sorties and 2,500 support sorties 
were fl own by the RAF and 3,000 tons of weapons were dropped 
by air during this time. British Special Forces, drawn from all three 
services and numbering 650, were also committed, in their largest 
operation since 1945, entering Kuwait and Western Iraq, destroying 
communication lines and countering the threat of Scud missiles.10 
The intervention was also hugely signifi cant for Britain for politi-
cal reasons. The events gave the British government the opportunity 
to reinforce its role in the world after recent tumultuous interna-
tional changes and to re-establish its primacy in trans-Atlantic rela-
tions. Britain also had a large expat community in Iraq, Kuwait 
and surrounding countries which needed to be protected: around 
50,000 people – the largest group of Europeans living in the region 
at the time.11 In addition, there were national interests at stake. The 
invasion not only created regional uncertainty which could damage 
British exports to the Middle East but there was concern over the 
threat of disruption to the world’s oil reserves.12 
Planning the Intervention
Just like Suez, and unlike 1961, the FCO was unprepared for the 
events of 1990. Primary focus had been on the menace of Iran 
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and Saddam’s assurances to Arab leaders had provided false com-
fort; at the time, the FCO was busy counselling Kuwait on how 
to handle the Iraqi dispute diplomatically. In fact, the British had 
been persuaded by the long held maxim that Arab states did not 
attack each other, ignoring the individual development of Arab 
nations since the Second World War and the increasing brutality 
of the Iraqi system. The British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Alan 
Munro, would later conclude that the Iraqi invasion ‘at a stroke 
demolished assumptions about regional amity and balance’13 whilst 
the Middle East Heads of Mission would be asked ‘Why did we 
fail to foresee the Gulf Crisis and take preventative action? . . . The 
beginning of wisdom is to acknowledge mistakes.’14 The threat 
from Saddam Hussein was disregarded to such an extent that, at 
the time of the invasion, the FCO Iraq desk was manned by just 
one young diplomat.15 Although the FCO Emergency Unit was put 
on precautionary alert, both the Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, 
and Minister of Defence, Tom King, were away on holiday. At 
the same time, the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, was en 
route to a conference in Aspen and neither the British nor the US 
Ambassador to Iraq were in Baghdad.16 The British Ambassador 
and Consul to Kuwait were also taken unawares and remained 
under siege for several months in the Kuwaiti Embassy, surrounded 
by Iraqi troops, without electricity and water supplies, living off 
tinned tuna and a vegetable patch.17 
In the IC, the JIC had not only failed to predict the end of the 
Cold War but had continued to invest large amounts of its reduc-
ing resources into countering the communist threat. As a result, 
the Middle East had received little attention for some time. There 
was no formal indicator and warning system for aggression in 
Iraq or Kuwait and, as a result, when an old threat emerged, 
the IC found itself lacking in many areas of intelligence.18 The 
former Chief of Defence Intelligence, Lieutenant-General Derek 
Boorman, admitted that the area was ‘under-resourced’ and any 
intelligence on Iraq was primarily limited to Baghdad or dedi-
cated to sanction busting.19 A post-operational report on intel-
ligence during Granby acknowledged that although both Iraq 
and Kuwait were considered to be high priority for assessment 
‘Granby was unexpected’.20
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When Saddam threatened Kuwait in his speech on 17 July it 
was noted by the IC, but Britain invoked no precautionary mea-
sures. The Kuwaitis placed their Army on alert, but there was no 
request for Western assistance, nor any evidence that the British 
government tried to persuade the Ruler of Kuwait of its necessity.21 
It was not until two days later that the DIS reported the threat 
and Defence Attaché staff travelled by car to Kuwait to identify 
troop movements. The DIS used their information to confi rm that 
all eight divisions of Iraq’s Republican Guard were involved.22 
Despite their importance in Vantage it was the Falklands cam-
paign – Operation Corporate – which had led to identifi cation of 
the importance of intelligence gathering by Defence Attachés.23 
The report on intelligence support for Granby concurred stating 
‘This intelligence could not have been obtained from any other 
source’ noting that one of the key lessons identifi ed for the IC was 
‘Attachés can provide a unique source of intelligence on military 
developments.’24
American satellites had also picked up the movement of troops 
and the US informed their Embassy in Baghdad on 20 July 1990 
but did not share the intelligence with the British until four days 
later.25 It was only following the American confi rmation of move-
ment that the Middle East Current Intelligence Group of the 
JIC met to produce an assessment of the threat. It assessed that 
Iraqi military action could not be ruled out ‘in the medium term’ 
but the JIC were less optimistic about the timing and circulated 
a minute to the government indicating that there was a cause 
for concern.26
The next morning, on Friday 27 July 1990, the Chairman of 
the JIC and Foreign Affairs Advisor to the Prime Minister – Percy 
Cradock – sent a minute to Thatcher re-emphasising the threat. He 
also made clear that the Kuwaiti Army would not be able to resist 
Iraqi aggression and that the emergence of Saddam as a predator 
in the region would pose a grave threat to British interests.27 He 
did not receive a reply to his note and made further inquiries on 
the morning of Monday 30 July but to no avail. The intelligence 
warning had not been disseminated and the FCO continued to 
advise travel to Kuwait was safe, with a fl ight taking off on the 
morning of the invasion.28
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The MoD was even more suspicious and issued a warning on 
1 August that an invasion was likely.29 However, it was no more 
prepared to react; the expectation of a ‘peace dividend’ at the end 
of the Cold War had led the government to reconsider its military 
expenditure and the MoD had responded with the ‘Options for 
change’ defence review.30 This review proposed creating a ‘smaller 
but better’ force, designed primarily for deployment in Eastern 
Europe, but within a week of its announcement Iraq invaded 
Kuwait. Consequently, the post-operation learning process became 
hugely signifi cant for wider strategic and long-term planning. Fur-
thermore, unlike in 1961, no contingency plans were in place. In 
fact, no serious contingency plans had been considered for high 
intensity confl icts outside the NATO area in the previous twenty 
years.31 Nor had any contingency plans been generated for large 
scale operations. The Assistant Under-Secretary of State identifi ed 
to the House of Commons Defence Committee ‘We did not have a 
contingency plan for an operation of this scale, so to that extent we 
did have to initiate planning from scratch.’32 The lack of planning 
soon earned Headquarters British Forces Middle East (HQBFME) 
the nickname ‘Baldrick lines’ after the Blackadder character who 
claimed ‘I have a cunning plan.’33 The lesson identifi ed was not to 
prepare for specifi c threats in the future but to focus on a range of 
capabilities which could meet most situations.34
The MoD, therefore, was fortunate to benefi t from the period 
between the commencement of defensive and offensive operations, 
allowing fi ve months for necessary planning, training and equip-
ment modifi cations in Saudi Arabia. In addition, the Falklands had 
provided inshore fi ghting experience whilst the Royal Navy were 
extremely familiar with the Gulf region due to the Armilla patrol 
which had been in the area protecting British interests and shipping 
since the beginning of the Iran–Iraq war in 1980. There was also 
good fortune in the availability of forces at short notice, a lesson 
later identifi ed by Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine: ‘we were 
fortunate to have a sizeable force, well-trained and immediately 
available for release from NATO tasks, for Granby. We should not 
assume that we would always be able to respond similarly in the 
future.’35 In fact, Special Forces, due to other tasks, were not able 
to fully deploy until January 1991.36 
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Nonetheless, there was very little learning explicitly referenced 
in planning, even though military remnants of the 1961 interven-
tion were still in existence in Kuwait in the form of a training 
team. As a back-up after British withdrawal from Vantage, and 
under the British–Kuwaiti defence agreement, a stockpile of tanks 
had been left with a military mission to oversee their maintenance. 
By 1990, this mission had become a training team for the Kuwait 
Army’s British supplied armour and after the invasion the mem-
bers were held hostage by the Iraqis.37 
There were some differences which refl ected change since 1961, 
but these cannot be directly attributed to a learning process. For 
example, the operation was planned for the cooler months to avoid 
the summer temperatures and priority was given for adequate 
acclimatisation time for the troops.38 By the end of the operation 
the House of Commons Defence Committee concluded that excel-
lent general health was maintained amongst personnel through 
good training in personal hygiene, heat discipline and enforced 
abstinence from alcohol.39 
Once the invasion occurred and the FCO overcame the shock, 
it quickly sprang into action. On 2 August the Emergency Unit 
was opened, in a blast-proof basement, and the crisis manage-
ment team formally assembled under the Head of the Middle East 
Department, Rob Young. The FCO was logistically prepared for 
the event, with the Unit Manager ensuring the provision of beds, 
baths and meals for staff working long days.40 The day began 
with an assessment of telegrams and draft resolutions from the 
UK–UN Mission as well as preparing ministers for questions from 
the media. At 7:30 the Emergency Unit met to discuss the day 
ahead. This was shortly followed by an inter-departmental brief-
ing between the FCO, Cabinet Offi ce and MoD. At 8:30 a meet-
ing was held between various representatives in the FCO: Middle 
East, Near East, Defence, UN, Economic Relations, Information 
and News, as well as the MoD and Cabinet Offi ce. At 9:00 the 
Foreign Secretary held his own meeting with specifi c experts. A 
smaller group also met at 11:00 in the Cabinet Offi ce and a full 
review of the day was held at 18:00.41 
On the ground, a similar process was mirrored within the 
embassies. In Saudi Arabia the Embassy Section Heads – political, 
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press, military, consular, commercial and management – met every 
day, seven days a week, mid-morning and in the evening.42 The 
FCO worked like a well-oiled machine, implementing lessons from 
responding to a succession of crises, and all the effort fed into the 
Overseas Defence (Gulf) Cabinet subcommittee which was estab-
lished to oversee the operation. This in itself was the product of 
lessons from the Falklands and it was concluded that ‘One prin-
ciple reason that it did [work so well] was that care was taken 
from the start to take account of the lessons identifi ed in 1982.’43
A Crisis Cell was also opened in the Defence Intelligence Centre 
on 3 August 1990 and the fi rst intelligence summary was issued at 
17:30 the next day. By 6 August the cell was manned twenty-four 
hours and producing two summaries a day.44 Initially this worked 
well but as staff increased there was a heavy reliance upon augmen-
tees – personnel assigned as a temporary duty – mainly from the 
Warsaw Pact and Scientifi c and Technical Intelligence Directorates.45 
By January 1991, the supply of augmentees was exhausted and the 
lesson was identifi ed for the future: ‘Suffi cient augmentees, with 
clearly defi ned assignments, must be earmarked to meet all fore-
seeable crisis requirements.’46 The DIS later identifi ed ‘It is uncer-
tain whether the DIS (even with MoD augmentation) would have 
the resources to provide intelligence support for two simultaneous 
crises.’47 Consideration for opening a second Crisis Cell happened 
twice during Granby – once due to unrest in the USSR and once due 
to a confrontation between India and Pakistan.
Similarly, once Iraq invaded Kuwait, the focus of the IC shifted 
to the Middle East region and the central intelligence machine 
sprang into action. After Corporate, the IC was criticised for being 
‘too passive in operation to respond quickly and critically to a 
rapidly changing situation which demanded urgent attention’ and 
a review of the structure and the position of the JIC Chairman 
was recommended.48 This identifi ed lesson was implemented; the 
JIC was expanded and the central machinery rebuilt, overseen by 
Percy Cradock. Granby, therefore, provided the opportunity to 
test the changes under crisis conditions and to demonstrate that 
lessons had been learned. The Middle East Current Intelligence 
Group began its morning meeting at 4:00 to produce a daily intel-
ligence bulletin. This would inform the JIC which met at 6:00 to 
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produce a briefi ng for senior offi cials at 8:30 who prepared an 
agenda for the minister’s meeting at 10:00.49 
The quick and decisive response was also led by Thatcher, 
who, upon hearing of the invasion, immediately instructed two 
Royal Navy ships to head for the Gulf. Her response was also the 
implementation of a lesson from history, but again not from 1961. 
Instead, it was the impact of Suez, an event that occurred three 
years before she became a MP, and her experience in the Falklands 
which determined her resolve. In her memoirs, Thatcher described 
‘Suez syndrome’ as a distorted perspective of Britain’s place in the 
world: having previously exaggerated British power, after 1956 
Britain exaggerated its impotence, ignoring successes and overem-
phasising failures. For Thatcher the Falklands campaign changed 
this state of mind and the Gulf crisis offered the opportunity to 
reinforce British success: 
The signifi cance of the Falklands War was enormous, both for Britain’s 
self-confi dence and for our standing in the world. Since the Suez fi asco 
in 1956, British foreign policy had been in one long retreat. The tacit 
assumption made by British and foreign governments alike was that 
our world role was doomed steadily to diminish. We had come to be 
seen by both friends and enemies as a nation which lacked the will and 
the capability to defend its interests in peace, let alone in war. Victory in 
the Falklands changed that. Everywhere I went after the war, Britain’s 
name meant something more than it had.50
Furthermore, Thatcher’s opinion on how to handle Saddam Hus-
sein was marred by her experience of living through the Second 
World War. For her, Saddam, the aggressor, was the new Adolf Hit-
ler, and his annexation of Kuwait was as defi ant as Hitler’s invasion 
of Czechoslovakia. Similar to Eden, in opening the two-day debate 
on the Gulf crisis in the House of Commons, Thatcher identifi ed 
‘We have bitter memories of the consequences of failing to challenge 
annexation of small states in the 1930s. We have learned the lesson 
that the time to stop the aggressor is at once.’51 Douglas Hurd, on 
the other hand, preferred the analogy of Korea. He declared ‘One 
way or another Kuwait must be freed. Forty years earlier we had 
fought a war in Korea to reverse an act of aggression. The same 
principle, even more blatantly, was at stake here.’52 It was also the 
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‘Korean precedent’ which was agreed to be followed by the FCO 
in the pursuit of UN resolutions.53 Consequently, many different 
identifi ed lessons, from contrasting events of history, were drawn 
upon in planning the intervention but little refl ection was made 
upon Vantage. In fact, from July 1990–May 1991 the FCO Policy 
Planning Staff produced fourteen substantive analytical papers on 
Kuwait, Iraq and the Gulf War, none of which refl ected upon the 
experience in the region thirty years before.54 
The immediate concern of the FCO was to avoid appearing 
imperial in Britain’s response to the crisis. The quick suggestion of 
military action – two days after securing UN-imposed sanctions on 
Iraq – divided the institution similarly to the division of opinion 
in 1961.55 The British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Alan Munro, 
identifi ed ‘We were ever conscious, perhaps to the point of over-
sensitivity, of latent Arab resistance to foreign military involve-
ment. The bogey of Western imperialism still sent its echoes down 
the years from the Arab nationalism of Nasser’s Egypt.’56 He also 
later refl ected ‘Conditioned as I [was] by spending much of the 
past thirty years implementing Britain’s withdrawal from direct 
military engagement in the Arab world this reversal of hallowed 
policy [took] my breath away.’57 However, in line with the lessons 
identifi ed from Jordan and Kuwait, Thatcher insisted that troops 
could only be sent to Saudi Arabia in response to a specifi c request 
from King Fahd.58 Once the request had been made it was repeat-
edly emphasised to counteract Iraq’s propaganda machine and to 
portray the British response as appreciated assistance rather than 
unwanted intervention. By the end of Granby, UK–Saudi relations 
were closer than ever. Munro wrote to Hurd in January 1991 ‘our 
standing has never been higher, and our access at all levels has 
greatly improved’.59 Similarly, the British Ambassador to Kuwait, 
Michael Weston, wrote that 1991 had been ‘a good year for Anglo-
Kuwaiti relations, which are now better than at any stage since we 
last saved Kuwait from the Iraqis, in June 1961’ and ‘there was 
genuine regret when the last of our fi ghting troops withdrew at 
the end of July . . . our reputation here now stands higher than 
at any time for many years’. In fact, the reinvigorated relations 
led to contracts worth over £500 million for British businesses, 
despite the British Fire Group taking so long to sign their contract 
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that nearly all of the oil fi res were extinguished by the time they 
arrived.60
A further method to avoid appearing imperial was to place a 
heavy emphasis on the inclusion of other Arab states within the 
military coalition. The FCO’s Policy Planning Staff identifi ed that 
‘UK military action in the sole company of the US would have seri-
ous political implications’61 and the Granby Coordinator, David 
Parry-Evans, noted that the ‘strategy was to build up the role of 
the Arabs . . . to make sure that the campaign could not be inter-
preted afterwards as a Western, anti-Arab, engagement’.62 Whilst 
some states were proactive in response – Egypt was the bulwark 
of the Arab alliance and keen for swift intervention – others had 
to be convinced.63 The Assistant Under-Secretary of State – David 
Gore-Booth – was even sent to Syria, with whom Britain had bro-
ken off diplomacy in 1986, in a secret mission to convince the 
Syrians to take part in the operation.64 In the end, the only country 
which remained uncommitted to the coalition was Jordan where 
there were large protests and burning of British fl ags in support 
of Iraq. Nonetheless, Hurd optimistically noted ‘But we kept the 
Jordanians from committing themselves the wrong way even if we 
could not enlist them as an ally.’65 
The desire not to appear imperial and to respect local culture 
had also permeated into implementation by the MoD. As well 
as planning the operation well before Ramadan, much care was 
taken to avoid attacks on archaeological, cultural and religious 
sites. In particular, the Shia holy shrines of Karbala and An-Najaf 
were regularly photographed to prove that no damage had been 
caused.66 Commander-in-Chief General Peter de la Billière, who 
spoke colloquial Arabic, wrote an information pamphlet for circu-
lation to all troops which included an introduction to the Arabs, 
their way of life, the importance of religion in Arab culture, tips 
on how to behave in an Arab society and some basic vocabulary.67
The crisis also saw a strong UK–US working relationship, a les-
son which had been identifi ed previously but had become increas-
ingly necessary. The Policy Planning Staff declared ‘We must 
keep as close to American decision makers as possible’68 and it 
was consistently emphasised that policy should be discussed with 
allies in Washington before execution.69 This was made easier by 
5842_Kettle.indd   139 06/09/18   11:38 AM
Learning from British Interventions in the Middle East
140
good working relations between Margaret Thatcher and President 
George Bush as well as between Douglas Hurd and the Secretary of 
State James Baker. Hurd described the relationship as ‘work[ing] 
together in close confi dence as friends’.70 Anthony Acland, British 
Ambassador to Washington, noted: 
[the Bush administration] all said to me . . . that when the chips are 
down there is only one wholly reliable ally in the world, and that is 
the United Kingdom . . . there were countries which were militarily 
competent but politically unreliable (I suspect they meant the French), 
and there were some which were politically reliable but militarily 
incompetent (like the Egyptians or perhaps, up to a point the Saudis). 
The only country which was politically reliable and militarily compe-
tent was Britain.71
In the MoD, working with the trans-Atlantic allies was a necessity 
because of the coalition. However, one of the most signifi cant les-
sons identifi ed for the British during Granby echoed those previ-
ously identifi ed in 1956: that in the future Britain could not plan 
major operations without ally support.72 Implementing the lesson 
of working together in the past had also earned Britain the privi-
leged position of being the only coalition member to participate in 
US-led planning. A senior British Brigadier was fully integrated into 
US Commander-in-Chief General Norman Schwarzkopf’s personal 
planning team of fi ve US offi cers. A similar arrangement was made 
for an RAF Wing Commander to be placed within the planning staff 
of General Horner, Commander of US Central Command (CENT-
COM) Air Force.73 In addition, Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine, 
Air Vice Marshal Bill Wratten and de la Billière all helped to pre-
pare and agree the coalition air campaign and Wratten retained the 
power of veto over all targets.74 The British Joint Forces Headquar-
ters (JFHQ) in Riyadh was located near to CENTCOM headquar-
ters, allowing close liaison and de la Billière to attend Schwarzkopf’s 
daily briefi ngs.75 Eventually, around a hundred British offi cers were 
placed within the American command system with tactical com-
mand passed to American Commanders.76 Much of the system 
worked well, facilitated by the use of established NATO procedures 
and experience. Hine identifi ed:
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it is clear that our voice within the councils of the Coalition was much 
stronger than the scale of our military contribution justifi ed, which 
refl ects the continuation of the special relationship between the UK 
and the US . . . These ties have been nurtured over a prolonged period 
and we must do all we can to maintain them in the future.77
The only area where joint planning was lacking was between the 
US and Royal Navies. Although remaining under British command 
for embargo operations, the Royal Navy was under US command 
for offensive operations. Three US Navy Task Force Commanders 
oversaw the operations but with little British consultation. Parry-
Evans opined ‘the RN’s lack of a seat at the planning table for the 
amphibious phase led to signifi cant US under-estimates of the time 
that would be required for mine clearance’.78 The only other time 
Britain felt excluded from military decision-making was over the 
calling of the ceasefi re. All coalition members were informed rather 
than consulted and many were surprised at the timing. However, 
as de la Billière noted, with half a million personnel deployed, 
‘inevitably, what the Americans did, everybody else really had to 
go along with’.79 
Aside from the Americans, the FCO identifi ed the need to gain 
and maintain broader international and domestic support. It was 
concluded that this lesson was most likely to be successfully imple-
mented if Britain had specifi c UN authority and could ‘avoid being 
thought to be acting beyond our UN cover’, especially as it was 
considered that a UK–US led attack without UN authority would 
produce a backlash from, and in, non-Arab Muslim countries as 
well as discontent in the British Muslim community.80 This was, 
however, in tension with the ideas of Thatcher who was con-
vinced that Article 51 of the UN Charter meant that no further UN 
authority was required to help the Kuwaitis expel Saddam from 
their country.81 Legally, Thatcher was correct but the Americans 
insisted on pursuing the UN route for legitimacy purposes.82
There were also many other diplomatic forums through which 
Britain negotiated throughout the crisis. These included OPEC, 
NATO, the European Community (EC) and Western European 
Union (WEU). Although the EC countries were the fi rst to impose 
economic sanctions on Iraq, following a special meeting in Rome, 
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the Foreign Secretary later had to block an EC initiative to hold 
negotiations with Iraq. As the deadline for Iraq’s withdrawal from 
Kuwait approached, a late French initiative, in an attempt to pro-
tect France’s Iraqi trading relationship, led to a dispute between 
Paris and London which had to be repaired. 
The MoD and FCO also had some diffi culties working with 
coalition nations on the ground. A US CENTCOM report noted 
‘coalition partners had diffi culty keeping pace with the crisis 
action or time sensitive mode – the learning curve for our plan-
ning partners was steep’.83 In particular, the status of the French 
forces remained unknown for some time, causing planning head-
aches whilst their government decided whether to offer outright 
opposition to Iraq. At a regular meeting of European Union 
Ambassadors in Riyadh the French Ambassador, Jaques Bernière, 
bragged that there were more French troops in Saudi Arabia than 
British troops. ‘But Jacques’, replied the Italian Ambassador, ‘we 
don’t know which way they are facing.’ When the French fi nally 
committed their forces to the ground assault General Schwarz-
kopf bemoaned ‘going to war with the French is like going duck 
shooting with an accordion’.84 However, overall the coalition held. 
Sweden, who had not taken part in a combat situation since the 
1813 Battle of Leipzig, returned to active service and even the 
Argentineans overlooked past hostilities and arrived to support 
the British naval fl otilla.85
Similar to 1958 and 1961, there was also concern over how 
long support could be maintained, especially given the weight of 
history. The FCO Policy Planning Staff identifi ed:
If we became embroiled in a long war, domestic and international oppo-
sition would increase even if we had specifi c UN cover. Comparisons 
would be drawn with Suez and Vietnam. Parliamentary unity would 
be threatened. Casualties would mount, and additional deployments 
would be unpopular.86
Consequently, support would be sustained by ensuring the war 
was as short as possible, achieving defi ned objectives quickly and 
effi ciently.87 In addition, the offensive military option was not to 
be the inevitable option; sanctions, diplomatic negotiations, a 
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coup, assassination, support of alternative leaders and a long-term 
economic siege backed by a naval blockade were all pursued or 
considered, and it was hoped that the threat of military action may 
also be enough to persuade Saddam to reverse his actions.88
To help manage domestic opinion, Parliament was recalled 
from recess for a two day debate on the crisis and a cross-party 
consensus was managed as it had been by Harold Macmillan. 
Drawing upon history, Douglas Hurd identifi ed, ‘Remembering 
Suez I felt that it would be wrong to commit British troops to a war 
denounced by the offi cial opposition’ and subsequently ‘At home 
the new Prime Minister and I knew we must do our utmost to keep 
the opposition on board.’89 Consequently, a number of meetings 
took place with Labour leaders and Commons debates were care-
fully handled, often with orchestrated parliamentary exchanges 
and Prime Minister’s Questions.90 John Major, who became Prime 
Minister on 28 November 1990, recalled:
I sought a cross-party consensus, and was determined to keep Neil 
Kinnock, as leader of the opposition, and Paddy Ashdown for the 
Liberal Democrats fully briefed. This was not only prudent in Parlia-
mentary terms, but would also ensure that our servicemen knew there 
was maximum level of support for the task ahead of them.91 
He was also aware that history provided no precedent for Granby 
and further identifi ed the need for good media management:
This was going to be a different sort of war . . . they were not fi ght-
ing for home and hearth as in the two great wars of our century. Nor 
were they fi ghting for the recovery of a British possession as in the 
Falklands. They were fi ghting for something much less tangible: the 
maintenance of international law.92
However, there was a consensus of support and Parliament 
did not prove diffi cult despite some hesitation from MPs, such 
as Denis Healey, who were concerned over the outcome and 
potential British casualties; this was in stark contrast to Presi-
dent Bush’s slim majority in Congress which had to be handled 
very carefully.93 In fact, the only time the government suffered 
signifi cant criticism was over the handling of British citizens in 
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Kuwait. There were many calls to the FCO complaining that 
not enough was being done to help British citizens and accusa-
tions that this had forced many to attempt their own escape: 
one forty-nine year old British male, Donald Croskery, was shot 
dead by Iraqis trying to cross the desert to Saudi Arabia. Criti-
cism increased when British expats were rounded up, detained 
and used as human shields. Demands for SAS rescue operations 
were made and a number of elderly statesmen, including former 
Prime Minister Edward Heath, went against the wishes of the 
FCO and visited Saddam Hussein to negotiate for the release 
of the hostages; Heath received equal criticism for negotiating 
with a tyrant despite returning from Baghdad with a hundred 
hostages.94
In the IC, the predominant diffi culty in planning the interven-
tion, echoing the lessons identifi ed from thirty years before, was 
an ongoing lack of intelligence on the Iraqi President’s intentions. 
With a focus on the Soviet Union, no SIS agents were in a position 
to obtain access to Saddam Hussein or his close circle of advis-
ers.95 Furthermore, a combination of a police-state creating fear 
amongst its population and good Iraqi training in communication 
security made the ascertaining of intentions challenging.96 During 
the Iran–Iraq War the Americans had trained Iraqi military per-
sonnel, including providing advice on how to avoid detection by 
space-based intelligence gathering and ensure secure communica-
tions through the use of landlines with fi bre-optic cables.97 Con-
sequently, a system of secure landlines, ironically supplied by a 
British company, had been installed to allow unmonitored com-
munications and, in the end, the primary source of intelligence on 
Saddam’s intentions came from intercepts of telephone calls made 
from Saddam to his Ambassador to the UN in New York. These 
intercepts were relayed from the US National Security Agency to 
London.98 Unfortunately, this intelligence was too late to warn of 
the invasion, by which point the Prime Minister had learned her 
lesson on Saddam’s intentions, ‘the important lesson for us was 
that Saddam Hussein was simply not predictable’.99 Charles Pow-
ell, the Prime Minister’s Private Secretary, later identifi ed ‘The most 
diffi cult type of intelligence to have is that about intentions. In the 
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Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, we knew where every tank was, but we 
got his intentions wrong.’100 
The IC did very little to rectify their lack of knowledge on the 
dictator or his intentions throughout the campaign, much to the 
frustration of military Commanders. The Americans knew little 
more, leaving General Schwarzkopf to state in a briefi ng that the 
lack of HUMINT meant he was ‘forced to go more by Urint – 
which is a feeling in the water’.101 In the end, de la Billière com-
pleted his own assessment using a detailed analysis of the Iran–Iraq 
War and in consultation with the British Embassy in Riyadh. This 
yielded a character sketch from which key weaknesses were able 
to be considered and exploited.102 
However, one lesson on the gathering of HUMINT had been 
implemented from Corporate. During the Falklands there had been 
a severe shortage of Spanish speakers but, by the time of Granby, 
ninety-three British Arabic-speaking personnel and seventy-eight 
Kuwaiti civilians were deployed to work in hospitals and prisoner 
of war camps in order to gather as much HUMINT as possible.103 
Beyond intentions, the IC also had gaps in capability assess-
ments. Whilst there was an existing understanding of the Iraqi Navy 
and Air Force to conduct maritime operations – as part of intelli-
gence support for the Armilla patrol – little intelligence existed on 
the strength and effi cacy of the Iraqi Army.104 Any existing intel-
ligence was further confused by the initial appearance of new Iraqi 
Divisions – a deception by Saddam to persuade the coalition of the 
existence of a larger Iraqi force.105 Consequently, the lesson was 
identifi ed and implemented by establishing thirteen support groups 
to advise and assist the DIS in the preparation of detailed assess-
ments. By 16 January 1991, 300 new background studies had been 
issued.106 However, the process was challenging as a considerable 
depth of technical knowledge was required on the wide variety 
of weaponry used by the Iraqis from all over the world. The DIS 
report acknowledged the lesson to be identifi ed: ‘The DIS needs to 
expand its expertise on weapons systems exported by the west to 
potential enemies.’107 The Granby Coordinator went further and 
suggested that a database of such information should be created to 
implement the lesson.108 
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One of the specifi c areas which required immediate assessment 
was Iraq’s non-conventional weapons systems and capabilities 
in order to inform military requirements for planning. To assess 
these capabilities, the IC implemented lessons identifi ed from the 
Iran–Iraq War and Iraq’s past use of chemical weapons, as well 
as existing intelligence assessments, to determine that Iraq had 
considerable chemical and biological weapons capability and was 
seeking to develop a nuclear weapon or acquire weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) by an extensive procurement network.109 
However, as the campaign progressed, little further intelligence 
was gathered on these capabilities. Following an International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection in November 1990, the 
JIC noted ‘We have no intelligence that would cause us to change 
our assessment of Iraq’s current nuclear capability.’110
During the Intervention
Once Granby began, the issue of overfl ying immediately returned 
to cause diffi culties, a lesson which had been repeatedly identifi ed 
in past interventions, but implementation was persistently lost 
between the FCO and MoD. France refused to give priority to RAF 
fl ights, whilst Egypt insisted on seventy-two hours’ notice for a pre-
cleared call sign slot to be allocated.111 In addition, securing clear-
ance to overfl y the Saudis on the way to Bahrain was forgotten 
until the night of departure. This was exacerbated by the late reali-
sation that the legal status of British forces in Saudi Arabia had not 
been agreed (this was not fi nalised until mid-October 1990) and, 
the night before the launch of the offensive, that Saudi consent had 
not been given to attack from their territory.112 
Once British forces landed, the FCO continued to do all it could 
to avoid accusations of imperialism and implemented this identi-
fi ed lesson by ensuring that Arab culture was respected. Imported 
magazines had female fl esh blacked out, women were forbidden 
from driving and there was prohibition on pork and alcohol, 
although local supermarkets tended to stock the basic ingredients 
for home brewing. Christian worship was done discreetly, on a 
Friday (the Muslim day of rest) by a Nigerian dentistry lecturer, 
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who was also ordained as a priest, or Army chaplains reclassifi ed 
as ‘morale offi cers’. The Saudi ban on public music also meant 
that – despite the presence of nineteen military bands – there were 
no musical performances and entertainment for off-duty offi cers 
was limited to male magicians and comedians; Paul Daniels and 
Harry Secombe obliged.113 The FCO and MoD also agreed that 
it was best that the Prince of Wales make his trip to Saudi Arabia 
unaccompanied by Princess Diana to avoid negative press around 
a high profi le female and subsequent exploitation of this by 
Saddam’s propaganda machine. Munro stated:
there were times when we all had to consider what would have been 
the attitude in 622 – the year of Hijra, when the Prophet Mohammad 
went from Mecca to Medina – when we tried to decide what line to 
take . . . we did need quite an historical reach-back to back up what 
was a contemporary war.114
In addition, the FCO was careful to manage the media reporting 
back to Britain, implementing another previously identifi ed les-
son. However, the policy was adopted in a new climate; Granby 
was the fi rst confl ict in history in which reporting could no lon-
ger be controlled by routing content through military channels 
because journalists had their own, portable, real-time satellite 
communications. Ambassador Munro recalled that the strat-
egy was ‘maximum briefi ng material, no matter how trivial, in 
order to keep the editors’ appetite fed’. Much was done by the 
Embassy in Riyadh to facilitate access for journalists but it was 
a delicate process and often loopholes or ‘blind eyes’ had to be 
negotiated. When the Saudi Embassy in London stopped issuing 
press visas, journalists were fl own by RAF Hercules to Dhahran 
where they received briefi ngs and were able to observe squad-
rons on patrol as long as they remained on the airbase. Once 
they had arrived in the fi eld, diffi cult journalists were often ‘han-
dled’; the unpredictable editor of The Sunday Times, Andrew 
Neil, was promptly sent off to a maritime patrol to divert him 
out of the way.115 
From the outset, the MoD had also been keen to manage media 
relations well. Although this principle had been long established, 
the lessons specifi cally referenced only dated back to House of 
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Commons Defence Committee lessons identifi ed from the Falk-
lands.116 However, since 1982 a considerable amount of work had 
been done: plans had been made to meet the PR requirements of 
all future confl icts with contingency plans including PR annexes. 
The PR staff had become part of the internal planning process 
and relationships with editors and senior media staff had been 
nurtured. A central document had also been produced for quick 
reference which identifi ed, distributed and retained lessons: ‘Pro-
posed Working Arrangements with the Media in time of Tension 
and War.’117 
In theatre, over 170 visas were secured for press and over eighty 
military personnel were responsible for ensuring good relations 
between the forces and journalists. Tom King held major press 
conferences in the desert, arriving by tank for added drama, and 
a number of reporters were attached to major Army formations, 
Royal Navy ships or RAF detachments.118 British reporters were 
fully briefed on the details of the Battle Plan weeks before much 
of the rest of the military by General Rupert Smith, assessing that 
a well-informed press – entrusted with confi dential information – 
was less risky than investigative journalists rushing to reveal snip-
pets of discovered information. The generous treatment of the press 
was appreciated by British journalists as it was in stark contrast to 
their US counterparts whose military–media relationship ‘started 
at rock bottom and then deteriorated’; a hang-up on both sides 
from Vietnam.119
A further way in which the MoD managed the press was less 
direct; great care was taken over precision bombing. Targets were 
diligently selected to minimise civilian casualties and avoid water 
supplies or sewage installations which could have caused media 
criticism. Specifi c military targets were agreed and the care with 
which the air campaign occurred led the Secretary of State to com-
ment that ‘life basically continued in Baghdad normally while key 
military installations were taken out’.120
The good management of the media also improved morale and 
public support. On 11 January 1991, de la Billière wrote a letter 
to all of the British newspapers thanking them for their support 
throughout the campaign. In response the Daily Star encouraged 
the public to bake ‘battle cakes’, based on a dense fruitcake recipe, 
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to send to the troops.121 The response was so overwhelming that 
the delivery of cakes began to hamper the fl ow of essential military 
kit.122 De la Billière later identifi ed: 
In terms of infl uence on morale, the media are central. If they report 
adversely, you will get British people either ill-informed or perhaps 
made fearful, and that will refl ect in terms of their communications 
with the servicemen at the front and have a dramatic impact on 
morale quickly.123
Troop morale was also maintained by the provision of a radio sta-
tion and a weekly newspaper, The Sandy Times.
Throughout the operation FCO and MoD cooperation was 
successful. Two senior FCO offi cials were seconded to Joint 
Headquarters (JHQ) for the duration of the crisis. As in 1961, 
de la Billière used the Embassy for political advice and senior 
staff would attend the Embassy’s briefi ng meetings.124 During the 
Falklands, de la Billière had identifi ed the need for close coopera-
tion with the FCO’s representative on the ground and he imple-
mented this throughout Granby. He later echoed the lesson of 
Air Marshal Sir Charles Elworthy thirty years earlier by identify-
ing the importance of the close working relationship declaring 
‘There are important lessons to be reemphasised in this in terms 
of the necessity of the in theatre British Embassy and military 
command working closely together in harmony.’ The result of 
clearer communication was a government who supported the 
military Commanders with ‘confi dence and fi rmness’.125 
Internally, the MoD command structure worked well across the 
forces but proved more challenging in relation to working with 
civil servants and ministers. Since 1961, a third tier had been added 
to the command structure for British operations: HQBFME headed 
by the Commander-in-Chief, JHQ at High Wycombe commanded 
by Air Chief Marshal Hine and the MoD under the Minister of 
Defence, Tom King. JHQ had been added in an endeavour to over-
come many of the diffi culties previously experienced in operations 
involving all three services but, although this had been a lesson 
identifi ed in Vantage, the new system was only implemented from a 
lesson identifi ed from Corporate twenty years later. Admiral Julian 
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Oswald noted ‘The importance of lessons learnt in 1982 in the 
Falklands is not lost on people. A lot of good command and con-
trol points came out of that campaign and, on the whole, they were 
well and sensibly picked up.’126 The relationship between JHQ and 
HQBFME worked ‘excellently’ but relations between JHQ and the 
MoD were often strained.127 This was partly due to clashes of per-
sonality but there was also a feeling that Whitehall bureaucracy was 
ineffi cient and lacked urgency.128 Many at JHQ also felt that there 
was a disproportionate input by the MoD on decision-making. The 
Joint Commander refl ected ‘at times the political imperative (as 
seen from the MoD) appeared to delay or obfuscate sound military 
judgement . . . I sometimes felt that I had been given responsibility 
without the associated authority.’129 One minister became known 
as ‘the long screwdriver’ for too much interference in the construc-
tion of the military force, particularly from a naval perspective, 
leaving the Royal Navy’s contribution to Granby less than it would 
have wished.130 Following the crisis, this lesson was formally identi-
fi ed and it was recommended that a Defence Secretariat be included 
within JHQ in the future.131
The IC had also been criticised in 1982 by the identifi cation 
of a failure to work effectively across Whitehall with the FCO 
and MoD.132 To implement this lesson Cradock assumed a dual 
role, attending both the JIC and War Cabinet meetings, and set-
ting up a series of morning meetings to ensure daily intelligence 
liaison across ministers and intelligence agencies.133 The Director 
General of Intelligence, who led DIS, briefed Cabinet daily, paral-
leling the Chief of Defence Intelligence’s briefi ng to the MoD. He 
also attended the JIC as well as carrying out briefi ng tours in the 
Gulf, sharing intelligence assessments with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman.134 The implementation of the 
lesson was successful and after the operation Parry-Evans wrote 
‘the general assessment by the Cabinet Offi ce of the operation of 
the Government machinery during the crisis is that it worked well 
. . . care was taken from the start to take account of the lessons 
identifi ed in 1982’.135
The identifi ed lesson of cost management remained promi-
nent too, despite Thatcher’s exclusion of the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer – John Major and then Norman Lamont – from the 
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War Cabinet to avoid any objections about money.136 Early on 
in the operation, FCO Economic Advisors worked on a paper on 
the economic consequences of intervention.137 It was agreed that 
‘for reasons of cost’ Western forces should be temporary and 
by January 1991 it was recommended that means of securing 
compensation be taken out of Iraqi revenues.138 Douglas Hurd 
recalled: 
A sub-theme of my foreign visits at this time could have become 
embarrassing. Long gone was the British tradition of fi nancing our 
allies in time of war. In 1991 we expected well-to-do friends to fi nance 
us . . . I begged my way around the world.139
In total, Granby cost approximately £2.5 billion of which £2 bil-
lion was negotiated in cash contributions from other countries. In 
addition, assistance in kind – including transport, accommodation, 
medical services, fuel and food – was received from eighteen differ-
ent countries.140 Saudi Arabia, as the host nation, provided much 
assistance141 and a post-Granby report concluded the ‘benefi ts of 
conducting operations from the forecourt of the world’s largest pet-
rol station should not be overlooked’.142 
The problem for the MoD was that the Civil Secretariat, which 
had previously been used to monitor spending, was abolished in 
the 1980s. In the fi rst few months of the war the British Army 
provided credit cards for spending, but it was using them without 
any form of restriction or accounting. This meant that, unlike 
other European allies, when the Saudi’s offered to pay Britain’s 
bill, only around 70 per cent of costs had been offi cially recorded 
and could be compensated. After the intervention the National 
Audit Offi ce and the House of Commons Committee of Public 
Accounts considered the MoD’s costs and fi nancial management 
during Granby and a number of lessons were identifi ed; the fi rst 
troops in Bosnia the following year were accompanied by a Civil 
Secretariat.143 
Other previously identifi ed lessons on equipment and logistics 
were also forgotten. The poor handling of cargo left many troops 
without suffi cient equipment and quickly earned the British the nick-
name ‘the Borrowers’.144 Some of the equipment which did arrive 
was unsuitable, as it had been in 1961. Much of the weaponry was 
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designed for counteracting the Soviet threat. Logistics vehicles had 
also all been procured for operations in Europe and lacked cross-
country capabilities,145 whilst suits were inappropriately designed 
for hot climates.146 Puma engine fl ying hours were reduced from 400 
to forty due to sand getting into the engine and causing blade abra-
sion, something which was of particular concern to Thatcher who 
recalled the events of 1980 and the failed US–Iranian hostage rescue 
attempt, Operation Eagle Claw.147 The Defence Committee identi-
fi ed ‘there was no clear basis for provisioning, and several evident 
defi ciencies, such as the absence of desert clothing and footwear’.148 
Special Forces suffered with particularly poor equipment due to 
their recent focus on counterterrorism operations. Special Forces 
aircraft could not support twenty-four hour, all weather, cross-
border operations, which prevented deployment. Helicopter sup-
port was limited to 30 per cent of the duration and there were 
diffi culties in long range land vehicles as well as a real-time com-
munication system being unattainable.149 These challenges also 
occurred during the worst weather conditions in the region for 
thirty years – including sandstorms, fog and nights so cold that 
diesel fuel froze – and much has been written about the results of 
such failings, particularly by members of the now infamous SAS 
patrol under the call sign Bravo Two Zero.150
In addition, the British did not have enough stockpiles of ammu-
nition and £260 million worth of ammunition had to be borrowed 
from NATO allies. Nor were there enough spares available, blamed 
largely on years of ‘shop window’ procurement policy and budget 
cutbacks. This led to double diffi culties with the use of the unreli-
able Challenger I battle tank. At any one time over 75 per cent 
of tanks were under repair or out of service – despite Margaret 
Thatcher summoning the Head of Vickers and the Defence Sec-
retary to swear their reliability for the Gulf. The result was that 
the MoD made Vickers produce more engines, so that every tank 
had around four engines spare. In the meantime, engines had to 
be removed from operational tanks in Germany and sent to the 
Gulf.151 The situation was made worse by the political require-
ment to provide ammunition, spare parts and weapons systems to 
the Saudis, Kuwaitis, Egyptians and Syrians in order to encourage 
their participation in the coalition – causing another disagreement 
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between the MoD and JHQ.152 However, this time a lesson was 
to be learned and following the end of Granby a Battlefi eld 
Equipment Reliability Return system was introduced to monitor 
equipment and spares in the future.153 
Besides these lessons, the Gulf War threw up some new chal-
lenges, for which there was no historical learning available, due 
to the advances in technology. In particular, the MoD was not 
fully prepared for chemical or biological warfare and no relevant 
defence policy was in place. An Iraqi newspaper had boasted 
‘Iraq’s arsenal contains surprises which will astonish our enemies’ 
and the British were aware of considerable Iraqi chemical and bio-
logical capabilities.154 The IC had also assessed that Saddam was 
seeking to develop a nuclear weapon or acquire WMD.155 Many 
of the IC assessments turned out to be correct with the UN Spe-
cial Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq confi rming the existence 
of mustard agents, nerve agents, a programme on anthrax and 
botulinum toxin and chemical delivery systems in the forms of 
bombs, artillery, rocket launchers and missile warheads.156 How-
ever, the IC were unable to provide important details surrounding 
the weapons; no chemical warfare survey had been produced to 
establish plant locations, nor was there immediate reconnaissance 
capability to detect locations storing such weapons. In addition, 
some capabilities were overstated – the Special Commission found 
no evidence of weaponised biological agents – whilst the effort and 
scale of progress with nuclear weapons had been understated.
However, the IC warning did enable back channel diplomacy 
to provide Saddam Hussein with unmistakeable warnings about 
immediate and catastrophic consequences for Iraq if any such 
attacks occurred.157 It also allowed greater precautions to be taken 
within the military against the risks of such attacks. There had 
been much research into, and procurement of, protective cloth-
ing, detection, immunisation and decontamination equipment as 
countermeasures. There was also planning to avoid attacking tar-
gets which may release radiation, extensive preparations to deal 
with victims and training for putting on protective clothing and 
apparatus.158 In addition, the MoD offered a vaccine to all troops 
on a voluntary basis. This precaution soon proved to be contro-
versial as three months after the inoculation most immune systems 
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collapsed and there have been many accusations of links between 
the vaccination and Gulf War syndrome, a chronic multi-symptom 
disorder. Furthermore, most battlefi eld vehicles were fi tted with 
a series of seals, air fi lters and conditioners to protect passengers 
from outside contamination. However, such measures were less 
effective on older equipment; on Striker vehicles the gun could 
not be fi red or reloaded without breaking this vital seal.159 Follow-
ing the crisis the MoD sought to improve some of the shortcom-
ings in awareness and training for chemical and biological warfare 
through the revision and extension of relevant training courses.160
A new lesson was also identifi ed during the operation, again 
brought about by rapid changes in technology. On 16 December 
1990, three briefcases and a laptop computer containing Britain’s 
war plans were stolen from the boot of a car. The papers were 
recovered within a few hours but the laptop remained missing until 
7 January 1991 when the self-proclaimed patriotic thief returned 
the item, although it remained in the MoD post room for some time 
before its signifi cance was realised.161 The event led to the identifi -
cation and implementation of lessons; immediately new rules were 
enforced for the handling of such data and all fi xed hard-disk lap-
top computers were withdrawn.162 
In the IC, during the intervention, work was done to counteract 
the lack of HUMINT by relying on IMINT, as had also been the 
case in 1961. However, although there had been much emphasis in 
the past on maintaining IMINT, capability was limited and before 
hostilities began the British were dependent upon US satellite sys-
tems. Once hostilities commenced, the MoD also relied upon other 
American equipment, including two Joint Surveillance and Target 
Attack Radar System (JSTARS) prototypes, which provided pro-
cessed, real-time, intelligence on moving targets.163 This proved 
invaluable as UK Midge drones were unreliable; Major General 
Rupert Smith identifi ed to the Defence Committee that the Midge 
often failed to return or returned with unusable imagery.164
Instead, the IC achieved air reconnaissance primarily through 
six Tornado GR1As, a new addition for the RAF as implementa-
tion of lessons identifi ed from the Falklands.165 However, the IC 
had a severe shortage of photographic interpreters (PI) and there-
fore also relied upon US analysis. The DIS identifi ed the lesson 
for the future: ‘Crisis planning must take account of limitations 
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in PI availability and the need to depend in large part on the out-
put of US Agencies.’166 The lack of up-to-date IMINT was further 
exacerbated by the difference in grids and reference system datums 
used around the world; it was during Granby that international 
agreement was made to use the new World Geodetic System. This 
rendered all French maps, for example, unusable based on the 
different Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver settings used 
by forces.167 
Similar diffi culties occurred in securing intelligence on Battle 
Damage Assessments (BDA). The IC did not possess appropri-
ate intelligence gathering equipment for BDA and coalition staff 
became so overloaded with raw intelligence for analysis that the 
DIS struggled to get tactical BDA in a timely manner.168 The IC 
identifi ed two lessons: fi rstly, that the British were reliant upon 
the US as the only coalition member with large scale BDA capabil-
ity and, secondly, that a British BDA methodology was required, 
aligning with the Americans.169
More broadly there was diffi culty in the timely analysis, dis-
tillation and dissemination of all forms of intelligence. SIGINT, 
for example, was collected from Nimrod R1s, GCHQ’s listening 
base in Cyprus and the US space borne capability which combined 
to provide huge quantities of raw data to GCHQ.170 In addition, 
the CIA alone sent 215 tons of IMINT to CENTCOM and after 
fi ve days it was advised that there was not the capacity to handle 
the deluge of intelligence.171 As a result, only a small percentage 
of available intelligence was analysed and even less was dissemi-
nated to the fi eld, let alone disseminated in a timely fashion. De 
La Billière identifi ed to the Defence Committee ‘there was so much 
[intelligence] available in the end that it was very diffi cult to cope 
with it and to extract from it the detail which was required at 
lower command levels’.172 
Dissemination problems, which were also present throughout 
Corporate, were compounded by a combination of the lack of 
secure communication links, document classifi cation and opera-
tional security.173 The DIS noted ‘the limited number of secure voice 
links to US agencies proved a particular hindrance’, exacerbated 
by the American move to a new system which it had previously 
refused to release to the UK.174 Many intelligence assessments were 
classifi ed in a way that required sanitation before being sent to 
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HQBFME, leaving the Middle East Current Intelligence Group and 
JHQ knowing more than those in theatre.175 This lesson had previ-
ously been identifi ed during Vantage but was re-identifi ed by the 
MoD thirty years later.176 A similar problem also occurred within 
the coalition where a wide application of US NOFORN (no for-
eigners) and UK EYES A (UK citizens only) classifi cations of intel-
ligence caused sharing diffi culties and was only solved by a direct 
intervention from General Schwarzkopf.177 Following the end of 
hostilities, there was wide identifi cation of lessons to be learned 
and procedures for the distillation and dissemination of intelligence 
were reviewed.178 
Furthermore, throughout the campaign the IC retained a close 
working relationship with the US as it had done in previous oper-
ations. Early on, the JIC had worked with the CIA to provide 
estimates on Iraq WMD.179 Similar to the MoD, working together 
in the past had also earned the British a privileged position. Air 
Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine confi rmed ‘The ready availabil-
ity to us of high-quality US intelligence refl ected the mutual trust 
and rapport established between our intelligence communities 
over the years.’ In addition ‘there appeared to be no constraints 
on the fl ow of US information’.180 In fact, the close relationship 
led the British to believe that they were not only fully informed 
of national assessments in Washington, but were able to infl u-
ence that assessment. A British Defence Intelligence Liaison Staff 
was established in Washington with mirrored Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA) and CIA representatives in London to ensure close 
communications between the capitals. However, a new lesson was 
identifi ed: that working with the Americans was not only desir-
able but had become essential. US agencies had much larger staffs 
than the UK and the existence of unifi ed geographic Commands 
meant that – unlike the UK – each had a signifi cant, permanent 
intelligence component focused on an area of the world.181 One 
British analyst advised ‘Over 90 per cent of what was in my 
reports was American material. If we didn’t have the Americans, 
I’d have nothing to write about . . . Without them, we’d be little 
better than Belgium.’182 
Working with other ally intelligence agencies during Granby 
was also important.183 Early on in Granby ‘C’, the Head of the 
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SIS, went to Saudi Arabia to cement the British–Saudi intelligence 
relationship and compare notes on Saddam with his counterpart 
Prince Turki. A British Intelligence Corps liaison was also estab-
lished within the headquarters of the Commander of the Arab 
Forces and the Saudis ran aerial reconnaissance as part of their 
contribution to the coalition.184 Throughout the campaign, liai-
son visits were made to the Gulf, Europe and Washington. In 
addition a weekly – and later daily – intelligence summary was 
released by NATO to Arab allies. The DIS lessons report noted 
‘European and Arab participation in Coalition forces and the 
political importance of [redacted] proved the value of connec-
tions established by the DIS with many other national intelligence 
agencies.’185 Parry-Evans agreed and identifi ed the key lesson was 
‘The importance of the UK/US intelligence link cannot be over-
emphasised, but many of our intelligence links with a wide range 
of countries were of particular value, pointing the need to main-
tain and foster such links.’186 
IC psyops also developed during the intervention. Even though 
psyops had proved of value before Suez, when Iraq invaded Kuwait 
British psyops capability consisted of one man at the Intelligence 
Corps training centre. Eventually this number reached twelve, a 
far cry from the US’ 4th Psyops Group of several hundred person-
nel. Nonetheless, the SIS smuggled videos and cassettes into Iraq 
which advised that Saddam was leading the country to disaster. 
A radio station, Free Iraq, was funded which incited people to 
revolt, but due to Saudi sensitivities had to be broadcast from the 
air rather than Saudi territory. Instead, a secret radio station in 
Saudi Arabia masqueraded as Radio Kuwait and broadcast false 
news, including that Kuwait City had been recaptured by the allies 
causing a number of Iraqi units to fl ee prematurely.187 Psyops were 
also focused upon Iraqi troops through leafl eting which warned 
against fi ghting and offered safe conduct passes for those who sur-
rendered. With the decision not to fl y into enemy territory before 
the offensive began, 25,000 leafl ets were fi rst sent by hot air bal-
loon. During the war, leafl ets were more successfully distributed 
than they had been in Musketeer; 27 million leafl ets were dropped 
on Iraqi units and many soldiers who promptly surrendered were 
found clutching a psyops safe conduct pass.188
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After the Intervention
Since 1961, the FCO had experienced a few changes. The House 
of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee was established in 1979 
to scrutinise FCO policy which encouraged accountability – and in 
turn self-refl ection, including the identifi cation of lessons. However, 
the committee itself did not offer much in the way of contribution 
to the learning process. It examined the Gulf War on two occa-
sions: in October 1990 and at the end of the confl ict in 1991. The 
fi rst session acted as a fact-fi nding mission but did not discuss any 
lessons from history or attempt to identify lessons from the actions 
of the FCO. 189 The second session reached a number of conclu-
sions but these were focused upon summarising actions, offering 
approval to policy or supporting declarations, not refl ecting upon 
lesson identifi cation.190 
Nonetheless, internally, the FCO had begun to refl ect upon 
interventions. Although the FCO confi rmed that no lessons 
reports were written during Granby, following British with-
drawal, a conference was organised with all of the Middle East 
Heads of Mission to review the recent events.191 No minutes 
from the meeting remain192 but a Chairman’s Steering Brief was 
circulated in advance which identifi ed three lessons from the 
experience.193 The fi rst lesson related to Gulf state security, iden-
tifying ineffective defence and that non-aggression pacts between 
regional states alone did not provide security. The historical 
examples of the 1975 Algiers agreements between Iraq and Iran 
and the 1989 non-aggression pact between Iraq and Saudi Ara-
bia were particularly referenced. The second lesson focused upon 
arms control and non-proliferation, identifying that the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) would at best provide only partial 
protection from WMD and long range delivery systems. The 
third lesson identifi ed was ‘that a serious effort must be made 
to break the Arab/Israel logjam’.194 During the confl ict Iraq had 
attacked Israel with Scud missiles in the hope of drawing it into 
the war and recapturing some Arab support. 
The Steering Brief also provided a number of key conclusions, 
one of which remains redacted. The six conclusions identifi ed 
were: to support the establishment of security arrangements for 
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the GCC, restore stability in Iraq, support the US initiative on the 
Arab–Israel confl ict, continue to improve relations with Iran and 
Syria, restore the relationship with Jordan and maintain contact 
with the PLO, and, fi nally, ‘we should begin serious consider-
ation of ways to reduce our dependence on oil’.195 These identi-
fi ed lessons were subsequently implemented to different extents 
but there was no follow-up process in place to ensure implemen-
tation, further distribution or retention of lessons. Furthermore, 
there was little else written on learning, and no offi cial history 
– although the FCO and MoD did cooperate in the publication 
of a more general history written by the Central Offi ce of Infor-
mation.196 
Despite the success of the intervention, there were questions 
after withdrawal as to whether British forces had done enough. 
However, the lessons identifi ed from history informed the US 
and British decision not to depose Saddam. In August 1990, the 
FCO prophetically assessed that, if Saddam was removed or killed 
by multinational forces, ‘There would be an upsurge of popular 
nationalist and anti-Western sentiment in Iraq, probably including 
violence against Western interests. Possibly an upsurge of Islamic 
fundamentalist sentiment too.’ If Saddam stepped down volun-
tarily it was still considered to be a diffi cult situation: ‘There is no 
prospect of Western style democratic regime emerging internally 
in the short-term: there is simply no democratic infrastructure or 
tradition, and very powerful anti-democratic forces.’197 Further-
more, the FCO was keen not to become involved in any form of 
occupation. Margaret Thatcher had long warned of not letting 
Britain’s arm get caught in Iraq’s mangle whilst the Foreign Sec-
retary had stressed that the British had no right to decide Iraq’s 
leadership.198 Alan Munro identifi ed a number of historical lessons 
which informed all of these decisions:
there were the lessons of our own experience in the Twenties, Thirties 
and Forties of an association – tutelage association with the govern-
ment of Iraq. Iraq is not a homogeneous political society – it is split 
three ways . . . [If we sought] to establish an alternative government 
of reconciliation and recovery in Iraq, I rather doubt if we would have 
got away with it.199 
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There were also other complications: the UN mandate was limited 
and in a post-Cold War era establishing its legitimacy was vital. 
Upon refl ection, offering a warning of what was to come in 2003, 
John Major advised:
If the nations who had gone to war on the basis of international law 
were themselves to break that law, what chance would there have 
been in the future of order rather than chaos? What authority in 
the future would the great nations have against law-breakers if they 
themselves broke the law and exceeded the United Nations mandate? 
They would never have trusted us again.200
In the MoD, a wide range of post-Granby lessons reports were 
produced – as they had been in 1961 – with major studies on 
planning, equipment effectiveness, fi nances and budgeting, com-
munication and information systems, logistics, withdrawal, 
intelligence, the use of scientists and military survey as well as 
a number of more minor papers.201 Lessons were identifi ed at 
unit level, passed upwards through the chain of command into 
overall reports for land, air and sea, endorsed by high command 
and then by the MoD.202 For many reports lower ranking ser-
vicemen were interviewed, which meant incorporating a new 
spectrum of experience and opinion into the learning process.203 
‘Wash up’ conferences were held, with the RAF hosting a one day 
event at Cranwell with all Commanders as well as Senior Staff 
Offi cers.204 Furthermore, individual investigations occurred for 
specifi c events – including the tragic shooting of nine British ser-
vicemen by an American A10205 – and despatches, including les-
son identifi cation, were written by Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick 
Hine and Commander-in-Chief Peter de la Billière.206 
Following the end of hostilities Tom King told the House of 
Commons Defence Committee:
There is a very extensive exercise going on, which will continue, to 
make sure that we have learned the lessons from this whole period of 
confl ict. It is very extensive in that it involves all the services, all the 
arms, a whole range of different lessons . . . there are going to be some 
very, very interesting lessons to learn.207
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The Defence Committee concluded ‘The Ministry has gone to some 
lengths to discover and analyse the lessons of Operation Granby 
and monitor their implementation . . . the evidence suggests that 
the arrangements have been broadly effective.’208 However, notice-
ably some of the strategic questions about chemical, biological and 
nuclear war, or the failure of the Kuwaiti defence after thirty years 
of British training, were not addressed.
The MoD also had lessons identifi ed by external bodies. The 
National Audit Offi ce examined the movement of personnel, 
equipment and stores to and from the Gulf and concluded that 
there were diffi culties in handling priorities and tracking freight.209 
In fact, 228 aircraft pallets, worth £680,000, and eighty shipped 
containers were unaccounted for at the end of Granby, with a fur-
ther 2,800 containing unknown contents.210 One RAF Group Cap-
tain drew upon these identifi ed lessons in a plea for more learning 
from history. Group Captain Neville Parton explained that during 
the preparation for Operation Torch, in the Second World War, 
tools and spares were packed into containers with a code placed 
on the outside. For security reasons the list that identifi ed the code 
number was included as a secret annex to the operation order, 
with a limited distribution. As a result, when items landed on the 
beach, the contents and planned destination of the containers were 
unknown, leading to weeks of delays for equipment. Twenty years 
later, in 1961, one report from Vantage identifi ed a long, classi-
fi ed, often incorrect, coding list for containers resulting in over 
130 containers being unnecessarily opened to fi nd cooking equip-
ment. By the time of the Gulf War, teams worked for months trying 
to identify thousands of unmarked containers, making it quicker 
to get spare parts from Europe than from within the country.211 
Following the National Audit Offi ce identifi cation, the lesson was 
fi nally implemented and the MoD announced the introduction of 
new tracking systems including bar coding and other automatic 
identifi cation systems.212 
More generally, the Defence Committee had been scrutinising 
the actions of the MoD, providing a new method of learning, 
since 1979. In response to Operation Granby the committee pro-
duced two substantial reports focused on lessons: Preliminary 
Lessons of Operation Granby and Implementation of Lessons 
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Learned from Operation Granby.213 This was an additional 
learning process which had been used after Corporate and made 
the identifi cation and implementation of lessons widely avail-
able for public reading and scrutiny. Consequently, not only was 
the input into lesson identifi cation becoming more democratic, 
through the interviewing of all ranks, so was the distribution of 
lessons. 
The second report revealed that a new process was in place 
in the MoD to ensure lesson implementation. In March 1991, 
Air Chief Marshal Sir David Parry-Evans was appointed Granby 
Coordinator to prepare a work plan detailing all the tasks to be 
addressed, all the individuals and groups responsible for their 
progression and target dates for their completion.214 Parry-Evans 
produced a full report in December 1991 and in early 1992 a 
small cell was established to consolidate identifi ed lessons into 
one document to ensure implementation. All lessons were allo-
cated an ‘action manager’ who reported to the two-star offi -
cer responsible for that area and the Defence Staff monitored 
progress.215 A six-monthly audit on the process of implementing 
equipment lessons was also established and the responsibility for 
ongoing monitoring of implementation was given to the Director 
of Defence Policy, Margaret Aldred, who had also been respon-
sible for implementing lessons from Corporate.216 
The Defence Committee also questioned whether there was 
any benefi t of examining the lessons of implementation from the 
Falklands. Committee member Bruce George asked:
We have gone through this process before, inquiring into the lessons 
of the Falklands, and I wonder if there is any scope for an inquiry 
into the lessons learned from the Falklands, and I wonder if there is 
any scope for an inquiry into lessons learned from how to learn les-
sons . . . Are you satisfi ed that the process of implementing lessons of 
the Falklands was adequate, and are there lessons from that exercise 
that might be helpful in gaining full value for diminished resources in 
learning the lessons of the Gulf operation?217
Unfortunately, nothing further came of the inquiry and there 
remained no formal process on how to learn lessons for some 
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time. In addition, budgetary restraints continued to hamper les-
son implementation. Even learning of the stretch of forces during 
Granby did not prevent their further reduction, with British forces 
in Germany reduced from 56,000 during the Cold War to 23,000 
by 1994 and the number of tanks reduced from 450 during the 
Gulf War to 286. Similarly, whilst there was some investment in 
the RAF – for example in the air transport fl eet – reductions in 
defence spending meant that a number of the lessons identifi ed 
in Granby would be re-identifi ed in the lessons reports from 
Kosovo eight years later. These included diffi culties with secure 
air-to-air communications and the reliance on the US leading to a 
lack of timely BDA.218 
After 1991 the MoD began incorporating relevant contractors 
into the learning process, particularly manufacturers of military 
equipment. Whilst lessons were discussed with manufacturers dur-
ing deployment, the MoD also invited companies to discuss lessons 
identifi ed in more detail after the operation to ensure implementa-
tion. Furthermore, in July 1992, the MoD attended a supplier’s 
conference and made a presentation specifi cally on the lessons 
identifi ed from Granby.219
By 1991, the MoD had also become more involved in lesson 
distribution and identifying lessons from others. Conversations 
were held with allies on relevant issues and a British lesson iden-
tifi cation report was prepared for distribution to both NATO and 
the US.220 This relationship was reciprocal and the US Defence 
Department shared its classifi ed report – which was prepared for 
Congress – with the MoD.221 The Granby Coordinator also visited 
the Pentagon and established principles for the exchange of les-
sons,222 whilst NATO identifi ed a number of lessons which were 
shared with the alliance.223 
Throughout Granby, the MoD was aware that many of its defi -
ciencies had not been completely exposed due to the Iraqi’s lack 
of fi ght and swift surrender. This had not been expected as Iraq 
possessed the fourth largest permanent Army in the world and 
Saddam had recalled the Popular Army, a militia of several hun-
dred thousand men.224 In addition, the Iraqi Air Force offered no 
retaliation and the lack of resistance was aptly illustrated when 
one unit even surrendered to a surprised group of journalists. In 
5842_Kettle.indd   163 06/09/18   11:38 AM
Learning from British Interventions in the Middle East
164
fact, the Iraqi Army became so desperate to prevent further sur-
renders that they banned the wearing of white items of cloth-
ing.225 In addition, the British forces were again fortunate, as 
they had been in 1956, 1958 and 1961, to be relieved from any 
long-term responsibilities, this time by the UN. The deployment 
of UN troops to support operations meant the coalition was not 
subjected to protracted fi ghting, peace-building or stability opera-
tions but could withdraw from the region.
Across the IC, at the end of the campaign, the DIS conducted a 
major study on intelligence support to Granby.226 In addition, the 
Granby Coordinator and the Defence Committee identifi ed a num-
ber of relevant lessons for the IC resulting in lessons being imple-
mented. Many new strategies were developed and the organisation 
and procedure of intelligence was revisited.227 To increase the shar-
ing of intelligence across different users and services, an intelligence 
division was created within Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) 
at Northwood.228 In addition, to improve the distillation and dis-
semination of intelligence, all assets were centralised under the 
Chief of Defence Intelligence, whilst an offi cer was appointed to 
coordinate and increase intelligence training including running full 
scale military exercises.229
Nonetheless, as part of the MoD, these reports were focused 
upon defence intelligence, with only a few lessons identifi ed for 
the wider IC, and there is little evidence of similar reports or self-
refl ection across other intelligence agencies. Towards the end of 
the operation, the IC used identifi ed lessons from the Falklands to 
assess the likelihood of an Iraqi uprising against Saddam Hussein: 
An assumption that we made, not simply an assumption of conve-
nience, but one of serious calculation, was that – rather as in the 
case of the post Falklands situation – Iraqi public opinion would have 
reasserted itself – with support from elements within Iraq’s still very 
powerful Army, and would have overthrown their regime; the Galtieri 
syndrome if you like.230
However, by April 1991 it was clear that a successful uprising 
was increasingly unlikely and yet there was no refl ection upon 
the assumptions of this assessment.231 It was not until 2004, when 
Lord Butler conducted an offi cial review of intelligence on WMD, 
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that assessments were revisited, questioned and lessons identi-
fi ed. One such lesson included that assessments of Iraq’s chemical 
weapon stock had been based upon the false assumption that no 
weapons had been leftover from the Iran–Iraq War.232
The IC also underwent a number of changes following Granby, 
but these were the result of entering the post-Cold War era – 
including disputes over IC legality, oversight and fi scal manage-
ment – rather than lessons identifi ed from the Gulf War. Several 
reviews quickly got underway; the Cabinet Offi ce’s ‘Review of 
protective security’, the Permanent Secretary of Defence’s ‘Review 
of intelligence requirements and resources’, two separate reviews 
on GCHQ and three on counterterrorism.233 The Permanent Sec-
retary’s review also sparked an internal SIS review leading to a 
‘Christmas massacre’ which saw the comprehensive retirement 
of MI6’s Board of Directors to be replaced by a younger genera-
tion.234 In addition, Britain’s fi rst legislative intelligence oversight 
body was established, the Intelligence and Security Committee, 
and in 1994 the ongoing existence of MI5 and MI6 was offi cially 
recognised in the Intelligence Services Act, bringing forth a new 
era of scrutiny. As a result, the IC was already involved in imple-
menting much broader lessons, leaving the lessons identifi ed from 
Granby largely ignored.
Granby Learning
The operation in the Gulf revealed that lessons identifi ed from 
Vantage had long been forgotten. Although a wide variety of his-
torical events were drawn upon, the events of 1961 were not refer-
enced whereas those of 1982 remained ever present. The FCO also 
focused upon Britain’s history of imperialism and the operation in 
Korea for lesson identifi cation whilst the Foreign Secretary identi-
fi ed lessons from the experience of Korea and Suez and the Prime 
Minister drew upon Suez and the Falklands. Thatcher and Bush 
also regularly analogised Saddam Hussein to Adolf Hitler and 
warned that a lack of response would be akin to the appeasement 
of the 1930s. In contrast, by the time John Major arrived to the 
Premiership he was convinced that history provided few lessons 
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for Granby. Such debates only solidify the idea of subjectivity in 
learning from history. In the individual sphere, the role of Thatcher 
and her identifi ed lessons from appeasement, Musketeer and Cor-
porate, in combination with her power of personality were crucial 
for the British response. The Policy Planning Staff also offered a 
number of identifi ed lessons on the requirement to limit British 
action in the region and respect the UN mandate. Unfortunately, 
a lack of institutional implementation or retention of these lessons 
would lead them to be easily disregarded by government in 2003.
In the MoD, lessons identifi ed from the last major campaign, 
Corporate, remained the primary focus, ignoring other relevant 
experience, including the last major coalition campaign – Korea 
– or Vantage. In fact, despite the large learning process in place 
in 1961, many of the same lessons were re-identifi ed thirty years 
later – including the necessity of working with the Americans and 
the benefi t of working with the local Embassy – or had only been 
implemented as a result of lessons being re-identifi ed during Cor-
porate. This demonstrated an over-reliance on learning in the indi-
vidual sphere and resonated with the old maxim that the military 
were always fi ghting the previous war. 
For the IC, learning from history was limited to the identifi ca-
tion of lessons from the Iran–Iraq War to assess Iraq’s chemical 
and biological weapons capability. Some lessons which had been 
formally identifi ed from Corporate were implemented in the insti-
tutional sphere, perhaps because these emerged as part of a pub-
lic report – the external review conducted by Lord Franks – thus 
forcing a response. In fact, the analysis of chemical and biological 
weapons would not be examined again for lesson identifi cation 
until the IC was forced to respond to the Butler external review 
conducted in 2004. However, a number of lessons identifi ed from 
Corporate had not been learned, including issues surrounding the 
dissemination of intelligence. 
The emphasis upon learning from history had, however, begun 
to change across all three institutions. New external methods of 
scrutiny, through increased media accessibility and coverage, 
Parliamentary Committees and extraordinary inquiries, forced 
attention towards learning lessons and the institutions responded 
accordingly. In the FCO, post-crisis refl ection had begun through 
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the holding of a conference, although there is no evidence of fol-
lowing up identifi ed lessons with implementation or distribu-
tion. There is also no record of the conference which would have 
retained lessons and the Foreign Affairs Committee proved much 
less concerned with ensuring lessons were identifi ed and imple-
mented than the Defence Committee. 
In the MoD, the learning process had developed the most sig-
nifi cantly. Lesson identifi cation had been extended to external 
sources of critique – including the National Audit Offi ce, Com-
mittee of Public Accounts and Defence Committee – which each 
proved rigorous in their approach. There was also an increased 
emphasis placed upon lesson implementation, by both the MoD 
and Defence Committee, whilst lesson distribution had extended 
to the sharing of lessons with allies and relevant contractors. The 
learning process had also become more transparent through the 
Defence Committee, and more democratic, by including a range 
of ranks in the process of lesson identifi cation. However, there 
was still no formal document within the MoD on how lessons 
should be learned and economic restrictions for implementation 
were instilled through the ‘Options for change’ defence review.235 
Between 1990 and 2002 defence spending reduced by more than 
20 per cent – going from around 4 per cent of gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) to 2½ per cent. 
At the same time, across all three institutions, there was rec-
ognition of the importance of history to current operations in 
limiting or empowering British actions. In particular, all three 
institutions acknowledged that Britain’s history of imperialism 
required increased sensitivity, whilst a history of working with the 
Americans had earned the British a privileged position in US-led 
coalitions.
The Gulf War also led to the identifi cation of new lessons for 
the future. For the FCO, the most signifi cant new lesson was that 
Saddam Hussein could not be trusted. For the MoD, the new les-
sons were that Britain could no longer run large scale operations 
without ally support and needed to be prepared for operations 
against an enemy with chemical and biological weapons. In the IC, 
the new lessons included the limitations of SIGINT when fi ghting 
a well trained Army, and that working with the Americans was 
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essential for increasing collection and assessment capability. Many 
of these lessons would remain important, especially as the opera-
tion had not solved the problem of an aggressive Iraq long term. 
Percy Cradock identifi ed:
The underlying question remained, however: how to deal with post-
war Iraq? We had to recognize that Saddam had survived and was 
probably there to stay . . . Means had to be found to reassure his 
neighbours, to maintain long-term pressure on him and prevent him 
developing his more dangerous weapons.236
This challenge would be revisited over the next twelve years as, 
despite the removal of Iraqi forces, Kuwait remained apprehensive 
and pessimistic about its position.237 There were also several scares 
which led to the prompt return of British troops to Saudi Arabia 
and in the long term the stage was set for the invasion of Iraq 
in 2003 when the rigour of the lessons identifi ed, implemented, 
retained and distributed from the Gulf War would be truly tested.
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6 Afghanistan Part Two – Iraq 2003–9
I would stick to how we come up with a military and political plan 
that is likely to be successful; how we get the necessary support; and 
how we set it up properly, with Afghanistan as the model.
(Jonathan Powell advising Tony Blair before a meeting 
with George W. Bush, 28 March 2002)1
At 8:46 EST on 11 September 2001 hijacked American Airlines 
Flight 11 was fl own into the North Tower of the World Trade 
Centre in New York City. A second plane, United Airline Flight 
175, hit the South Tower less than twenty minutes later. By 9:40 a 
third plane had crashed into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, 
home of the US Department of Defence and less than four kilome-
tres from the White House. A fourth plane came down in Shanks-
ville, Pennsylvania, after passengers overcame the hijackers. These 
events marked the worst ever terrorist attack on American soil: 
2,753 people died in New York, 184 in Arlington and forty in 
Pennsylvania. The events changed the international environment 
overnight; security became America’s utmost priority and it lost 
all tolerance for countries posing any form of national security 
threat. Despite occurring across the Atlantic, the attacks were also 
felt in Britain. There were sixty-seven Britons killed, more than 
the Lockerbie bombing or the 7/7 attacks that would take place 
in 2005. 
The hijackers were nineteen members of al-Qaeda and the US’ 
initial response to the attacks focused on Afghanistan, where the 
leader of the terrorist group – and mastermind of the hijackings, 
Osama Bin Laden – was believed to be hiding. On 7 October 
2001, the war against Afghanistan began with UK and US aerial 
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bombings. However, President George W. Bush soon turned his 
attention to Iraq. Iraq had long been a thorn in the side of the 
West, ever since President George H. Bush had called a ceasefi re 
on the Gulf War and refused to depose the regime of Saddam 
Hussein. The terms of the ceasefi re included an Iraqi obligation 
to destroy, remove or render harmless all of its WMD under the 
supervision of a UN weapons inspection team (the United Nations 
Special Commission – UNSCOM), but Saddam remained unco-
operative and obstructive throughout the 1990s.2 
When 9/11 happened, the JIC was quick to assess that Iraq was 
not involved. However, in the wake of the events, issues of terror-
ism and WMD became confl ated, with concerns raised that Saddam 
could share his weapons with al-Qaeda. On 29 January 2002, the 
President addressed the Capitol for the State of the Union Address 
and accused three states of helping terrorism and seeking WMD, 
labelling them an ‘axis of evil’: North Korea, Iran and Iraq. Despite 
intelligence assessments concluding that Iraq had no signifi cant 
links to al-Qaeda its card was marked.3 By October 2002, President 
Bush had persuaded Congress to move the War on Terror beyond 
Afghanistan. They authorised the removal of Saddam’s regime as 
a pre-emptive strike to prevent further proliferation and minimise 
the possibility of any WMD being passed to terrorist organisa-
tions. In November, the UN unanimously adopted Security Council 
Resolution 1441 which demanded Iraq’s compliance with the UN 
Monitoring, Verifi cation and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) 
– the successor of UNSCOM – and Britain commenced contingency 
planning for a military operation. During the beginning of 2003, 
British forces began to be deployed. At the same time the UK, US 
and Spain worked to draft a second resolution to authorise mili-
tary intervention for non-cooperation, but it soon became clear that 
France intended to use its veto. Consequently, on 17 March 2003, 
the British Cabinet agreed to join the US, without a UN mandate, 
in a military ‘coalition of the willing’ to topple Saddam from power. 
This was a coalition of thirty-nine other countries, none of which 
was Arab. 
In the early hours of 20 March 2003 Operation Telic – Opera-
tion Iraqi Freedom in the US – began with air strikes. By late 
evening the ground campaign had also begun with 40 and 42 
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Commando Royal Marines seizing the Al Faw peninsular. It was 
the largest military operation since Granby with a similar num-
ber of personnel deployed in approximately half the time; 46,000 
personnel, nineteen warships, fourteen Royal Fleet Auxiliary ves-
sels, 15,000 vehicles, 115 fi xed-wing aircraft and 100 helicop-
ters were all deployed. Although major combat operations ended 
on 30 April 2003, with the set-up of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) as a transitional government, British forces 
remained in Iraq for six years trying to build peace, with some 
members remaining even longer to train Iraqis. In total 148,990 
individual Armed Forces personnel were deployed and 179 lost 
their lives.4
Planning the Intervention
Despite considerable discussion of intervention in the run-up to 
the Iraq War, the FCO was still surprised by the decision and tim-
ing of the military operation. Although intense negotiations with 
the US and UN meant that the events of 2003 were less unexpected 
than those of 1956 or 1990, the Head of the Defence Secretariat 
for Iraq, David Johnson, noted ‘Many diplomats couldn’t believe 
it would ever come to war, and behaved accordingly.’5 This was 
partly because diplomats had worked hard on a policy of ‘smart 
sanctions’ – a redesign of sanctions to control military and WMD 
items, whilst avoiding the negative impact of sanctions on the 
Iraqi people – and had a fi rm commitment to achieving a second 
UN resolution. There was also widespread suspicion that Saddam 
would become more cooperative towards weapons inspectors once 
he realised the extent of the rising tensions.6 
In addition, the FCO had repeatedly warned of the huge risks 
of intervention. Briefs were presented which identifi ed many of 
the same concerns raised during Granby: the complexities of 
Iraqi society, the instinct for revenge, the lack of security and 
that democracy installation was unlikely to be successful.7 Even 
lessons identifi ed from Suez were revisited. The FCO Director 
of Middle East and North Africa, Edward Chaplin, advised the 
Foreign Secretary ‘we risk a repeat of the Suez debacle, which 
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apart from its short-term effects (e.g. sweeping away the Hash-
emite regime in Iraq) changed Arab popular opinion towards 
Britain for a generation’.8 
Between 2002 and 2003, in an endeavour to identify and 
implement further lessons from the past, the FCO recalled former 
Ambassadors to discuss the growing Iraq crisis. They identifi ed 
two key lessons. Firstly, they advised that British experience in Iraq 
in the 1920s–30s revealed the tensions within the country which 
would be unleashed upon intervention. Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the 
British Ambassador to the UN, later informed the Foreign Affairs 
Committee ‘The Foreign Offi ce understood better than some what 
Iraq might become . . . clearly, given the way things went, their 
advice was not heeded.’9 
These lessons from the past were also echoed by the IC who 
provided assessments of the risks and costs involved for an oper-
ation in Iraq, including the differences with Afghanistan, the 
strategic impact on Russia, the European Union (EU) and other 
Middle Eastern countries, the diffi culties foreseen within the UN 
and the increase in the al-Qaeda threat.10 Even one month before 
Telic began, the JIC warned of the many diffi culties of running a 
post-Saddam Iraq and identifi ed that UN authorisation would be 
‘crucial’.11 Two months later the JIC again highlighted risks and 
prophetically judged ‘Iraqi jubilation at Saddam’s fall will dissi-
pate quickly’ and ‘The Iraqi population will blame the coalition if 
progress is slow.’ 12 
Prime Minister Tony Blair also identifi ed the possibility of sectar-
ian violence. He wrote to Bush in January 2003 ‘The biggest risk we 
face is internecine fi ghting between all the rival groups, religions, 
tribes etc. in Iraq when the military strike destabilises the regime. 
They are perfectly capable, on previous form, of killing each other 
in large numbers.’13 However, he chose to draw upon his previ-
ous experience as guidance and reassured senior Labour fi gures 
‘I’ve had two wars – Kosovo and Afghanistan – and I think I can 
claim that we got it right.’14 This ignored the fact that Afghanistan 
was supported by the UN and was ongoing, with the outcome still 
uncertain. The Kosovo analogy also failed to recognise a number of 
crucial differences: the intervention was to halt an ongoing humani-
tarian crisis – not to force regime change – it was widely supported 
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by the international community – including countries in the region – 
and it was soon validated by the UN. Blair was not ignorant of these 
differences, writing to President Bush ‘This is not Kosovo. This is 
not Afghanistan. This is not even the Gulf War’ but ignored them in 
situations requiring persuasion.15 
The second lesson identifi ed by the former Ambassadors was 
that the FCO was being bypassed by the Prime Minister as it had 
been in 1956, which could lead to similarly disastrous results.16 
No10 had installed a small group of foreign policy advisors within 
the Cabinet Offi ce, reducing FCO input and withholding key 
information and intelligence from senior FCO offi cials and minis-
ters.17 In fact, similarly to Suez, much of the machinery of govern-
ment was avoided. The Cabinet were not involved in any major 
decision-making and were kept informed rather than incorporated 
into the policy process.18 Likewise, in contrast to the fi ve recorded 
discussions of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (DOP) 
for the four days of UK–US air strikes to degrade Iraq’s WMD 
capability in 1998 (Operation Desert Fox), no DOP meetings 
occurred before Telic. In fact, the DOP had held its last meeting 
on Iraq in March 1999.19 Instead, planning decisions were made 
either bilaterally between Blair and the relevant Secretary of State 
or in small meetings which were often not minuted, against stan-
dard protocol. This sidelined the Cabinet Secretary and avoided 
Cabinet challenge or collective ministerial responsibility.20 These 
lessons were later identifi ed by the Iraq Inquiry but are yet to be 
implemented; no new procedural machinery has been put in place 
despite calls from the permanent secretaries of Department for 
International Development (DfID) and the MoD for an oversight 
committee of ministers.21 
Effective scrutiny was also not achieved through Parliament 
or Parliamentary Committees but, unlike Eden and similar to 
Harold Macmillan, Blair was concerned with securing public and 
parliamentary support which would be tackled in the same way 
as Afghanistan.22 Creating a convincing case for military action 
became an increasing priority and, echoing Thatcher, included 
a number of analogies between Saddam and Hitler.23 However, 
public opinion remained against Telic with large scale anti-war 
protests held across the country. In January 2003, a poll in The 
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Guardian suggested public opinion was 43 per cent against to 
30 per cent for any intervention but No10 remained convinced 
that once the war began support for the troops would lead to a 
‘Blair bounce’ in the opinion polls.24 Blair even famously declared 
of the protests ‘Let the day-to-day judgments come and go: be 
prepared to be judged by history.’25
Parliamentary support was more forthcoming. The Leader of 
the House of Commons, Robin Cook, drew upon lessons iden-
tifi ed from circumnavigating Parliament in 1956 to recommend 
that the Prime Minister recall the House of Commons for a formal 
debate. Cook stated ‘All I ask is that every morning you remember 
what happened to Anthony Eden.’ Whilst Blair dismissed the com-
parison, the advice was heeded and the historic decision was taken 
to ask the House of Commons whether to commit Britain to the 
Iraq War.26 The parliamentary vote was held on 18 March 2003 
ending 412–149 in favour of intervention. This vote set a historic 
precedent for all future Prime Ministers to gain parliamentary per-
mission to send British troops to war. 
Blair had also identifi ed the importance of international sup-
port and, as in past operations, the FCO worked hard to secure 
it – albeit with little success. The Prime Minister wrote in March 
2002 ‘The persuasion job on this seems very tough. My own side 
are worried. Public opinion is fragile. International opinion – as 
I found at the EU – is pretty sceptical.’27 Between April and July 
2002, Blair tried to persuade Bush against unilateral US military 
action. Communications included the infamous note on 28 July 
2002 which began ‘I will be with you, whatever’ before setting out 
a strategy for achieving a coalition for action, stressing that ‘we 
need, as with Afghanistan and the ultimatum to the Taleban, to 
encapsulate our casus bellum in some defi ning way. This [the UN] 
is certainly the simplest.’28 In September 2002, Bush reluctantly 
agreed and on 8 November 2002 UN Resolution 1441 was agreed, 
with Saddam announcing his intention to comply fi ve days later. In 
the meantime, the Bush administration was growing impatient and 
– on 10 December – Blair learned that the US was planning mili-
tary action as early as mid-February 2003. Blair wanted to delay 
military action to allow the inspections process more time and gain 
further international support for the invasion. On 24 January 2003 
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he wrote to Bush urging for inspectors to be given until the end of 
March or early April to complete their task. He also argued for the 
need for a second resolution to state that Iraq had failed to comply 
with its obligations, therefore tacitly authorising military action.29 
However, the FCO was fi ghting a losing battle for another resolu-
tion in the UN; German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder had won a 
second term in 2002 by rejecting military action against Saddam 
and it soon became clear that France intended to follow suit. Rus-
sian President Vladimir Putin was also proving problematic and 
accused Britain and America of inconsistency in their foreign pol-
icy.30 Similarly, the Arab states were extremely concerned about 
Western military intervention, despite the FCO’s early attempts 
to offer reassurance, including sending messages to Iran. Saudi 
Ambassador Prince Turki Al Faisal advised the annual meeting of 
the all-party Saudi Group ‘The view of the Arab world is that this 
is an exercise in empire building.’31 
Throughout planning, the one diplomatic relationship which 
remained unscathed was with the US. Just as the Thatcher–Bush 
relationship had led the UK–US relationship in 1990, so the Blair–
Bush relationship led it in the 2000s with almost daily phone calls. 
Journalist Michael White drew upon history in an analysis of the 
situation: ‘The fact is, however, that no British prime minister can 
afford to fall out with the President. The last one who did was 
Anthony Eden and look what happened to him.’32 Foreign Secretary 
Jack Straw agreed. He advised the Iraq Inquiry that there was an 
‘enduring spectre of Suez over British foreign policy which led to an 
all-pervasive view that the United Kingdom should so far as possible 
seek to “stay close” to the United States’.33 For him ‘The spectre of 
Suez had been by far the most potent infl uence over successive Brit-
ish government’s engagement with the US since the 50s’ and when 
Blair began as Prime Minister he had been advised by Jonathan 
Powell to ‘get right up the arse of the Americans’.34 
However, the aim was not only to maintain good UK–US rela-
tions but to provide the opportunity to infl uence US policy from 
the inside, as Blair believed he had done in Afghanistan. The Iraq 
Inquiry concluded ‘The issue of infl uencing the US, both at the 
strategic and at the operational level was a constant preoccupa-
tion at all levels of the UK Government.’35 It also identifi ed a deep 
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naiveté in Blair’s approach to Anglo-American relations; No10 
decided early on that the best way to infl uence US policy was to 
‘commit full and unqualifi ed support’ in an endeavour to persuade 
from the inside, but in so doing the Prime Minister immediately 
resigned his diplomatic leverage. Blair also lacked judgement in 
assessing the situation and his capabilities as his ideas could not 
have trumped those of the neo-conservative agenda. The problem, 
the inquiry concluded, was that ‘Mr Blair overestimated his ability 
to infl uence US decisions on Iraq.’36 The ‘Lessons’ section of the 
report identifi ed that infl uence should not be treated as an objec-
tive in itself but as a means to an end.37 
US liaison also extended within the FCO. Foreign Secretary 
Jack Straw had a good relationship with his US counterpart Colin 
Powell and the FCO also maintained a good working relationship 
with the US State Department.38 The problem for the FCO was 
that there was a poor relationship with the key ideologues in the 
White House who were doing much of the operational decision-
making. Greenstock later identifi ed this lesson: ‘The Blair-Bush 
relationship was very good. The Powell-Straw relationship was 
very good. But neither Bush for one reason, nor Powell for another, 
were actually having much effect on operational decision-making, 
because Rumsfeld and Cheney were running it.’39 In particular, 
Dick Cheney, the Vice President, had been Defence Secretary 
during the Gulf War and was thought to have been frustrated at 
Saddam’s sanction busting and inspection dodging leading to a 
personal feeling of responsibility for failing to remove him from 
power in 1991. Straw later noted ‘The whole time I was Foreign 
Secretary I worried about Vice President Cheney’s instincts, and 
his preoccupation with atoning for his 1991 failure.’40 
In the IC, working with the US had, by now, become an 
entrenched lesson and its implementation formed part of a broader 
intelligence relationship. The SIS Chief, ‘C’, went to Washington 
in July 2002 for talks and to share with the CIA a report that 
Iraq had tried to purchase uranium oxide from Niger. A leaked 
National Security Agency memo to GCHQ also revealed the ongo-
ing relationship between the two SIGINT agencies,41 whilst the 
CIA even offered comment on drafts of an intelligence dossier pre-
sented to Parliament.42 The IC also remained reliant – as they had 
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been in Granby – on the US for intelligence sources and warnings. 
In the run-up to Telic, the UK utilised US technical intelligence and 
during the campaign the Americans provided pilotless drones to 
collect IMINT and SIGINT – a resource which the British lacked.43 
In the MoD, UK–US military discussions on contingency plan-
ning for Telic began in early June 2002, with British offi cers having 
been embedded in CENTCOM since September 2001.44 The lesson 
of the necessity of working with the Americans was re-emphasised 
in 2003 when the MoD noted: 
It is probable that any future UK medium – or large-scale war – fi ghting 
operation will be fought in a US-led or backed coalition. Working with 
the US in a coalition brings political, diplomatic and military advan-
tages, including the aggregation of capabilities, fl exible war-fi ghting 
options and the sharing of intelligence and risk.45
The Iraq Inquiry found that, in developing the military options 
for Iraq, the MoD pursued a policy of infl uencing the US from the 
inside. Initially air and maritime forces alone were suggested for the 
intervention, but the MoD believed that offering a signifi cant mili-
tary contribution would provide the means of infl uencing US deci-
sions. It warned the Prime Minister that Britain could be excluded 
from planning if ground forces were not provided and Blair agreed 
to the inclusion of ground troops on 31 October 2002.46 However, 
in contrast to Granby, the MoD had a considerable lack of impact 
on US plans. Having committed to an all-service military campaign, 
the MoD soon became aware that it had used all its leverage. The 
House of Commons Defence Committee identifi ed ‘We are not, 
however, able to defi ne the areas in which the British made a spe-
cifi c contribution to what was essentially an American campaign 
plan’ and ‘[b]eing a junior partner in a coalition constrained the 
British Government in its ability to plan independently for after the 
confl ict’.47
In fact, when it became clear that war was approaching, con-
cerns were raised over US post-invasion plans. Straw wrote to Blair 
voicing fears that the US had a serious ‘lacunae in their plan, nota-
bly . . . no thought apparently given to “day after” scenarios’.48 
From Washington, the British Ambassador – Christopher Meyer 
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– identifi ed lessons from recent experience and warned ‘Afghani-
stan has shown that the US is not good at consolidating politically 
what it has achieved militarily.’49 Consequently, the FCO began to 
consider how the UN could contribute to post-confl ict assistance, 
as they had in Fortitude, Vantage and Granby. Many historical 
examples were debated: ‘post WWII models of occupation in 
Germany and Japan’, ‘a sort of “Bonn process”’, ‘a Kosovo model’, 
‘“lite” operation on the lines of operations in Afghanistan and 
Cambodia’, ‘full UN administration on the . . . East Timor model’, 
and even ‘by analogy with the 1991 action in Northern Iraq’.50 
However, as the start of operations drew nearer, the FCO failed to 
consider post-war strategic planning any further. In part this was 
because there was an assumption that the intervention would be 
well executed, UN authorised and take place in a relatively benign 
environment, but it was also because the focus on achieving a UN 
resolution, the management of public and parliamentary opinion 
and the political day to day following 9/11 left little time for post-
war strategic planning in either Iraq or Afghanistan.51 This les-
son was subsequently widely identifi ed by witnesses at the Iraq 
Inquiry.52 
For the MoD, examining Musketeer, Fortitude, Vantage and 
Granby offered few relevant lessons for post-war planning. 
Instead, the British drew upon lessons identifi ed from humanitar-
ian interventions and the Chief of the Defence Staff considered 
Bosnia as a ‘worst case’ for the length of an aftermath operation, 
although the experience of Northern Ireland would have provided 
an estimate of around thirty years.53 The Americans went back 
even further into history, with Powell reassuring UN ministers that 
the US had considerable experience of nation-building from estab-
lishing governance in Germany and Japan post-Second World War. 
However, unlike in 1958, 1961 and 1990, the ‘end state’ for mili-
tary contingency planning was broad and idealistic: ‘A stable and 
law-abiding Iraq, within its present borders, cooperating with the 
international community, no longer posing a threat to its neigh-
bours or to international security, and abiding by its international 
obligations on WMD.’54 
For CPA planning the problem was the opposite; there were no 
objectives, timelines or end states. As early as January 2003, the 
5842_Kettle.indd   178 06/09/18   11:38 AM
179
Iraq 2003–9
Chiefs of Staff had reported to the Prime Minister that ‘aftermath 
planning was still quite immature’ and there was no preparation 
of MoD CPA staff prior to deployment.55 The result was a lack of 
strategic direction, a lesson which the CPA’s Senior British Military 
Representative in Iraq, Sir Freddie Viggers, identifi ed to the Iraq 
Inquiry: ‘we suffered from lack of clarity about Ends, Ways and 
Means. The plan emerged piecemeal and was prone to dislocation 
by breaking news and by events.’ Furthermore, ‘Everything was a 
priority – security, the rebuild, creating the political architecture, 
capture Saddam, stop the sabotage and smuggling, sustain fl ows 
of vital supplies to nations, get the economy going, remove the 
weapons (tons, of all types)’, and all of which was to be completed 
whilst the CPA remained perpetually understaffed ‘by quality and 
quantity’.56 Mark Etherington, principle representative of the CPA 
in Wasit province, confi rmed this analysis. He arrived into post in 
September 2003 to fi nd he was part of a team of two responsible 
for governing a population of 970,000.57 
These diffi culties were compounded by the lack of fi nancial 
support for the reconstruction efforts. The Iraq Planning Unit, 
in considering the implications of post-Saddam Iraq, advised at 
the beginning of 2003 ‘This would be very expensive and could 
have wider resource implications. Ministers urgently need to take 
a view on this before the military planning assumptions become a 
fait accomplis.’58 Initially, it seemed as if the lesson of protecting 
the British economy had been unlearned as in advance of the war, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, advised that he 
would not rule out any military options on the grounds of cost. 
The fi rst comprehensive estimate of costs was only produced by 
the Treasury a month before Telic began and was not sent to Blair 
or other ministers leaving the Cabinet to agree to Telic without 
any idea of affordability.59 However, a Special Reserve had been 
created in 2002 in preparation for Telic and once the confl ict 
phase of the operation was complete concern for British fi nances 
led to restrictions in funding for reconstruction efforts.60 This had 
a negative impact and David Johnson later identifi ed ‘it is absurd 
to spend billions on a short, sharp war and then try to run an area 
the size of France with hardly two pennies to rub together’.61 Telic 
eventually cost £9.24 billion.62
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Although very few senior Commanders in Telic had served 
in the Gulf War,63 there had been considerable local operational 
experience in the Royal Navy and RAF since Granby (working 
with the US as part of Operation Resinate to patrol an Iraqi no-fl y 
zone and the Armilla patrol, to enforce UN sanctions). Lessons 
from these experiences were considered ‘of particular value’ dur-
ing planning.64 Similarly, recent exercises were drawn upon for les-
sons, particularly Exercise Saif Sareea II in Oman in 2001, which 
informed the implementation of a range of modifi cations to the 
Challenger II battle tank and the successful establishment of a Joint 
Forces Logistics Command Headquarters.65 At the end of 2002, 
the British also participated in the US-run Exercise Internal Look 
in Qatar, which rehearsed the set-up and running of a headquar-
ters for a major coalition campaign. Other exercises which proved 
of benefi t for learning included those with British and American 
Marines in autumn 2002, 1 (UK) Armoured Division in Kuwait 
in April 2002 and NATO’s Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. Each 
provided soldiers with important high intensity confl ict training.66 
In addition, there were some key strategic decisions which 
demonstrated that lessons from 1961 and 1991 remained learned. 
In particular, the initial operation was planned for the cooler 
months and there was adequate time for troops to acclimatise, 
with a programme in place to help those who were deployed 
from other weather extremes. The Desert Rats, for example, went 
from training on the northern German plains at -4°F (-20°C) to 
the desert at 86°F (30°C). However, the speed of operational 
requirements meant that the lesson was soon unlearned; when 
one division replaced another in the height of summer, heat casu-
alties rapidly increased. From 15 July to 9 September 2003 over 
800 personnel were treated for heat-related issues, 200 were 
returned to the UK and one soldier tragically died.67 This lesson 
was quickly re-identifi ed and after 2004 better training combined 
with improved air conditioning in accommodation and some 
vehicles implemented the lesson.68
Overall, MoD planning for Operation Telic was extremely chal-
lenging. Troops and resources were already stretched with deploy-
ments in Sierra Leone, Northern Ireland and the Balkans as well as 
Afghanistan and around 19,000 personnel committed to providing a 
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replacement fi re-fi ghting service during a union strike.69 As a result, 
when planning was taking place over Christmas 2002, personnel 
joked that Telic was an acronym for ‘Tell Everyone Leave Is Can-
celled’. This pressure also increased over time and the 2010 Strategic 
Defence and Security Review later identifi ed:
We must also confront the legacy of overstretch . . . UK forces were 
deployed at medium scale in both Iraq and Afghanistan. This exceeded 
the planning assumptions that had set the size of our forces and placed 
greater demands both on our people and on their equipment.70
However, this lesson was identifi ed before proposing restructuring 
the Armed Forces to deploy around 30,000 troops for a limited 
time – two thirds of the force sent to Iraq in 2003.71
The IC was also instrumental in the planning of the Iraq War.72 
The IC had monitored Iraq since Granby and particularly its 
WMD programme. After the Gulf War, the Cabinet had agreed to 
commit resources to counter-proliferation with a special Current 
Intelligence Group within the JIC focused upon the topic. MI6 
also set up a new unit and recruited expertise from the DIS to 
monitor the FCO Non-Proliferation Department’s ‘countries of 
concern’ including Iraq. The result was regular JIC reporting on 
Iraq’s WMD programme with at least twenty-two separate assess-
ments produced from 17 April 1991 to 9 September 2002.73 
Nevertheless, the lessons that the IC had identifi ed from the 
Gulf War had a negative impact upon the assessment of Iraq’s 
WMD programme during this time. Post-Granby, it was revealed 
that the intelligence agencies had greatly underestimated Saddam’s 
WMD activities and the lesson identifi ed was to not be deceived in 
the same way again. Its implementation resulted in over-compen-
sation and an inquiry, later established under the Chairmanship of 
Lord Butler, into intelligence on WMD concluded that there was ‘a 
tendency for assessments to be coloured by over-reaction to previ-
ous errors. As a result, there was a risk of over-cautious or worst 
case estimates, shorn of their caveats, becoming the “prevailing 
wisdom”’.74 Even when UNMOVIC failed to fi nd WMD – after 
inspecting around 500 sites in Iraq – no re-evaluation of intelli-
gence assessments occurred. 
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In mid-2002, the JIC took the unprecedented decision to jointly 
publish an intelligence assessment with the government on Iraq’s 
WMD programme.75 This document became known as the ‘Septem-
ber dossier’ and was eventually attacked for overstating the immi-
nence of the Iraqi threat, with journalist Andrew Gilligan famously 
claiming that the document had been ‘sexed up’. The Butler inquiry 
advised that the dossier was unprecedented in three ways: fi rstly, the 
JIC had never produced a public document before; secondly, no gov-
ernment case for international action had previously drawn on a JIC 
publication; and thirdly, the authority of the IC had never before 
been used in such a public way.76 In so doing, the usually secretive 
work of the IC was exposed for the fi rst time and, when questions 
over the wording of the assessment began to be scrutinised, it quickly 
placed the IC under new public criticism and pressure to refl ect upon 
lessons to be learned including over the independence of the Chair of 
the JIC, John Scarlet. This was a lesson that echoed back to the era 
of reorganisation under Patrick Dean.
Inside Iraq, the availability of HUMINT had not developed since 
1991. The Prime Minister, in the foreword to the September dos-
sier, stated ‘Gathering intelligence inside Iraq is not easy. Saddam’s 
is one of the most secretive and dictatorial regimes in the world.’77 
However, as identifi ed in Granby, part of the reason for the lack 
of HUMINT was that the UK and US had become over-reliant on 
the intelligence gathered from UN weapons inspectors and had not 
replaced the resource once they left Iraq in 1998. Instead, defec-
tors and exiles – who had their own agenda – were interrogated as 
primary sources for HUMINT. In the end the British only had fi ve 
main HUMINT sources and each were ineffectively validated.78 As a 
result, little further understanding of Saddam Hussein, or his inten-
tions, had developed since 1991. Instead, it was incorrectly assumed 
that Saddam’s policy had been to seek WMD before Granby and 
therefore his policy would be to seek WMD afterwards too.79 
During the Intervention
As Telic became a reality, two intelligence groups were established 
within the central intelligence machine, implementing lessons from 
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managing the war in Afghanistan. The ‘inner group’, chaired by the 
Prime Minister’s Foreign Policy Advisor included all of the intel-
ligence agencies but the ‘wider group’, chaired by the Overseas 
Development Secretariat, included representatives from DfID, the 
Metropolitan Police and the Treasury.80 Similarly, the structure of 
the FCO changed to accommodate the complexity of the opera-
tion. In February 2003 an interdepartmental unit, the Iraq Planning 
Unit, was set up to coordinate government policy across White-
hall. In March, two Emergency Units, a policy unit and a consular 
unit were opened, working twenty-four hours a day.81 The rapid 
response was the result of implementing lessons from 9/11, the war 
in Afghanistan and the threat of an India–Pakistan war, where the 
lesson had been identifi ed that the handling of emergency opera-
tions required improvement.82 To implement the lesson a new data-
base was created, with details of volunteers who could be deployed 
at short notice. 
In Iraq itself, members of the FCO were seconded to the 
Offi ce for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) 
– the predecessor of the CPA – in Baghdad, Basra and seven of 
the eighteen Governorates. The British Offi ce in Baghdad was 
quickly opened using a containerised Embassy that could accom-
modate four people and, implementing a lesson identifi ed from 
Afghanistan, by June a newly developed ‘fl at pack embassy’ had 
arrived. This was a self-supported container (in terms of electric-
ity and water) which could house up to forty people.83 However, 
despite the immediate response, the 2004–5 FCO annual report 
identifi ed that there were many more lessons to be learned as 
teams in Iraq had to work under extreme conditions including 
unbearable heat and a lack of infrastructure.84 When the new 
Consulate opened in Basra, in July 2004, it suffered almost daily 
mortar attacks and was sealed off by twelve foot high concrete 
walls where the only way in or out was by military helicopter. 
Fifty members of staff were protected by sixty former Ghurkhas 
and a company of soldiers, with Black Watch troops guarding 
the area. At night, everyone had to wear body armour.85 The 
challenging environment meant that FCO postings were reduced 
to the maximum of a year, leading to a much higher turnover of 
staff and a frequent loss of lessons. 
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At the same time, tour lengths in the MoD were also limited 
to six months, due to the high intensity of operations. There 
was also very limited time allocated for handover, again causing 
lessons to be forgotten and personnel only seeing snapshots of 
operations, rather than gaining a strategic overview. This lesson 
was later identifi ed by Major General Richard Barrons, Assistant 
Chief of the General Staff, who admitted that the reduced tour 
lengths caused ‘relatively few members of the British armed forces 
[to have] a genuine understanding of the full ebb and fl ow of the 
land campaign’.86 In contrast, the US Army had twelve to fi fteen 
month tours and the British had been on two year resident tours 
in Northern Ireland. 
To compound the problem of lessons being lost within depart-
ments and across personnel, cross-Whitehall relations were diffi cult 
and deteriorated as the campaign progressed. The FCO struggled 
to coordinate with DfID, leaving each with different missions and 
aims. Coordination between the MoD and other Whitehall depart-
ments was similarly diffi cult and this was combined with a failure 
to prioritise the operation within Whitehall. There was also no 
single minister in charge of Iraq which made it diffi cult for those 
on the ground to manage multiple lines of reporting and account-
ability. Lieutenant General Chris Brown later identifi ed
the FCO maintained its traditional broad remit; DFID was at least ini-
tially focused on Millennium Goals – it did not see its role as “bailing 
out” the military’s mistakes, and the [cross-departmental] Stabilisation 
Unit has seen Afghanistan as its focus from its inception.87
The new Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, identifi ed this lesson 
in 2008: ‘We need better integration, particularly between MoD, 
DfID and FCO . . . we need to think more radically about joining 
up at all levels.’88 However, two years later, the lesson had still 
not been implemented. In 2010 the House of Commons Public 
Administration Select Committee identifi ed ‘Cross-departmental 
collaboration is variable, analytical resources are underutilised, 
and different departments understand and discuss strategy in dif-
ferent and incompatible ways. Departmental collaboration there-
fore falls short.’89 The Iraq Inquiry concluded that a lead minister 
5842_Kettle.indd   184 06/09/18   11:38 AM
185
Iraq 2003–9
should have been appointed to coordinate across departments and 
the House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional 
Affairs Committee (PACAC) suggested that the appointment of a 
Secretary of State, akin to the Brexit Secretary, would have imple-
mented this lesson.90 
The relationship with the US also remained challenging through-
out Telic. In Baghdad, the UK Special Representative, Jeremy Green-
stock, sat in an offi ce next to the US Ambassador, Paul Bremer, and 
assumed charge of the CPA in his absence. Greenstock, advised 
that UK opportunities to infl uence CPA policy was hampered by 
the dominating Bremer and he later described the feeling of ‘sitting 
in the second carriage, not driving the engine’ of post-war plan-
ning.91 The Iraq Inquiry noted the inability of the UK to infl uence 
the policy of de-Ba’athifi cation, over which it had a number of mis-
givings, or to infl uence the US to produce an Iraqi-wide approach 
to the reform of the Iraqi Security Forces. It also stated that Britain 
was excluded from discussions on oil policy, decisions on how to 
spend the Development Fund for Iraq and the creation of the Iraqi 
Central Bank as an independent body. In addition, UK approval 
was also not sought for the CPA’s ‘Vision for Iraq’ and ‘Achieving 
the vision’ strategic documents, with the FCO only became aware 
of the documents once they were at advanced stages of drafting. 
However, Britain held the status of joint occupying power and was 
therefore equally liable for any CPA decisions. In an endeavour to 
manage the legal risk, London proposed a Memorandum of Under-
standing but Washington would not agree. The Iraq Inquiry report 
identifi ed ‘the US had little incentive to give the UK an infl uential 
role . . . and the UK lacked the will and leverage to insist’. In the 
end the British were so concerned about their lack of infl uence that 
Whitehall made the strategic decision to minimise the number of 
staff sent to CPA headquarters in Baghdad. The aim was to reduce 
the risk of personal liability and the appearance of UK responsibil-
ity for the decisions being made.92
The situation was similar in the MoD. Despite many planned 
operations in the Gulf and Iraq, and embedded staff in the pre-
dominantly US-manned Coalition headquarters, UK–US relations 
on the ground did not run smoothly and suffered from a lack of 
military liaison on both sides. As a result, Multinational Division 
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South East (MNDSE) tended to turn to Whitehall or Northwood 
for assistance rather than effectively communicating with Multi-
national Corps Iraq (MNC-I) in Baghdad. A report on the land 
campaign later identifi ed that this was compounded by a lack 
of understanding on how best to engage the US and the British 
complained that the US Commander, General Rick Sanchez, never 
visited, called or installed a secure phone link to Basra.93 The Brit-
ish Chief of Staff, Colonel Tanner, declared ‘Despite our so-called 
“special relationship”, I reckon we were treated no differently 
than Poland.’94 
Over time the UK–US relationship disintegrated further as the 
British disappointed their allies. After committing wholeheartedly 
to going into Iraq, dedication to the operation slowly eroded. By 
2004, Lieutenant General John McColl, Britain’s Senior Military 
Representative in Iraq, reported back to London that the UK refusal 
to deploy further troops had ‘chipped away at the US/UK relation-
ship’.95 In the summer of 2006, General Mike Jackson reported 
‘The perception, right or wrong, in some – if not all – US mili-
tary circles is that the UK is motivated more by short-term politi-
cal gain of early withdrawal than by the long-term importance of 
mission accomplishment.’96 The Iraq Inquiry supported this view 
and concluded that British attention was focused upon Helmand 
Province, with Iraq increasingly viewed as drawing resources from 
the primary theatre of war in Afghanistan. In 2007, the difference 
between the two allies came to a head when Bush announced ‘the 
surge’ strategy – the decision to send a further 28,000 American 
troops to Baghdad and Al Anbar Province – whilst, in contrast, 
the UK was planning its withdrawal. Overall, the Iraq Inquiry 
concluded ‘US and UK strategies for Iraq began to diverge almost 
immediately after the confl ict . . . by early 2007 the UK was fi nd-
ing it diffi cult to play down the divergence, which was, by that 
point, striking.’97 When the Iraq Inquiry report was released, the 
Chairman, Sir John Chilcot, gave a statement in which he high-
lighted one clear lesson for the future: the UK had to re-evaluate 
its relations with the US.98
Telic also presented challenges in communication and informa-
tion systems. As in Granby, there were considerable problems of 
integration and not all British systems were either compatible with 
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US systems or able to handle the volume of information traffi c. An 
analysis of the land campaign identifi ed this lesson stating ‘there 
was considerable electronic fratricide between UK ECM and UK, 
US and Iraqi communications’.99 At the tactical level, this lesson 
was quickly identifi ed and implemented when the ageing short-
range radio was replaced in 2004 with considerable success, lead-
ing the US Marines to purchase 5,000 of the same sets.100
The IC also experienced challenges in communication, particu-
larly of dissemination of assessed intelligence. Similar to Granby, 
there was inadequate connectivity between coalition partners due to 
both a lack of reliable communications and ongoing classifi cation 
incompatibilities.101 For example, all of the information on the US 
digital intelligence network was classifi ed NOFORN (no foreigners) 
– at times leaving British pilots fl ying American planes and unable to 
access pilot and maintenance manuals. When SIGINT collected by 
the British was given to the US for analysis the reports produced were 
also classifi ed NOFORN, forbidding the IC to access its own intel-
ligence. Having identifi ed this lesson, Blair complained to Bush who 
signed a directive to remove the NOFORN restriction for Britain 
and Australia but, as the US digital intelligence network contained 
years of intelligence and information, the Pentagon had to create a 
separate network for British and Australian access. Consequently, 
the lesson took some time to implement.102
As well as diffi culties in sharing intelligence across allies, there 
was a failure to effectively deliver intelligence down to the low-
est levels of tactical decision-making – brigade, battlegroup and 
sometimes company or squadron – due to over-classifi cation and 
a lack of fl exible dissemination protocols.103 Similarly, there was 
diffi culty in sharing intelligence up the chain of command, par-
ticularly in centrally collecting tactical intelligence from company 
and battlegroup levels.104 There was even a failure to effectively 
distribute intelligence across the wider IC with the DIS, PJHQ and 
theatre intelligence structures all requiring greater fusion.105 The 
Butler report identifi ed the lesson of ‘unduly strict “compartmen-
talisation” of intelligence’ and that the DIS needed further integra-
tion into the wider IC.106 
Despite diffi culties, the MoD did have some initial successes 
in Telic; the approach to Basra was a military victory with joint 
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UK–Iraqi patrols conducted within a week and the Royal Navy 
successfully cleared mines from the Umm Qasr waterway. In addi-
tion, in contrast to 1961 and 1991, the RAF were so keen to secure 
overfl ying rights that a duplication of effort emerged, with some 
individual offi cers taking it upon themselves to personally task 
embassies with gaining approval rather than following the offi cial 
command structure.107 This was in stark contrast to the FCO’s fail-
ure to gain permission from Turkey for British forces to enter Iraq 
from the north with the US 4th Infantry Division – forcing troops 
to be transported an additional 3,000 miles into Kuwait and push 
into the less peaceful Basra region of southern Iraq. Lessons iden-
tifi ed from Afghanistan on how to maintain rifl es in dusty condi-
tions were also implemented.108 
However, in a repeat of the events of 1961, approximately £14 
million worth of ammunition had to be discarded due to being 
stored unprotected in high temperatures. Radars, communication 
and information systems, unmanned air vehicles and airfi eld navi-
gation aids were all less reliable in the hot and dusty conditions 
and, in some cases, the air conditioning – used to implement the 
lesson of the importance of keeping equipment cool – caused con-
densation which effected sensitive electrical equipment.109 There 
were also reports that the temperatures in the back of the Warrior 
vehicle were potentially fatal.110 The journalist John Humphreys 
identifi ed ‘sitting in the back of a Warrior is like travelling in an 
oven on tank tracks. It gets to 140 degrees in summer. You can cook 
a leg of lamb at that temperature.’111 Additionally, some equipment 
was delayed because of political concerns in 2002 that early prepa-
rations by industry would suggest to the international community 
that military action was inevitable when diplomacy was still being 
pursued.112 Diffi culties with equipment logistics also persisted, 
despite the re-identifi cation of these lessons. Personnel arrived in 
theatre before much of the desert clothing, resulting in a mixture 
of green and desert camoufl age, as planning assumptions had only 
ensured suffi cient equipment for 9,000 personnel.113 There was 
also a shortage of nuclear, biological and chemical protection suits 
and detection equipment and, as there had been in Granby, there 
were shortages of ammunition, with some soldiers only having fi ve 
rounds each.114 The equipment shortages had tragic consequences 
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as the fi rst British casualty of the war, Sergeant Steven Roberts, 
died due to his unit not having enough body armour, whilst the 
June 2003 murder of fi ve Royal Military Police Red Caps resulted 
in a Board of Inquiry into their lack of ammunition and commu-
nication systems. 
Once supplies were dispatched, further delays occurred due 
to ongoing equipment identifi cation and tracking failures.115 The 
National Audit Offi ce reported that poor asset identifi cation and 
tracking had been identifi ed from the Second World War, 1961 
and 1991, as well as more recent operations including Operation 
Resolute and Lodestar in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995–8), Opera-
tion Besemer in Macedonia (2001) and Exercise Saif Sareea II in 
Oman (2001) but the lesson had not been implemented.116 It also 
identifi ed that the diffi culties were so extreme that frontline units 
would often send teams back down the supply chain to fi nd their 
required items. In one example, 1 (UK) Armoured Division sent 
a team back from Kuwait to the Defence Stores and Distribution 
Agency depot in Oxfordshire to locate required items.117 The 
failings quickly re-earned the British the same nickname that they 
had held thirteen years before – ‘the Borrowers’. The House of 
Commons Defence Committee identifi ed in its report: 
We are in no doubt that one of the key lessons to emerge from Opera-
tion Telic concerns operational logistic support and, specifi cally, the 
requirement for a robust system to track equipment and stocks both 
into and within theatre – a requirement which was identifi ed in the 
1991 Gulf War.118
There were also initial challenges with the command structure 
leading to lessons being identifi ed and implemented during the 
operation. The three UK Contingent Commanders were under 
the tactical control of the US, based on NATO and Gulf region 
interactions of the past. For Air and Maritime, for whom there 
had been ongoing US operations in the area, this worked well 
but for Land there was an additional level of command – the US 
1st Marine Expeditionary Force – between UK Land Contingent 
HQ and US Land Component HQ. Similarly to Granby, opera-
tional command of UK forces remained with the Chief of Joint 
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Operations, Lieutenant General Sir John Reith, through PJHQ 
to the National and UK Contingent Commanders in theatre. This 
did not mirror US command structures, resulting in some confu-
sion and complexity. However, the lesson was quickly identifi ed 
and doctrine updated by the end of 2003.119 The Defence Com-
mittee also identifi ed the same lesson and recommended a more 
adaptable command structure to ensure working in greater par-
allel with the US in the future.120
In continuing to implement the previously identifi ed lesson 
of media management, the method of embedding journalists – 
learned from Granby – was expanded in Telic. Around 700 jour-
nalists were embedded within coalition forces, including 153 
within British units. The MoD considered this process to be highly 
successful as 90 per cent of the reporting during the combat phase 
from embedded journalists was classed as positive or neutral.121 
However, the initial establishment of PR operations was slow. 
There was a shortage of trained PR personnel in the Press Infor-
mation Centres in Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and the headquarters 
of 1 (UK) Armoured Division, leaving positions to be fi lled by 
regulars and reserves leading to a delay. Once the centres were up 
and running there was a continual battle to suffi ciently brief offi -
cers in order for them to answer questions from journalists who 
were monitoring twenty-four hour media coverage. The problem 
was also mirrored in London where the speed of questions from 
reporters outran the speed of information reaching the top of the 
Defence chain of command. The result was the need to make reg-
ular parliamentary statements at short notice leading to a huge 
demand on the MoD for information. David Johnson wrote ‘it is 
hard to overstate the number of vexatious and pointless requests 
(“exactly how many Iraqi tanks were in that column that just left 
Basrah?” was a No10 classic)’.122 
Once the combat phase was over, PR became even more 
demanding as experienced media personnel returned to the UK, 
including many embedded journalists. For those journalists who 
remained in theatre, the diffi cult security situation hampered any 
positive reporting and the absence of a coherent UK and coalition 
strategic narrative caused further diffi culties, especially as UK and 
US strategy diverged after ‘the surge’ in January 2007. The MoD 
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identifi ed the lesson: ‘Planning for similar operations in future 
should take into account, from the outset, media demands during 
the transition to the post-confl ict phase.’123 Additionally, in June 
2003, the MoD participated in a Royal United Services Institute 
(RUSI) seminar with journalists, broadcasters and academics to 
identify lessons on how PR campaigns could be handled better in 
the future.124
In conjunction with managing UK and international media, 
information operations (Info Ops) were being run to communicate 
with the local population. Britain had identifi ed the benefi t of Info 
Ops in Bosnia where the British had their own radio station which 
had become the most popular in the country. Whilst the broad 
idea was replicated in Iraq, many of the lessons on how to conduct 
such operations were ignored. General Dutton identifi ed in 2006 
‘I still do not think that we have got Info Ops right . . . We have 
not got the same level of coordination as was demonstrated in the 
Balkans.’125 This was not surprising given the failure to deploy 
professionals to theatre and the approach of conducting Info Ops 
from the top down with restrictive direction from the MoD.126 
The conclusion was ‘Info Ops were appalling. It is a subject that is 
treated like some form of magical pixie dust that can compensate 
for any holes in the tactical plan; Info Ops consistently failed to 
deliver.’127
Despite some examples of lesson identifi cation and implemen-
tation during the campaign, there were criticisms that the MoD 
was slow to identify lessons at the strategic level. Since 1991, the 
learning process had developed with strategic identifi ed lessons 
originating primarily from the Directorate of Operational Capa-
bility (DOC), operational lessons from PJHQ and tactical lessons 
from Front Line Commanders. Each was managed on a bespoke 
database and, in addition, Land, Sea and Air each had a separate 
system. This provided a compartmentalised approach to lesson 
learning which was compounded by three changes in IT systems 
and locations during the fi rst few years of Telic.128 
Having identifi ed this lesson, in 2006, the DOC introduced 
the Defence-wide Lessons Management (DwLM) system. DwLM 
incorporated a new lessons database – Defence Lessons Identifi ed 
Management System (DLIMS) – which was universal in allowing 
5842_Kettle.indd   191 06/09/18   11:38 AM
Learning from British Interventions in the Middle East
192
input into the lesson identifi cation process by all ranks and across 
all environments.129 The system then ensured that each identifi ed 
lesson was assigned a method of implementation and a gatekeeper 
to oversee the process. Lessons remained ‘open’ until the gate-
keeper provided a written statement detailing its implementation, 
after which it was digitally retained in the Defence Lessons Library, 
remaining accessible for reference.130 This was a rigorous, institu-
tionalised procedure but, by making the input more democratic, it 
became increasingly time-consuming for the lessons teams to pro-
cess identifi ed lessons. At the same time, the Operational Training 
and Advisory Group (OPTAG) – who conducted pre-deployment 
training – visited theatre regularly to identify lessons for implemen-
tation in training the next wave of troops. However, they too could 
not keep up with the changing situation on the ground and the 
overall slow turnaround of lessons created an inability to exam-
ine wider trends and patterns. In fact, due to the overwhelming 
amount of information being collected, DOC was forced to stop 
capturing any new strategic or operational lessons in Iraq between 
2007 and 2009.131 
Consequently, British reaction in Basra was slow and lacked 
dynamism and recent experiences – in the Balkans, Sierra Leone or 
the latter stages of Northern Ireland132 – led the MoD to treat Iraq 
as a stability operation for too long.133 The 2002 Strategic Defence 
Review, the 2003 Defence White Paper and the 2005 Defence 
Strategic Guidance all failed to recognise the need for counter-
insurgency and updated doctrine on stabilisation and counterin-
surgency, JDP 3–40, was not published until the end of 2009, too 
late for Telic.134 Similarly, from 1997 to 2008 middle ranking and 
junior Army offi cers received limited counterinsurgency education 
or training whilst the Royal Navy and RAF received none at all. In 
contrast, the US counterinsurgency doctrine developed quickly; in 
particular, the Commanding General of Multi-National Force-Iraq 
(MNF-I), the American David Petraeus, searched the history of 
counterinsurgency warfare to inspire his 2006 issued fi eld manual 
FM 3–24.135 In 2005, he also made the study of counterinsurgency 
history compulsory at the US Army’s advanced training colleges 
resulting in T. E. Lawrence’s Seven Pillars of Wisdom and David 
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Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare becoming bestsellers at book-
shops near US Army bases.136
In the IC, the lessons identifi ed from Granby regarding lan-
guage requirements had not been implemented, leading to an 
ongoing lack of HUMINT. Whilst English speaking Iraqi civil-
ians and third party nationals were hired, the exodus of many 
educated Iraqis, combined with intimidation from militias, meant 
that there were not enough interpreters for one to be available 
for each patrol and there remained a lack of local expertise to 
understand customs and dialects, or to localise coalition informa-
tion campaigns.137 This problem was compounded by a failure 
to learn from the example of General de la Billière in Granby 
and to provide troops with basic cultural training in order to 
gain the trust of the local population for HUMINT.138 It was not 
until 2007 that the MoD implemented this lesson and produced 
‘Iraq: cultural appreciation booklet’ providing information on 
Iraqi history, culture, religion and language for personnel in the-
atre.139 A post-operational analysis of land operations concluded 
‘The language and cultural understanding capabilities deployed 
on Op Telic by the Army were never adequate’140 and the fi rst 
DOC lessons report identifi ed: ‘Humint is an invaluable resource 
and [redacted] that should be accorded appropriate priority and 
resourcing.’141 To implement this lesson, in 2005, the DIS devel-
oped its language capability and the Defence School of Languages 
was enhanced to improve Iraqi linguistic capabilities. The DIS 
also began working with GCHQ to share an understanding of the 
different Iraqi dialects.142 
SIGINT collection had improved slightly since Granby, particu-
larly as the Iraqi leadership used an old system of communication 
which had been manufactured by a British company, Rascal. There 
was also some additional SIGINT success through mobile units 
accompanying UK land forces, 14th Signals Regiment and Royal 
Marines Y Squadron. However, the lessons identifi ed around the 
distillation of intelligence were not successfully implemented.143 
The scale of operations, technology and global communications 
meant that the amount of raw intelligence which was collected 
was overwhelming. The MoD quickly re-identifi ed this lesson: 
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In an operation of this scale and complexity a vast amount of infor-
mation has to be processed and interpreted . . . a need to service the 
requirements of rapid, decisive and multi-layered campaigns, has 
the potential to test severely even the most sophisticated intelligence 
organisations.144
Psyops operations also persisted with leafl ets dropped on the Iraqi 
Army prior to hostilities. However, Britain had not implemented 
lessons from Granby and continued to be unable to disseminate 
leafl ets in a non-benign environment due to the lack of modifi ed 
aircraft.145 Therefore, the UK remained heavily reliant on US capa-
bilities to cover well populated areas. 
After the Intervention
On writing his memoirs on the run-up to the Iraq War, the British 
Ambassador to the US, Christopher Meyer, refl ected ‘Hindsight 
usually follows failure’ and for the fi rst time the FCO started to 
embrace the idea of learning lessons.146 Its 2003–4 annual report 
included a small ‘lessons learned’ section on the impact of Telic 
on visas in the region.147 The House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee supported this development – ‘We particularly wel-
come the new “lessons learned” sections and recommend that 
they be developed and made more specifi c in future reports’148 
– and consequently the 2004–5 annual report included a specifi c 
‘lessons learned’ section on Iraq, which identifi ed staff successes 
and the need to improve project management, staff recruiting and 
training.149
The partly FCO manned and owned Stabilisation Unit went 
further and produced a lesson identifi cation report, albeit that it 
was published too late to inform policy during Telic. This report 
utilised Iraq as a case study to provide policy-makers and prac-
titioners with lessons on how to operate in complex stabilisation 
environments.150 At the end of Telic the UK also formed a 1,000 
strong civilian standby capacity managed by the Stabilisation Unit 
to improve capability further, although criticisms of its effective-
ness remained following the 2011 intervention in Libya.151
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The Foreign Affairs Committee also began to embrace the idea 
of learning lessons and produced a series of seven reports on the 
foreign policy aspects of the War on Terror, including lessons iden-
tifi ed from Iraq. It additionally published one-off reports, including 
The Decision to go to War in Iraq and Global Security: The Middle 
East, which identifi ed an array of lessons as a result of discussions 
with offi cials from the UK, US, UN, France and NATO.152 There 
was also a newfound concern for monitoring FCO progress which 
forced some consideration of lesson implementation by the Foreign 
Secretary in his response to committee reports.153
However, despite the new agenda, FCO lesson identifi cation 
was limited. Just as in 1956 there were concerns over the publica-
tion of memoirs and after controversy following the publication of 
Meyer’s book – without FCO approval – Jeremy Greenstock was 
asked by Jack Straw not to publish his account of events until after 
the publication of the Iraq Inquiry report.154 The annual reports 
were also criticised as they were written for public consumption 
and accused of being ‘PR jobs’ with a lack of transparency over 
how lessons were drawn and offering little self-criticism. For 
example, in 2004, the FCO’s key identifi ed lesson from Iraq was 
‘in such an environment every single member of staff must be pre-
pared to make 100% commitment’.155 In addition, no details were 
provided as to how lessons would be implemented, compounded 
by the misnomer of identifi ed but not implemented lessons headed 
as ‘lessons learned’. 
The Foreign Affairs Committee reports also suffered a num-
ber of failings. The fi rst report focused upon the decision to go to 
war in Iraq and endeavoured to establish whether the FCO had 
presented accurate and complete information to Parliament in the 
run-up to Telic. The foremost sources for this analysis were papers 
provided by the government on the assessment of the Iraqi regime 
and its WMD and as a result the report focused upon the use of 
intelligence rather than diplomacy and foreign policy. There was 
no investigation into why alternatives to war were not sought or 
why the previous Iraqi policies of containment and smart sanc-
tions had been abandoned. In addition, reports were limited by the 
committee’s lack of access to information. They even accused the 
government of failing to satisfactorily answer their questions.156 
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Those witnesses who were called for evidence were the most senior 
offi cials, mainly promoted by the government and towing the min-
isterial line, often leaving committee conclusions as little more 
than a summary of events. When the former FCO offi cial, Carne 
Ross, appeared as a witness before the committee in 2006 – for a 
broader report on active diplomacy – he advised that despite being 
closely involved in Iraq policy for many years, and having been 
a central part of the drafting of British policy in the UN Security 
Council, he had never been asked to testify to any committee. He 
concluded ‘I take that as an example of that absence of scrutiny.’157
The few lessons that were identifi ed by the reports were not 
given priority within the FCO for implementation. Carne Ross, 
also advised:
what Parliament or this Committee said about our policy was, at best, 
insignifi cant . . . Inside the FCO, the recommendations of the FAC 
[Foreign Affairs Committee] are given little attention. The FCO will 
politely pretend otherwise, but it is in reality able to carry on its busi-
ness without fear of signifi cant intrusion.158
Mark Etherington argued that the root cause of the FCO’s inabil-
ity to learn was cultural. He told the Iraq Inquiry that the FCO 
was likely to perpetuate mistakes because of a disinclination for 
self-criticism and an avoidance of questioning key assumptions 
by taking comfort in meaningless statistics – spend, speed and 
numbers of people deployed:
The argument is often made that the UK has learned from its mis-
takes in Iraq and moved forward. There is limited evidence of this 
. . . We still lack the ability – and inclination – dispassionately to con-
sider our errors, identify and act upon the requisite lessons and move 
on. This has constrained debate, education and our national perfor-
mance. Lacking this rigour, we tend to turn self-referentially inward; 
and risk viewing criticism as a threat . . . One fears that a measure of 
arrogance, complacency and hubris has long prevented us learning.159 
In contrast, extensive and routine lesson identifi cation reports 
and processes, which had been in place in the MoD in 1991, 
remained in 2003 and had been further expanded. New methods 
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of identifying lessons – including developing relationships with 
academics – had developed and the DwLM formalised the pro-
cess further by renewing the emphasis upon the implementa-
tion of lessons, albeit slowly. Internally, specifi c ‘lessons learned’ 
reports continued to be submitted through the chain of com-
mand.160 Telic had a specifi c lessons team assigned to identify 
lessons and retain those identifi ed by others. They also produced 
two summary reports for public reading whilst the Land Warfare 
Centre – which united with the Army lessons staff in September 
2009 – collected an archive of post-tour reports and interviews 
and held a lessons conference in January 2010.161 In addition, 
DOC produced three volumes of reports identifying lessons and 
the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff commissioned four special 
reviews to identify lessons on logistics, consignment tracking, 
combat identifi cation and nuclear, biological and chemical war-
fare.162 The MoD also continued to identify lessons from seri-
ous incidents through Boards of Inquiry and further internal 
inquiries, including the Aitken report on the deliberate abuse 
and unlawful killing of Iraqis.163 Although the volume of lesson 
identifi cation documents produced seem overwhelming, many of 
the lessons were subsequently implemented as part of Operation 
Entirety – the endeavour to resource, structure and prepare land 
forces for counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and hybrid opera-
tions elsewhere.
As in 1991, the National Audit Offi ce and House of Commons 
Defence Committee complemented the process by providing exter-
nal lesson identifi cation and monitoring lesson implementation 
throughout the campaign. The National Audit Offi ce conducted a 
full investigation of the operation and the Defence Committee ran 
an inquiry – visiting units, organisations, the CPA and interview-
ing witnesses – to produce the report Lessons of Iraq.164 In compli-
ance with the European Convention on Human Rights, the MoD 
also held a number of external inquiries for issues related to tor-
ture and abuse: the Baha Mousa and Al-Sweady inquiries as well 
as investigations carried out under the Iraq Historical Allegations 
Team and the Iraq Fatalities Investigation. Each of these inquiries 
included the requirement to identify lessons for the future in their 
terms of reference.165 
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Lesson distribution and identifi cation from others had also 
extended since Granby. The Defence Medical Services reports 
from Iraq revealed that lessons identifi ed from the National Health 
Service (NHS) had been implemented.166 Lesson distribution also 
worked particularly well with the intergovernmental body of the 
Stabilisation Unit, which had its own lessons team, and by the end 
of Telic it was fully integrated into DLIMS.167 Across the rest of 
Whitehall there was an inconsistent approach. The MoD IT system 
was incompatible with the FCO’s, making lesson distribution more 
diffi cult, compounded by cultural differences in the classifi cation of 
information; the FCO system did not accept documents above ‘con-
fi dential’ whilst many MoD documents were assigned the higher 
classifi cation of ‘secret’.168 There was also mutual lesson distribu-
tion with coalition allies and NATO. The lessons team at the MoD’s 
Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) had the IT 
capacity installed to distribute identifi ed lessons with ABCA nations 
(Australia, Britain, Canada, America) resulting in greater connectiv-
ity with those countries than across Whitehall.169 
However, there remained a number of challenges. Many 
of the Boards of Inquiry were marred by accusations of being 
cover-ups,170 an internal lessons report was suppressed to avoid 
distribution171 and – without embedded lessons teams in theatre 
– post-event investigations relied upon an audit trail.172 The new 
democratic input into the lessons process also caused diffi cul-
ties. Soldiers often felt uncomfortable submitting lessons which 
refl ected badly on themselves, their unit or their Commanders.173 
When lessons were submitted, an increasingly haphazard lessons 
process developed and an investigation into abuse and unlawful 
killings in Iraq similarly concluded that the lessons process was 
fl awed by its subjectivism.174 
In the IC, exposure from the September dossier led to new, pub-
lic, methods of scrutiny and lesson identifi cation. This became even 
more fervent when WMD failed to be found – despite searches, 
reward schemes for informers, the digging up of tarmac and the 
use of ground-penetrating radar.175 Initially, the Foreign Affairs 
Committee supported the decision to publish an intelligence assess-
ment describing it as a ‘welcome innovation’.176 However, the dos-
sier had created a sense of IC advocacy for government policy. 
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John Williams, Chief Spokesman and Media Advisor to the FCO 
commented to the Iraq Inquiry that his lesson for the future was 
that ‘producing papers like the dossier was the wrong approach, 
because the media had come to see them as productions’.177 
The Foreign Affairs Committee were quick to examine the lead-
up to war after the invasion, investigating whether the government 
had presented ‘accurate and complete information to Parliament’ 
and publishing a report in July 2003 which included a number of 
lessons for the IC.178 This inquiry was transparent, hearing oral 
evidence from a number of witnesses and considering a variety of 
issues surrounding the dossier including: its use of language, con-
cluding that it was too assertive; accuracy, which was considered 
to be too early to judge; and the charges that it had been ‘sexed 
up’, which the committee denied. However, it also concluded that 
the IC had been tainted by the production of an additional dos-
sier in February 2003, which became known as ‘the dodgy dos-
sier’, even though this was produced by Alistair Campbell’s Iraq 
Communications Group and had not been cleared for publication 
by the JIC. 
However, the IC did not facilitate the external lesson identifi ca-
tion process. The Foreign Affairs Committee complained of a lack 
of access to intelligence material and individuals for interview. 
The committee wrote to the Cabinet Offi ce Intelligence Coordi-
nator, the Chairman of the JIC, the Chief of Defence Intelligence, 
the Head of SIS and the Director of GCHQ without receiving 
one reply. The committee declared ‘We regard the Government’s 
refusal to grant us access to evidence essential to our inquiries as a 
failure of accountability to Parliament.’179 Blair justifi ed the lack of 
cooperation by confi rming that full cooperation would be given to 
another inquiry, run by the Intelligence and Security Committee.180 
This did not appease the committee who noted that the Intelligence 
and Security Committee was appointed by, and reported directly 
to, the Prime Minister.181 
The Intelligence and Security Committee had similar objec-
tives to the Foreign Affairs Committee, to ‘examine whether the 
available intelligence, which informed the decision to invade Iraq, 
was adequate and properly assessed and whether it was accu-
rately refl ected in Government publications’.182 The report was 
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published in September 2003 and included the identifi cation of 
some lessons, including recommending a process for individuals 
to record formal concerns on draft JIC documents. However, the 
criticisms of the September dossier by the Intelligence and Secu-
rity Committee were temperate. In discussing the repetition of the 
headline grabbing claim that Saddam’s WMD could be ready for 
deployment within forty-fi ve minutes – without the context that 
this assessment only referred to battlefi eld chemical and biological 
munitions – the committee merely stated ‘This was unhelpful to 
an understanding of this issue.’ The failure of the MoD to disclose 
that a number of staff had raised concerns about assessments in 
writing to their line managers was labelled simply ‘unhelpful’.183
It also seemed unlikely that the lessons of the Intelligence and 
Security Committee would be taken any more seriously by the IC 
than those identifi ed by the Foreign Affairs Committee. The JIC 
still withheld eight relevant papers from the inquiry and, whilst the 
government welcomed the Intelligence and Security Committee 
report, the IC failed to respond to the committee’s questions and 
recommendations until fi ve months later.184 When the response 
arrived, the committee was equally unhappy with the outcome: 
‘The Committee is not satisfi ed with the Government’s Response. 
It emphasised only four key conclusions whilst either rejecting or 
failing to address fully many of our other conclusions and recom-
mendations.’185
While the Intelligence and Security Committee was conduct-
ing its inquiry, a series of events led to the death of Dr David 
Kelly on 17 July 2003. Dr Kelly was a MoD biological weap-
ons expert who had been revealed as the source for a claim that 
the September dossier had been ‘sexed up’. The controversy sur-
rounding Dr Kelly’s sudden death led the Secretary of State for 
Constitutional Affairs to request an urgent judicial inquiry into 
the surrounding circumstances presided over by Lord Hutton. 
However, the inquiry provided more of a narrative of events than 
a focus upon identifying lessons.186 
On the same day that Hutton’s report was published, a for-
mer top US weapons inspector, Dr David Kay, testifi ed to the 
US Senate Armed Services Committee that Iraq did not possess 
WMD and that the programme had begun to be dismantled as 
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early as 1991. At the same time, there was an ongoing inquiry 
by the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence into America’s 
pre-war assessments of Iraq and there was mounting pressure on 
the British Prime Minister to announce a similar inquiry. Con-
sequently, in February 2004, a fourth inquiry, headed by Lord 
Butler, was established. The inquiry was given a broad remit to 
review intelligence coverage of WMD as well as the accuracy of 
intelligence on Iraqi WMD and its use by the government. The 
inquiry was still limited by working to a tight timetable, having 
to conclude before other important pieces of evidence – including 
the report of the Iraq Survey Group – became available. How-
ever, unlike the Foreign Affairs Committee and Intelligence and 
Security Committee, the Butler inquiry was provided access to all 
JIC assessments and members of the IC for interview. The result 
was a plethora of identifi ed lessons.187 
When the report was presented to Parliament, the Prime 
Minister announced four lessons were to be implemented imme-
diately, including that an SIS offi cer was to be appointed to over-
see the implementation of all Butler lessons.188 On 15 November 
2004, Jack Straw announced that a wider lesson implementation 
programme had commenced and that the Security and Intelli-
gence Coordinator, Sir David Omand, would establish a special 
implementation oversight committee, the Butler Implementation 
Group.189 
The Butler Implementation Group tasked study teams to provide 
implementation plans and present the results the following year.190 
These were reported to ministers and the government subsequently 
published its own report which revealed a number of lessons had 
been implemented.191 These included new procedures and resources 
to oversee SIS validation of HUMINT, greater cross-government 
intelligence coordination through the creation of a new IT system, 
the expansion of the Assessment Staff and a new Professional Head 
of Intelligence Analysis.192 Furthermore, according to Cabinet Sec-
retary Gus O’Donnell and National Security Advisor Peter Ricketts, 
Butler lessons were further institutionalised by being given ‘signifi -
cant weight’ in the intelligence sections of the 2010 Strategic Defence 
and Security Review.193 Nonetheless, whilst the government  report 
demonstrated that a number of lessons from the Butler inquiry had 
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been implemented, other identifi ed lessons were ignored. The 216 
page Butler report only resulted in an eleven page implementation 
report, which did not address Butler’s recommendations one by one 
as was the usual government response format.194 
The Intelligence and Security Committee was requested to mon-
itor the ongoing progress of lesson implementation and included 
a specifi c ‘Butler implementation’ section in its own annual report 
until 2006. It revealed a number of implementation failures, 
including concerns over the slow arrival of the new IT system and 
the merging of the positions of the JIC Chairman and the Secu-
rity and Intelligence Coordinator.195 Other lessons implemented 
from the Butler review quickly became unlearned. The role of the 
Professional Head of Intelligence Analysis was held until August 
2007, when the holder retired, and the post remained vacant until 
March 2009 when the government subsumed it again into the JIC 
Chairmanship.196 
The Butler report also recommended that ‘lessons-learned pro-
cesses’ be continued by the JIC.197 Although this did not occur 
regularly, two examples emerged: on 13 July 2004, a Current 
Intelligence Group assessment refl ected upon the accuracy of past 
intelligence by reviewing the possible links between al-Qaeda 
and Saddam Hussein; and the Challenge Team were tasked with 
reviewing past papers to see if judgements were correct and to 
identify lessons for the future.198
Throughout the 2000s there were repeated calls for a further, 
broader, offi cial inquiry into the Iraq War. Initially the govern-
ment argued that such an inquiry would be a ‘huge diversion of 
effort’,199 that it was the responsibility of Parliament to scrutinise 
the government over Iraq – not an external inquiry – that any such 
efforts would divert away from the efforts to improve Iraq and 
that such an inquiry should not be held whilst troops remained in 
the country.200 Many of the arguments against holding an inquiry 
echoed those of the post-Suez clamour, but MPs made compari-
sons with the Franks inquiry into the Falklands War as a historical 
precedent for such an inquiry to take place. 
Eventually, under some political pressure, Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown established the Iraq Inquiry on 15 June 2009 
with the huge scope of examining the run-up to the war, the 
5842_Kettle.indd   202 06/09/18   11:38 AM
203
Iraq 2003–9
military action and its aftermath, to establish what happened 
during this time and to identify any lessons to be learned for the 
future. Under the Chairmanship of Sir John Chilcot – who had 
also been a member of the Butler inquiry – the evidence hearing 
began in November of the same year with the report published 
seven years later, on 6 July 2016. 
There were many criticisms of the inquiry from the outset, 
including the failure to include Parliament in deciding the terms 
of reference201 and the committee composition202 as well as 
ignoring previous recommendations from the House of Com-
mons Public Administration Committee on how to conduct 
inquiries.203 There was also some anger that it was not to be a 
form of truth and reconciliation process, and it was explicitly 
stated by the Prime Minister that the inquiry should not attempt 
to ‘apportion blame’.204 As the inquiry progressed there were 
also criticisms on the length of time it took to publish205 – the 
inquiry ended up taking longer than the war itself – and the cost 
to the tax payer – a fi nal total of £13,126,900.206 Nonetheless, 
the inquiry process was substantial; over 150,000 documents 
were examined and twenty-one weeks’ worth of oral evidence 
was taken from 180 senior politicians and offi cials – many in 
front of a public audience. Although there were arguments 
between the Cabinet Offi ce and the inquiry committee over what 
documents could be declassifi ed or included in the fi nal inquiry 
report, access to government information and individuals was 
unprecedented. 
The fi nal report was damning and wide-ranging, concluding 
that Iraq had posed no imminent threat, that the war was not a 
last resort and that Britain failed to achieve its objectives. It was 
2.6 million words long, over four times the length of Leo Tol-
stoy’s epic War and Peace, and provided a masterful narrative of 
events supported by evidence; its own offi cial history long before 
any offi cial history would usually be written. This was not surpris-
ing given the inquiry committee included Sir Lawrence Freedman, 
Emeritus Professor of War Studies at King’s College London and 
the offi cial historian of the Falklands campaign, and Sir Martin 
Gilbert, an Honorary Fellow at Oxford University and offi cial 
biographer of Winston Churchill. However, it was less successful 
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in identifying lessons. Whilst the report was scattered with ‘fi nd-
ings’ throughout its twelve volumes only eleven and a half pages 
pulled them together as ‘lessons’.207 Additionally, unlike previous 
inquiries, the report did not offer concrete recommendations as 
to how any identifi ed lessons could be practically implemented or 
institutionally entrenched, leaving the implementation decisions 
down to Whitehall departments. 
The report was released during the fallout from Britain’s monu-
mental referendum decision to withdraw from the EU. This deci-
sion had caused tremors across the political establishment and 
the Conservative Party were in the midst of a leadership election 
to decide the next Prime Minister whilst the Labour leader, Jer-
emy Corbyn, was also facing his own leadership battle. Much of 
the report’s media coverage focused upon blaming Tony Blair for 
leading Britain into an unsuccessful war and, in amongst a storm 
of political news stories, refl ection upon the fi ndings of the report 
was brief. The two-day parliamentary debate on the subject opened 
– after a packed session for David Cameron’s last ever Prime 
Minister’s Questions – with only fi fty-three MPs. The following day 
this number had reduced to just thirty-two. In his opening statement 
the Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, noted ‘the world’s eye will 
not be focused on our proceedings with quite the laser-like intensity 
that might have been expected’.208 However, Hammond suggested 
that Whitehall departments would look at the report in more detail. 
Initially, there was some concern that MPs, civil servants and the 
armed forces had long since identifi ed their own lessons and moved 
on. In fact, the Foreign Secretary offered one telling remark which 
suggested that little further lesson identifi cation or implementation 
would take place: 
The Government, including previous Administrations, have not stood 
still while waiting for the fi ndings we have before us today. There 
were a number of important reviews relating to the invasion and 
occupation of Iraq before Chilcot . . . As a result of each, lessons have 
been identifi ed and changes have been implemented, so a good deal of 
the work has already been done.209
Nonetheless, following the debate, the National Security Advisor 
was tasked with conducting a ‘lessons learned’ investigation across 
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Whitehall and the MoD held a ‘year of Chilcot’ with a team focused 
on identifying themes from the report and how these could imple-
mented.210 The House of Commons Public Administration and 
Constitutional Affairs Committee also followed up on this process 
and conducted their own inquiry to establish lessons to be learned 
from the Iraq Inquiry process itself, lessons for the machinery of 
government and how lessons could be implemented.211 In addi-
tion, the Liaison Committee heard evidence from Sir John Chilcot 
along a similar vein on 2 November 2016. During the questioning 
Chilcot stated ‘the real test will be the take-up of the lessons that 
we sought to draw and others may indeed fi nd . . . I am reason-
ably encouraged that the attempt is being made systematically in 
Government to address those lessons.’ He went on to conclude:
there is a question for Parliament as to how you wish to hold the Gov-
ernment to account for the way in which they do that task and give an 
account to yourselves, as parliamentarians, of what they have found 
out, accepted and changed.212 
However, a year and a half after the publication of the report, no 
written government response to identifi ed lessons has been issued 
and no further debate has occurred within Parliament. The risk, 
therefore, is that lessons from the Iraq Inquiry will not be learned.
Telic Learning
Telic revealed learning from history across all spheres within the 
FCO but with few references to Granby and none to Vantage. 
Instead, Suez and appeasement remained ever present and, similar 
to the Falklands during the Gulf War, the last major intervention 
in Afghanistan was frequently referenced. In the individual sphere 
many analogies were utilised, often incorrectly, unwisely or just rhe-
torically and the importance of No10 decision-making reiterated 
that the biggest barrier to learning was that lessons could be margin-
alised by the Prime Minister in the decision-making process.
In the institutional sphere, identifi ed lessons continued to 
be important for the approach to the UN, whilst the burden of 
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managing Britain’s imperial legacy remained in the FCO’s stra-
tegic approach. However, lesson implementation continued to 
be ad hoc. Lessons identifi ed from more recent events, including 
Afghanistan, were implemented but implementation during the 
operation was slow, leaving the diplomats in theatre to improvise 
in the individual sphere whilst waiting for the sluggish institu-
tional sphere to catch up. Moreover, as postings in Iraq lasted 
a maximum of one year – as opposed to the usual two or three 
years – there was a higher turnover of staff than in normal posts 
and the frequent changes of personnel translated to a lack of 
learning continuity.
Lessons identifi ed in the generational sphere also began to be 
important. FCO past experience in Iraq, from the 1920s through 
to the Gulf War, informed its understanding of the country and 
warnings of invasion. Attempts were made to harness individual 
and generational learning for institutional purposes through the 
recalling of former Ambassadors for policy discussions, which was 
a new method of lesson identifi cation and distribution. However, 
this shift in emphasis towards learning was very limited and did 
not compare to the reports identifying lessons produced by other 
departments, including the Stabilisation Unit and MoD; there still 
was not a learning culture. The Foreign Affairs Committee also 
revealed a lesson identifi cation agenda but the FCO failed to dem-
onstrate an emphasis upon lesson implementation. 
In the MoD, new lessons teams had been created to focus 
upon the learning process. New methods of identifying lessons 
– including developing relationships with academics – had devel-
oped and the DwLM formalised the process further by renewing 
the emphasis upon the implementation of lessons, albeit slowly. 
Externally, the National Audit Offi ce and Defence Committee 
complemented the process by providing additional lesson identifi -
cation and monitoring lesson implementation.
Additionally, the MoD had developed its lesson distribu-
tion and retention. Distribution occurred across individuals and 
services (through the Defence Lessons Library), the public and 
Defence Committee (through published reports) as well as White-
hall and coalition nations (through the dissemination of reports 
and conferences). The new Defence Lessons Library also ensured 
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that lessons were retained, beyond the updating of doctrine, to 
inform the planning of operations in the future – albeit that it 
remains extremely underutilised. Consequently, for the fi rst time, 
the MoD demonstrated a learning process which encompassed all 
four stages of the learning process, with the National Audit Offi ce 
determining the MoD lessons process to be ‘comprehensive’.213
However, there remained many challenges and Telic revealed 
that few identifi ed lessons from Vantage or Granby had been imple-
mented or retained long term. Throughout the planning, emphasis 
remained upon lessons identifi ed from Afghanistan and the most 
recent operations and exercises, demonstrating reliance upon the 
individual over the generational sphere. Other generational iden-
tifi ed lessons, including the importance of avoiding appearing 
imperial, had been unlearned. Whilst some lesson implementa-
tion was demonstrated in the institutional sphere, in the changes 
to equipment, this was haphazard and many items continued to 
be unsuitable. Furthermore, many lessons which had previously 
been identifi ed in the institutional sphere were either forgotten, 
re-identifi ed or quickly unlearned, such as the importance of clear 
military objectives, the necessity of working with the US and heat 
discipline. 
The MoD was also slow to identify and implement lessons 
during the operation. There were exceptions but these were out-
weighed by failing to examine strategic lessons until late; too late 
to inform Telic. This was, in part, due to the overwhelming number 
of identifi ed lessons that emerged from the operation and through 
a greatly expanded, more democratic, lessons process.
In contrast, the IC demonstrated little learning from past 
interventions in any of the spheres of learning during Telic, with 
two exceptions. Firstly, lessons identifi ed from Granby had led 
to overestimation in the institutional sphere which had also 
transcended into the generational sphere. Secondly, in the insti-
tutional sphere, lessons identifi ed from Afghanistan were imple-
mented in the central intelligence machinery. Otherwise, many 
identifi ed lessons were forgotten, including the importance of 
HUMINT, suffi cient language capabilities and methods to deal 
with the challenges of distillation, dissemination and classifi ca-
tion of intelligence. 
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However, the new publicity of intelligence, since the acknowl-
edgement of the existence of the agencies and due to the September 
dossier, placed the IC under such scrutiny that for the fi rst time it 
was forced to refl ect upon lesson identifi cation and implementation 
for the future. The commitment to learning lessons from the For-
eign Affairs Committee and Intelligence and Security Committee 
was negligible but the establishment of the Butler Implementation 
Group demonstrated that the lessons identifi ed by the 2004 inquiry 
were taken seriously, with many lessons initially implemented, 
albeit that several were promptly unlearned. Therefore, the shift in 
culture to embracing the lessons identifi ed by Butler was temporary 
and limited with little evidence of many lessons implemented long 
term. Furthermore, outside the DIS, the process of lesson identifi ca-
tion did not continue on an ongoing basis.
There was some initial hope that the Iraq Inquiry – with its 
wide remit – could help to compensate for the lack of learning 
in inadequate areas across government. However, its failure to 
explicitly identify a signifi cant number of lessons, and the lack 
of subsequent government response or parliamentary debate, 
suggests that it is even less likely that Chilcot’s lessons will be 
implemented, distributed and retained long term. It also revealed 
a broader question over the government’s reliance on inquiries to 
ensure that it does not fail history in the future.
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Rulers, Statesmen, Nations are wont to be emphatically commended 
to the teaching which experience offers in history. But what experi-
ence and history teach us is this – that peoples and governments never 
have learned anything from history, or acted on principles deduced 
from it. 
(Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 1837)1
In the past, the British government has failed history in a number 
of ways. Whilst it is clear that learning has developed over time, as 
has the emphasis placed upon the importance of learning lessons, it 
is also apparent that the FCO, MoD and IC each learn from history 
in different ways. Each focuses their efforts to learn on different 
stages of the learning process, different learners, different stages of 
an intervention, different levels of policy-making, through different 
methods and to different extents; there is no consistency for learn-
ing from history across government.
Learning from the past is not easy. It is a complex process, with 
several stages, that develops from ‘the acquisition of knowledge’ to 
‘informing policy decision-making’ and within, as well as between, 
each stage – identifi cation, distribution, retention and implementa-
tion – there are challenges to be overcome. From 1956 to 2009 the 
FCO was primarily focused on the lesson identifi cation stage of 
the process, from internal sources, including the use of despatches. 
Attempts by the Foreign Affairs Committee to offer external les-
son identifi cation were largely ineffective as the FCO did not seek 
to acquire knowledge from this body. The types of lessons iden-
tifi ed were usually strategic, rather than operational or tactical, 
and there was no routine learning process as there was within the 
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MoD. Any lesson implementation was ad hoc and lessons were 
only retained in individual memory and through the informalities 
of best practice. Despite the existence of in-house historians, no 
offi cial histories have been written in the FCO on any of the inter-
ventions examined in this book and consequently they do not offer 
a method of retention for the future. 
Out of the three government bodies, the MoD had the most 
comprehensive and substantial learning process, which developed 
and proliferated over time to cover all four stages of learning with 
specifi c lessons teams and systems. The MoD had long written 
post-operational reports identifying lessons, but implementation 
also began in earnest, fi rstly driven by defence reviews after Suez 
and then by a zealous minister after Kuwait. By Granby, a number 
of methods had been developed to distribute lessons internally, 
as well as to the public and suppliers. These methods were fur-
ther formalised during Iraq through the Defence Lessons Identifi ed 
Management System which provided a new method to ensure all 
identifi ed lessons were implemented and retained. 
Whilst the MoD identifi ed a large number of lessons internally, 
including through exercises and war games, there was also an increase 
in identifi cation of lessons externally from the media, Defence Com-
mittee, National Audit Offi ce and Committee of Public Accounts. 
Unlike the FCO, the MoD tended to be open to lessons identifi ed 
by these bodies and the Defence Committee developed its agenda 
to monitor the implementation of such lessons. Consequently, the 
failure of the MoD did not relate to learning lessons from operations 
but a failure to learn lessons across operations; treating each opera-
tion as individual entities whereby identifi ed lessons were either not 
transferred or were only implemented in the next major confl ict. The 
result was that future capability improved infrequently and previ-
ously identifi ed lessons were regularly re-identifi ed.
In the IC, any substantial lesson identifi cation was conducted 
externally. Although the IC did not implement the lessons identi-
fi ed by the Foreign Affairs Committee and, to some extent, the 
Intelligence and Security Committee, larger reviews – those con-
ducted by Lord Franks and Lord Butler – led to identifi ed lessons 
being implemented. In fact, the IC benefi ted at the implementation 
stage by the establishment of the Butler Implementation Group 
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and ongoing monitoring by the Intelligence and Security Commit-
tee, albeit that many implemented lessons were quickly unlearned. 
Similarly to the FCO, lessons were primarily retained through best 
practise norms and standards, with the Butler report acting as a 
reference guide. However, they were also retained through sig-
nifi cant changes in the institutional structure of the central intel-
ligence machine which proved to be a successful way to ensure 
lessons remained learned over the long term. 
To ensure that the British government does not fail history, 
the FCO, MoD and IC need to adopt methods to include all four 
stages of the learning process. To facilitate this process a lessons 
team must be established for any new intervention – to identify, 
record and enable implementation of lessons as quickly as possible 
and to avoid having to establish an audit trail after the operation. 
After any major event – including military operations – and annu-
ally in any event, the FCO, MoD and IC should also conduct a 
full lessons review and produce a report which clearly identifi es 
lessons and suggests methods of implementation. These reports 
must avoid the misnomer of ‘lessons learned’ when the lessons are 
only identifi ed, as it risks leading to a failure to learn based on the 
assumption that lessons have been implemented. The language of 
‘post-mortems’ should also be discouraged as it places negativity 
on the process from the outset and does not encourage cultural 
embracing of learning where reviews are treated as a current and 
active part of policy decision-making.
Upon completion of such a report it should be passed to an 
oversight body to ensure that identifi ed lessons are implemented, 
at least in the short term. Ongoing, oversight can be conducted 
internally through lessons management structures and externally 
through the House of Commons Select Committees – as the Defence 
Committee does currently – but there is also an opportunity for a 
cross-Whitehall lesson implementation group. Such a group would 
have the responsibility of ensuring lessons are implemented, dis-
tributed and retained but would also be able to consider methods 
for cross-departmental effi ciencies in terms of time and money.
Learning is further complicated by the number of competing 
actors and different spheres of learning involved in the process. 
From Suez to Iraq the FCO focus on learning was in the individual 
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sphere. An appreciation and sensitivity towards history, often borne 
from a concern and understanding of local environments devel-
oped through diplomatic postings, proved benefi cial. However, the 
emphasis on the individual sphere of learning led FCO policy to 
be more disposed to being driven by the agendas of strong, senior 
individuals. In particular, lessons identifi ed by the Prime Minister 
and Foreign Secretary often trumped those of diplomats – most 
clearly demonstrated in the run-up to the Iraq War – whilst the 
Prime Minister’s Private Secretaries and Cabinet Secretaries also 
played a signifi cant role. An over-reliance on this sphere resulted in 
an inconsistent approach across the institution; to overcome sub-
jectivity in the individual sphere, and to create coherent policies, 
identifi ed lessons must be formally agreed and institutionalised. 
However, the use of former Ambassadors in the run-up to Iraq 
revealed a new emphasis as individually identifi ed lessons were 
passed into the generational sphere for the fi rst time; the FCO 
was the only institution to demonstrate any active learning across 
generations during this time. Learning in this sphere is particu-
larly benefi cial for lesson retention as changes in personnel, from 
retirement and the revolving door of posting rotations within 
Whitehall, can lead to a loss of corporate memory. In addition, 
learning in the generational sphere is particularly signifi cant when 
dealing with the Middle East where many policy-makers stay in 
power for decades thus retaining lessons for longer than the FCO 
through individual memory. Generations can be better encouraged 
to interact through better briefi ngs, handover notes, exit inter-
views, retaining contacts, conferences, regular meetings and men-
toring schemes but other methods of retention can also be better 
exploited: changes in structure, habit, establishing best practices, 
education, training and storing formally recorded lessons digitally 
with well-functioning search engine capabilities. However, these 
lessons must be regularly updated to ensure contemporary rele-
vance. For Henry Kissinger, the lessons from history should be 
interpreted by each generation: ‘History teaches by analogy, shed-
ding light on the likely consequences of comparable situations. 
But each generation must determine for itself which circumstances 
are in fact comparable.’2 In this regard, context is key as history 
provides suggestions but must be examined critically to avoid 
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responding to the events of today with the logic of yesterday or 
injecting present day concerns into historical analysis to result in 
a biased conclusion. Intellectual honesty and critical thinking are 
required internally in government and within the media, as well as 
by the general public, in order that this can be achieved. 
In contrast, the MoD focus on learning was in the institutional 
sphere, through formal methods, with a wide understanding 
of the importance of the learning process. The MoD also took 
advantage of regular strategic reviews to place greater emphasis 
on relevant lessons which provided a bureaucratic imperative to 
take lesson identifi cation and implementation seriously, even dur-
ing peacetime. In this sense, lesson identifi cation provided data 
and rationale for decisions, making them more appealing and per-
suasive to politicians. 
However, focusing on learning in the institutional sphere alone 
had its limitations. The emphasis on learning is often at odds with the 
wider MoD culture whereby individuals are trained to have a ‘can 
do’ attitude, rewarded for doing the same thing well – rather than 
questioning its principles – and where loyalty is highly regarded. As 
Basil Liddell Hart mused ‘“loyalty”, analysed, is too often a polite 
word for what would be more accurately described as “a conspiracy 
for mutual ineffi ciency”’3 but the problem is compounded when loy-
alty is measured in terms other than to British security, such as com-
mand and departmental or regimental loyalty. In fact, a report by 
Charles Haddon-Cave – into issues surrounding the 2006 loss of an 
RAF Nimrod in Afghanistan – identifi ed twelve cultural challenges 
within the MoD to lesson learning.4 In any institutional sphere, cul-
tural issues must be combated – including the requirement for a posi-
tive professional institutional image, which may be threatened by 
admitting past diffi culties, or a belief that criticism of superiors is a 
form of dissent. An active encouragement of learning from history 
and a collaborative approach helps to promote learning as a unifi ed 
strength rather than a disloyal weakness and more research on oper-
ant learning in institutions – rewarding individuals for learning from 
the past – may also prove benefi cial. 
The institutional, habitual nature of lesson identifi cation within 
the MoD also risks removing careful refl ection upon lessons and 
the genuine desire to learn and the quality of lessons identifi ed. 
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Additionally, the formality of process can lead to a misguided 
assumption that once a lesson is identifi ed, it will automatically be 
passed along the conveyor belt to the next stage of learning and 
responsibility for overseeing its implementation is absolved. The 
comfort of this formulaic process also leads to the risk of ignoring 
informal learning that occurs amongst peers and down the chain 
of command at lower ranks.
From 1956 to 2009, in the IC, little learning occurred in any 
sphere. This lack of learning was partly due to its culture; whilst 
the FCO lived with the weight of history, the IC focused on horizon 
scanning for the future and dealing with the events of the moment. 
There was, therefore, very little opportunity for refl ection on the 
past. The nature of the IC as a service provider to ‘customers’ – 
almost as a consultancy whereby the customer drives the agenda 
– also meant that lesson identifi cation was primarily driven by cus-
tomer requests. In the 1970s, the US Intelligence Community Staff 
commissioned the Product Review Division to conduct reviews on 
the way it conducted its intelligence.5 It resulted in a number of les-
sons being identifi ed and implemented and a similar process may 
prove benefi cial in Britain.
Across all three bodies, the democratic input by learners into 
the lessons process varied. The FCO process was mainly focused 
on ministers and Ambassadors, the most senior diplomats. Input 
into the IC process was mainly by external infl uences – customers 
and inquiries. The MoD, over time, developed the most demo-
cratic lesson identifi cation process, allowing input by learners 
across services and ranks. A more democratic process reinforces 
that learning from history is culturally important to an institution 
and both a cross-personnel capability and responsibility, albeit 
leading to new challenges of managing the subjectivity and quan-
tity of data. For example, a brigade tour in Afghanistan would 
identify approximately 1,000 lessons, which would be distilled to 
around 300. However, in three months the Land lessons staff can 
only consider around forty lessons.6
As well as examining the learning process and different learners 
this book has considered learning at different stages of an interven-
tion: before, during and after. In the FCO, the majority of learn-
ing from history occurred during the planning of an intervention. 
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There was also some lesson identifi cation and implementation dur-
ing operations, but mainly at the early stages. In contrast, whilst 
the MoD often had the most time to draw upon identifi ed lessons 
in planning, especially contingency planning, the majority of refl ec-
tion upon history occurred only after the operation and on that 
specifi c operation alone. Learning at this stage was often easier for 
the MoD because the operation had a defi ned end point – marked 
by troop withdrawal – whereas the FCO and IC often continued to 
work in the area. In the IC, learning was the most limited and was 
primarily delivered in the form of assessments and reassessments 
before and during operations. As a result, it was not surprising that 
the FCO had a longer-term view, although this was limited to only 
key strategic identifi ed lessons, whilst the MoD refl ected upon the 
lessons identifi ed from the last major operation and the IC identi-
fi ed and implemented very little. 
The result was that long-term learning was sporadic. For 
learning from history to be successful it must occur at the plan-
ning stage – refl ections from past, relevant, operations – during 
the operation – to quickly identify and successfully implement les-
sons whilst the operation is ongoing – and after the operation – to 
ensure that lessons are learned for the future. Whilst some lessons 
remained learned from 1956 – managing the media and interna-
tional, domestic and parliamentary opinion, working with the 
UN, protecting the economy and the imperative of American sup-
port – others were regularly forgotten, unlearned, re-identifi ed or 
unsuccessfully implemented. In comparison to the learned lessons 
– which were strategic in nature – these were often operational: 
in the FCO, forgetting to secure overfl ying rights was a common 
theme; in the MoD, issues of logistics and tracking of equipment 
continued across operations; in the IC, security classifi cation issues 
reoccurred. In fact, outside the broad strategic identifi ed lessons, 
lessons from past interventions in the Middle East quickly became 
forgotten and learning primarily came from the last major confl ict: 
Suez for Jordan, the Falklands for the Gulf, Afghanistan for Iraq. 
Proximity of time proved more important than proximity of geog-
raphy or similarity of operation or enemy.
Consequently, in order to improve learning from history, each 
institution must conduct an internal analysis of its current process 
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for learning from history, with an admittance of any failings. To 
achieve this, SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) 
analysis can be utilised against each stage of the learning process 
(identifi cation, implementation, distribution and retention), the 
three different spheres of learning (individual, institutional and 
generational) and at each stage of the intervention process (plan-
ning, during and after). Each institution would also benefi t from 
studying the others’ learning processes in more detail, as well as 
learning in other countries, before establishing their own revised 
and improved processes. The analysis should consider that inter-
nal lesson identifi cation is a prerequisite to learning, but exter-
nal identifi cation is also benefi cial and should not be ignored. As 
inquiries are an expensive means of external lesson identifi cation, 
the House of Commons Select Committees offer a possible option; 
in comparison to the Iraq Inquiry, the Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee’s report on Iraq took a year to produce at a cost of £13,000.7 
In addition, the media, think-tanks and academics have a role to 
play through investigative journalism, the writing of critical histo-
ries and engagement with policy-makers. In 2002, several scholars 
founded a ‘History and Policy’ website to create a network of his-
torians and provide a resource for policy-makers and journalists.8 
The ambition was to demonstrate the contemporary relevance of 
history for policy-making, with a belief that history could provide 
relevant lessons for the present. Such forums provide an impor-
tant link which could be used to greater advantage. Focus must be 
given to learning from positive and negative experiences as well 
as opportunities to challenge historical or analogical assumptions. 
The government would also benefi t from a removal – or at least 
reduction – of the division of labour between history and learning 
lessons. Even in the MoD, where there are lessons teams, these 
are separated from historians whilst historical and lessons analyses 
are treated as distinct disciplines. The in-house historians, offi cial 
historians and historical branch historians all offer an invalu-
able resource for any learning process and should also be further 
incorporated into policy-making. This is the responsibility of both 
policy-makers and historians to create a new link and encourage 
histories to be written with a critical eye and in-depth analysis so 
that they are relevant for the future.
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The learning process requires fi nance and resources. In par-
ticular, the implementation stage of learning can be extremely 
costly. In an age of budget cuts and austerity measures, invest-
ment in history and learning is likely to be a low priority. This was 
exemplifi ed in 2009 when the Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, 
accounted that keeping open the FCO library cost £246 per book. 
Consequently, it was closed, dispersing 60,000 books, pamphlets, 
reports and documents and over 500 years of Britain’s history to 
other facilities. However, as a result of budget cuts, Whitehall is 
also experiencing pressure to reform and learning initiatives can 
offer low cost alternatives to dealing with failures or expensive 
policy reviews and inquiries which have proved ineffective for 
long-term learning. An ongoing learning process can help to pre-
vent costly mistakes and investing in the process should form part 
of the strategic decision-making of budget reviews within each 
body. Additionally, when resources are tight, focusing upon meth-
ods of learning which centre on the overlap of all three spheres 
of learning, including the holding of conferences, will provide the 
most effi cient results.
Learning from history is also time-consuming and the workload 
pressure and bottomless in-trays of busy bureaucrats, politicians 
and service personnel leaves lesson learning perpetually at the end 
of the ‘to-do’ list. This challenge has long been known; the political 
scientists Ernest May and Richard Neustadt advised in the 1980s 
of the diffi culties of getting policy-makers to read history.9 Even 
in the learning environment of MoD Staff Colleges, learning is 
against the clock, with voluminous reading lists and many topics to 
cover in a short space of time, allowing little opportunity for refl ec-
tion. This restricts ongoing learning but also signifi cantly impacts 
learning during planning. When crises occur, decisions have to be 
made quickly. Consequently, for example, despite the large num-
ber of lessons now digitally available in the MoD, there is no time 
to consult the Defence Lessons Library when a brief is required 
for a minister within a few hours.10 Similarly, time is required for 
lesson implementation and distribution. It is, therefore, important 
to identify opportunities where time to learn from history can be 
maximised: during training, lunchtime briefi ngs, diarising and pri-
oritising a regular time slot. In conducting the planning stage of 
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an operation, it is also recommended that a historian, or member 
of a lessons team, is included. As time is often limited during this 
phase, inclusion of such personnel will allow historical expertise to 
be included in discussion or relevant past experiences to be quickly 
researched for inclusion within the decision-making process. 
In addition to the diffi culty of allocating time to learn from his-
tory, sometimes time must pass after an operation to allow the 
political environment to be more open to learning from the past. 
Admitting failure or accepting criticism is always diffi cult and min-
isters and civil servants can be extremely sensitive about identifying 
lessons from past performances. After the 1979 Iranian Revolution 
the British Ambassador in Tehran, Sir Anthony Parsons, returned to 
London and ran a series of lunchtime meetings to ascertain how the 
FCO had failed to predict the recent events. The diplomatic corre-
spondent John Dickie noted ‘To have a senior ambassador stand up 
in front of everyone . . . and admit he made a mistake requires a large 
measure of courage.’ This was an ‘exception to the normal ostrich 
posture in the Foreign Offi ce over learning lessons from mistakes’.11 
This challenge has become increasingly diffi cult as manoeuvrings 
for career promotion rely on success, rather than admitting failure, 
and as leaders become more aware of creating their own legacy. 
Winston Churchill not only read history, but was also consciously 
instrumental in creating his own historical legacy through his 
speeches and writings.12 Anthony Eden also repeatedly appealed to 
history for vindication, convinced that in the course of time history 
would reveal his actions in Suez to have been correct.13 Over time, 
the use of spin doctors and increased media training has resulted in 
leaders becoming increasingly aware of managing their own image, 
including through the destruction or withholding of documents 
from public release. Consequently, if history is politically infl uenced, 
so are the lessons which are drawn. However, as this challenge is 
related to culture, it can be overcome with time and commitment.
Learning from History since Iraq
Despite the challenges to learning from history, events from the 
past continue to permeate policy debate. As Karl Marx observed 
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‘Men make their own history, but not just as they please. They do 
not choose the circumstances for themselves, but have to work 
upon circumstances as they fi nd them, have to fashion the material 
handed down by the past.’14 In fact, the spectre of Iraq has long since 
loomed over foreign and security policy decisions with its lessons 
pervading current debate, especially in regards to further military 
interventions in the Middle East region. When Britain withdrew 
from Iraq in 2009 it left a weak government in place. The 2010 
Iraqi elections saw the country without an agreed administration 
for 249 days and, in 2011, violent civilian deaths totalled 4,087 as 
US troops completed their withdrawal.15 In 2012, attacks on Shia 
Muslim areas of the country sparked fears of new sectarian vio-
lence and by the end of the year Sunni Muslims began mass rallies 
to protest against marginalisation that had begun with the coali-
tion policy of de-Ba’athifi cation. By July 2013, the violence had 
returned to the levels of 2008 as the sectarian insurgency intensi-
fi ed and, by January 2014, opposition fi ghters had infi ltrated the 
cities of Fallujah and Ramadi. 
Throughout this time, a new insurgent group was emerging. In 
2006, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) created an umbrella organisation, 
Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), which was soon weakened by coali-
tion counterinsurgency operations. However, post-withdrawal, 
in 2010, ISI gained a new leader – Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – who 
rebuilt the group’s capabilities. In April 2013, ISI announced a for-
mal merger with forces in Syria to create the Islamic State in Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIL), before shifting its attention back to Iraq. 
By June 2014, ISIL had seized Iraq’s second city, Mosul, and was 
advancing towards Baghdad, taking other key cities and towns 
along the way. It declared the creation of a caliphate and changed 
its name to Islamic State (known as IS, ISIS or Daesh). To combat 
this threat, since 2014, Britain has sent over 1,350 military person-
nel, trained over 52,000 Iraqi soldiers and conducted over 1,340 
air strikes. In addition, it has continued to support Iraq fi nancially, 
providing over £15 million to UN stabilisation efforts, pledging 
over £169.5 million in humanitarian aid and providing £300 mil-
lion in loan guarantees.16
Consequently, far from increasing security, Telic has facilitated 
the rise of extremism and continues to be costly. As early as 2005 
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the JIC assessed that the Iraq confl ict had exacerbated the threat 
to Britain from international terrorism and resulted in increased 
cooperation between terrorist networks.17 The displacement of an 
estimated 4 million people as a consequence of the war – the larg-
est human displacement in the Middle East since 1948, with a 
further 3.3 million Iraqis displaced by the presence of Daesh – only 
increased the threat further. In addition, North Korea and Iran, the 
two other ‘axis of evil’ nations, took the opportunity to enhance 
their own WMD capabilities while the West was distracted in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.18 This sense of failure had a profound impact on 
Britain and consequently policy-makers have been keen to stress 
that there will be ‘no more Iraqs’ and that the lessons from Iraq 
have been learned. 
The fi rst test for these lessons was during the Arab Spring; 
this was a revolutionary wave which swept across the Middle 
East and North Africa, beginning at the end of 2010 in Tunisia 
and, by the end of 2012, included the toppling of a number 
of regimes. The government claimed that the lessons identifi ed 
from Iraq informed its policy decision to avoid direct interven-
tion and, instead, support was offered through an Arab Partner-
ship Initiative and assistance to the Arab League. Focus shifted 
away from military options and towards diplomatic and eco-
nomic endeavours and similarly away from Western-led ini-
tiatives to working with international organisations, Middle 
Eastern states and organisations in the region. FCO Minister 
Alistair Burt advised ‘We learnt in Iraq . . . our response to the 
Arab Spring and our change in approach in Afghanistan have 
surely shown that we successfully learnt the lessons from the 
recent past.’19
As the Arab Spring sparked turmoil across the Middle East region, 
a growing crisis emerged in Libya in 2011, with anti-government 
protesters and rebels clashing with state security forces. As the death 
toll rose the possibility of a British intervention re-emerged. How-
ever, the Prime Minister, David Cameron, was keen to stress that if 
Britain was to commit to military involvement, the circumstances 
would have to be different to Iraq. In a debate in the House of 
Commons he stated:
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I want to deal with the way in which we will ensure that this is not 
another Iraq . . . there will be no foreign occupation of Libya . . . 
However, I would argue that the differences from Iraq go deeper. It 
is not just that this time, the action has the full, unambiguous legal 
authority of the United Nations nor that it is backed by Arab coun-
tries and a broad international coalition, but that millions in the Arab 
world want to know that the UN, the US, the UK, the French and the 
international community care about their suffering and their oppres-
sion. The Arab world has asked us to act with it to stop the slaughter, 
and that is why we should answer that call.20
After the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 – 
authorising member states to take all means necessary to protect 
civilians – Parliament voted 557–13 in favour of intervention. 
However, following Cameron’s identifi ed lessons from Iraq, fi ght-
ing in Libya was led by a local opposition movement against the 
dictator, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi . Consequently, Britain only 
provided air support – Operation Ellamy – with the Arab League 
providing further assistance; no British boots were put on the 
ground. At the peak of the operation, 2,300 British service person-
nel, thirty-two aircraft and eight warships and attack submarines 
were deployed. From 19 March to 31 October 2011 over 3,000 
sorties were fl own, more than 2,000 of which were strike sorties.21 
Militarily the operation was a success but the intervention has 
subsequently been criticised. Ellamy suffered from ‘mission creep’, 
extending from protecting civilians to supporting the capture and 
killing of Gaddafi  – who had governed the country since 1969 – 
by rebels. After his deposal, the country descended into chaos; the 
rebels supported by Britain – the National Transitional Council 
– murdered Gaddafi  and failed to maintain security. After power 
was handed to the General National Congress (GNC), voters 
became increasingly dissatisfi ed and chose to replace the GNC – in 
June 2014 – with the Council of Representatives. In response, the 
GNC established a rival government in Tripoli, causing further 
confl ict. In 2015, a UN initiative negotiated the unity of the two 
camps as the Government of National Accord but this has since 
been rejected by the Council of Representatives and large parts 
of the GNC, therefore creating a third government competing for 
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power. There are also many smaller rival groups holding terri-
tory across the country, including Tuareg and Daesh forces. The 
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee concluded that the 
government’s policy was not informed by accurate intelligence – 
including the nature of the Libyan rebellion – that it lacked a clear 
strategic objective or a post-war strategy.22 It was clear, therefore, 
that lessons from Iraq had not been learned.
Protests also began in Syria in 2011 against President Bashar 
al-Assad’s regime. These soon grew into a civil war, deteriorating 
throughout 2012–13 and causing a refugee crisis, with increasing 
evidence that Assad was using chemical weapons against his oppo-
sition. On 21 August 2013, a chemical attack killed hundreds of 
civilians causing widespread condemnation. Cameron again began 
to consider British intervention, especially as President Barack 
Obama’s administration was keen to send retaliatory air strikes 
and had asked for British participation in a coalition.23 Parliament 
was recalled for a vote and, echoing the events prior to Telic, a JIC 
assessment on Assad’s use of chemical weapons was published. 
The Prime Minister recognised ‘the scepticism and concerns that 
many people in the country will have after Iraq’ on the use of intel-
ligence as justifi cation and so the government went to great lengths 
to demonstrate that lessons had been learned in how to present 
intelligence to a wide audience.24 
Efforts were also made to reassure the nation over the inter-
vention itself with Cameron stating ‘I am deeply mindful of the 
lessons of previous confl icts and, in particular, of the deep con-
cerns of the country that were caused by what went wrong with 
the Iraq confl ict in 2003.’25 However, the failure of Libya made 
MPs nervous and, on 30 August 2013, Parliament voted 285–
272 against joining US-led strikes. Instead, the UK focused its 
efforts outside the country by condemning the actions of Assad, 
supporting the High Negotiations Committee of the Syrian 
Opposition and responding to the subsequent humanitarian cri-
sis in Syria and surrounding countries. However, as the humani-
tarian crisis worsened, Parliament changed its mind and – in 
a second vote on 2 December 2015 – chose to support strikes 
397–223. The UK has also committed £2.46 billion to the crisis 
since 2012.26
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Whilst Iraq has remained present in debates over interven-
tions in the region, there have also been a number of changes in 
approach to learning from history since Telic. The arrival of a new 
government, and particularly a new Foreign Secretary – William 
Hague – in May 2010, led to a number of immediate changes in 
the FCO. Hague, a part-time historian, regarded learning from 
history as signifi cant and set a new tone to the culture of the insti-
tution by quickly moving the in-house historians from a basement 
in a satellite building to a newly refurbished offi ce in the main 
FCO building. He declared: 
Just as one draws on economists and people with specialist knowl-
edge of a particular country, so we should be drawing on the insights 
provided by our historians. The historians are an obvious resource 
and they were not appreciated by the last administration. They were 
languishing in a basement and now the light is shining on their books. 
It is intended to be a signal to the whole Foreign Offi ce to use them, 
and to remember the importance of understanding history.27
Hague also reopened the FCO library and told the FCO in 2011 
‘We are putting greater emphasis on cultivating and retaining 
knowledge throughout the institution; bringing the work of FCO 
Historians back into the consideration and formulation of policy 
. . . including regular seminars to learn from history.’28 These semi-
nars primarily occur internally, as part of an optional lunchtime 
learning series, but more events have begun to be organised which 
bring together academics and policy-makers. 
To further encourage learning from history, Hague developed a 
new approach to FCO alumni. He noted when he arrived that when 
Ambassadors retired from the FCO their accumulated knowledge 
was being unnecessarily lost. Describing the retired personnel as 
‘part of the collective memory and intellectual fi repower of the 
organisation’, the Foreign Secretary set up a group of former 
FCO members to consider foreign policy on a global basis.29 In 
addition, ex-Ambassadors were invited to participate in regional 
forums, providing lesson distribution across generations, with the 
Middle East group meeting every two to three months.30 Although 
such meetings provide an ad hoc and less formal method of retain-
ing and distributing lessons, changes in technology mean that they 
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could become increasingly important. As electronic records have 
replaced paper records, information on policy decision-making 
has become easier to delete and many staff do not keep drafts of 
documents, only fi nal versions.31 This means that the investigation 
of policy-making to identify lessons, and to establish whether les-
sons from history were considered, is likely to become increasingly 
challenging and lead to more reliance on individual and genera-
tional memory.
In addition, the FCO’s 2015 annual report revealed that some 
learning processes had been established. In particular, the FCO 
crisis centre was conducting exercises after every crisis, albeit that 
these were titled ‘lessons learnt exercises’.32 There was also a less 
formal process to identify and implement lessons after security 
breaches, including after the 2014 attack in Kabul and the attack 
on the US Consulate in Benghazi. Furthermore, the set-up of a new 
Diplomatic Academy was heralded as a way in which to encour-
age learning in the generational sphere and may prove to offer an 
opportune method for lesson distribution.33 Moreover, the FCO 
has co-sponsored some doctoral research and experimented with 
secondments into the department for academic researchers.
The FCO board also recognised the institution’s weakness in 
learning lessons. An internal audit in 2013 identifi ed the ‘need to 
document formally lessons learned, and track the benefi ts, from 
completed major projects’.34 The 2013–14 annual report stated 
‘We are taking steps to respond to the audit’s recommendations.’35 
However, there was no detail as to how this was to be achieved, 
nor was there any reference to a link with history.
In the MoD, many layers and levels of lessons teams exist, over-
lapping with knowledge management teams. Lessons are getting 
increasing prominence – as seen in their own sections on the Army 
Knowledge Exchange and in the British Army Review’s ‘Learn-
ing in Confl ict’ special editions – and some association between 
the historical branches and the lessons teams in the DCDC and at 
Joint Forces Command have been established. Members of lessons 
teams have also attended events by the historical branches when 
the focus has been upon lessons.36 The history–lessons relationship 
has been further entrenched in the British Army through the recent 
establishment of the internal think-tank, the Centre for Historical 
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Analysis and Confl ict Research (CHACR) at Sandhurst. However, 
the relationship remains ad hoc, disparate and in its infancy, with 
the historical branches often dismissed as the poor relation and not 
relevant to contemporary lessons. The Army Historical Branch, in 
particular, spends most of its time dealing with legal issues rather 
than writing histories and the separation of services means that 
joint histories are not written to provide an overarching MoD his-
torical perspective. 
Nonetheless, the MoD has recognised the need to study wider 
patterns of learning across operations of the past. The US military’s 
Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Division have exam-
ined lessons reports from over a decade of operations to ensure 
that strategic themes are learned and the British military has been 
placed under pressure to conduct a similar review.37 The Defence 
Wide Lessons Board (DwLB) – a lessons management structure – 
began this process by collating and analysing historical lessons into 
a broad group of strategic lessons, but more can be done.38
In the IC, an annual assessment of accuracy was instigated as 
a way of identifying lessons across the year, following Butler rec-
ommendations, but soon fell by the wayside leaving no ongoing 
learning process in place. Instead, the most signifi cant change for 
the IC has been the establishment of the National Security Council 
(NSC), in May 2010. This was part of an attempt by the govern-
ment – along with the establishment of at least ten joint units in 
2015–16 – to improve cross-Whitehall coordination. It currently 
includes the Chief of the Defence Staff, the heads of the intelli-
gence agencies and the Chairman of the JIC, as well as relevant 
ministers and the Attorney General. It also has its own secretar-
iat led by the National Security Adviser. On the fi rst of the two 
day parliamentary debate on the fi nding of the Iraq Inquiry the 
Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, stated that the NSC was set 
up to ‘ensure that there is proper, co-ordinated, strategic deci-
sion making across the whole of Government . . . ensuring that 
all parts of the national security apparatus are properly joined up 
across Whitehall and beyond’.39 However, each weekly meeting 
commences with an overview of the latest JIC intelligence, forc-
ing greater IC accountability to security policy-makers and more 
self-refl ection on lessons, albeit less formally than through lessons 
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reports.40 Hammond went on to claim that the NSC also institu-
tionalised lessons from Iraq on challenging intelligence and plan-
ning, ensuring that they would remain learned: ‘Having sat on the 
National Security Council . . . it seems to me highly improbable 
that the process of conduct of business in relation to this matter 
through 2002 and 2003, as set out by Chilcot, could be repeated 
now.’41 However, this conclusion has been challenged by a number 
of Parliamentary Committees – especially in relation to NSC fail-
ings over the intervention in Libya in 2011 – suggesting that les-
sons still need to be learned.42
Additionally, in 2009, the government decided to review the 
programme of offi cial histories produced through the Cabinet 
Offi ce. This review was conducted by the retired civil servant Sir 
Joseph Pilling who concluded that the offi cial histories should 
continue. He also made a number of recommendations for their 
improvement, particularly noting that the rationale for the pro-
gramme remained unclear and that a new statement of purpose 
was required. For him the concept of accountability was central:
it follows inevitably that it will be possible to learn lessons from his-
tories written with the purpose of accountability in mind. Those with 
current responsibility in public life ought to be keenest to learn les-
sons but the lessons will be there to be learned and applied, whether 
by journalists, scholars or private individuals.43
He also made a number of signifi cant recommendations which 
are yet to be implemented. In particular, he recommended that 
subjects for offi cial histories be selected every two years (rather 
than every eight to ten) to ensure relevance, the profi le of the pro-
gramme be raised and more effort made by civil servants to take 
advantage of the scheme.44 
At the same time, another review was conducted into the pub-
lishing arrangements of the offi cial history programme by the lit-
erary agent Bill Hamilton.45 Hamilton also emphasised that the 
programme was not well utilised and that the histories needed to 
be communicated in other media as well as print: ‘If a central pur-
pose of the Histories is that they should provide lessons learned to 
practitioners within Whitehall and beyond, the written volume on 
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its own is unlikely to deliver this requirement.’46 For him, the value 
of the histories lay as much in the depth of knowledge accumu-
lated by the historian as the book itself and, therefore, the historian 
should provide consultation services and produce short, digestible 
briefs for busy policy-makers with reference to the relevant parts of 
the larger text.47
The Freedom of Information (FOI) Act 2000 has also had a 
signifi cant impact upon learning from history since Iraq. The Act 
provides access to information held by public authorities by oblig-
ing those authorities to publish specifi c information and entitling 
the public to request additional information. In some senses, this 
increased accountability of government and should have forced 
more refl ection upon learning as it allowed for the further scru-
tiny of the workings of Whitehall. However, in many ways, FOI 
has had the opposite effect for learning lessons. To avoid volumi-
nous information having to be sanitised for public release, for-
mal reporting has been reduced – including the abandonment of 
Ambassador annual reviews and valedictory despatches in 2006 
– leading to a loss of sources from which to identify lessons and 
write histories. Furthermore, codewords are widely used in order 
to avoid being found by FOI searches and informal, face-to-face, 
briefi ngs – without a written record – are now often preferred. 
As a result, the lessons of recent experience are expunged or go 
unreported and each new Head of Department arrives to a tabula 
rasa.48 In addition, the volume of evidence available to an inquiry 
akin to the Iraq Inquiry – specifi cally tasked with identifying 
lessons – is unlikely to be available again in the future.49
Conclusion
Parts of the British government do learn lessons – some of the 
time – from past experiences of interventions in the Middle East. 
The emphasis on learning from history has increased over time 
and there have been further changes, updates and improvements 
since the end of the Iraq War. Nonetheless, the British govern-
ment still regularly fails history and more needs to be done to 
reinforce, complement and improve recent developments. History 
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has current application and is relevant; events occur in a historical 
context and create the historical context for the future. The diffi -
culty is that historical lessons can be subjective, meaning different 
things to different people because lessons are interpreted as part of 
their identifi cation. In addition, in the FCO, MoD and IC, learn-
ing becomes irrelevant if the lessons cannot effectively and per-
suasively be communicated to the ultimate decision-maker – often 
the Prime Minister. Whilst a better relationship between the FCO, 
MoD, IC and No10 has begun to develop through the establish-
ment of the NSC, this must be further entrenched. 
However, it is not to be assumed that effective learning and 
communication of lessons will always signifi cantly impact the out-
come of future policy. Policy creation is a complex and contested 
process infl uenced by many factors including beliefs, political posi-
tions, domestic politics, bargaining power and persuasion as well 
as time and resource restraints. In addition, it is not to be claimed 
that learning lessons will provide a predicted outcome as there will 
always be unintended consequences, especially in the multifaceted 
environment of military interventions. 
Within the FCO, MoD and IC, identifying lessons from history 
will not be easy, but ensuring lessons are learned and stay learned 
will be even more challenging. History does not, as many historians 
are quick to point out, offer ‘school solutions’ but it does provide a 
database of how to conduct, or not conduct, interventions which 
can be contextualised to the requirements of today.50 Certainly, 
the past should be treated, as L. P. Hartley declared, as ‘a foreign 
country: they do things differently there’,51 but even Basil Liddell 
Hart conceded ‘History can show us what to avoid, even if it does 
not teach us what to do – by showing the most common mistakes 
that mankind is apt to make and to repeat.’52 In fact, whilst many 
historians would dispute Marx’s famous quote that history repeats 
itself, there are any number of regularities which lead one to align 
to the often cited Mark Twain maxim that history does not repeat 
itself, but it sure does rhyme. As Niccolò Machiavelli noted in 
1517 ‘Whosoever wishes to foretell the future must consider the 
past, for human events ever resemble those of preceding times.’53 
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